

SEPTEMBER 1959

The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ARTICLES • CRITICAL STUDIES • DISCUSSIONS • BOOKS
RECEIVED • DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1959 • ANNOUNCEMENTS

WILLIAM EARLE

CALVIN O. SCHRAG

GEORGE KIMBALL PLOCHMANN

JOHN E. SMITH

JAMES HADEN

H. J. McCLOSKEY

GEORGE A. SCHRADER

R. E. ALLEN

R. J. C. BURGNER

JOYCE E. MITCHELL AND STAFF

The Life of the Transcendental Ego
Existence and History

A Theory of Systems: A Rough Sketch
John Dewey: Philosophy of Experience
Copernicus—And the History of Science

Ethics, Metaphysics and Sociology
Existential Psychoanalysis and Metaphysics

Anamnesis in Plato's *Meno* and *Phaedo*

An Inceptive Theory of Thinking

Summaries and Comments

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1959

\$1.75

VOLUME XIII, No. 1 • ISSUE No. 49

The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Editor: PAUL WEISS

Managing Editor:

Joyce E. MITCHELL

Assistants: L. Kent Bendall, Fred
E. Brouwer, Richard DeGeorge, Robert
Ehman, Lewis Ford, Mustafa Girgin,
Karlton Harries, Robert Price.

The Review of Metaphysics is devoted to the promotion of technically competent, definitive contributions to philosophical knowledge. Not associated with any school or group, not the organ of any association or institution, it is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into root questions, regardless of the writer's affiliations.

| | |
|--|--------------|
| Subscription (yearly) | \$ 6.00 |
| Student subscription (yearly) | 4.00 |
| Sustaining Institutional subscription (yearly) | \$6.00 |
| Ten Year Index, 1947-1967 | 1.00 |
| Previous volumes | \$10.00 each |

Institutions may subscribe at the individual yearly rate; those, however, interested in the support of the Review may subscribe at the Sustaining Institutional rate of \$25.00 yearly, for which they receive two copies per issue.

Residents of Great Britain may arrange to receive the Review through our British representative, Dr. Ivor Leclerc, Glasgow University, Glasgow W.2, at a special rate.

The Review is sent free to foreign libraries now unable to pay for it, a service made possible in part by donations, and by Sustaining Institutional subscriptions.

Microfilms of complete volumes of the Review are available to regular subscribers only, and may be obtained at the end of the volume year in June. A complete set of Volumes I through VIII is also available at a cost of \$25.00 per set. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The *MLA Style Sheet* (Revised Edition), published by the Modern Language Association of America, 6 Washington Square North, New York 3, is the Review's authority on matters of style. Contributors are asked to follow the *Style Sheet* in preparing their manuscripts.

Articles appearing in the Review of Metaphysics are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*.

Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the editor and all other correspondence to the managing editor, 202 Linsly Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Material submitted for publication should be accompanied by return postage.

Copyright 1968, by the Review of Metaphysics

Published quarterly by the Philosophy Education Society, Inc., 202 Linsly Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

PRINTED IN LANSING, MICHIGAN, BY CHASMAN PRESS.

The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ARTICLES

- William Earle, *The Life of the Transcendental Ego* . . . 3
Calvin O. Schrag, *Existence and History* 28
George Kimball Plochmann, *A Theory of Systems: A
Rough Sketch* 45
John E. Smith, *John Dewey: Philosopher of Experience* 60

CRITICAL STUDIES

- James Haden, *Copernicus—And the History of Science* 79
H. J. McCloskey, *Ethics, Metaphysics and Sociology* . . 109
George A. Schrader, *Existential Psychoanalysis and
Metaphysics* 139

DISCUSSIONS

- R. E. Allen, *Anamnesis in Plato's Meno and Phaedo* . . 165
R. J. C. Burgener, *An Inspective Theory of Thinking* . 175

BOOKS RECEIVED

Joyce E. Mitchell and Staff, *Summaries and Comments* 185

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1959 194

ANNOUNCEMENTS 200

THE LIFE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

WILLIAM EARLE

IF, living in the world, I direct my explicit attention away from the real world and turn it upon my *consciousness* of that world, I can distinguish three features: I myself, the thinking subject; various acts of consciousness, such as perceiving, feeling, willing; and finally the world itself but now in the form of an appearance. And, following Descartes, we can say that so long as we reflect upon our perception we find that while we can not be certain of the real existence of anything we perceive simply on the grounds that we perceive it, nevertheless we can be certain that we, the thinking, perceiving subjects exist. It is within this reflection that the following analysis will move. We shall be concerned only with those features of consciousness which disclose themselves to that same consciousness reflectively turned upon it: the issue will be a description of certain features in that consciousness which in principle can be confirmed or disconfirmed by anyone.

The I in the reflectively revealed "I think" has had, as we all know, a rather checkered career. For Descartes, it was a "thinking substance". For Kant it was a "transcendental unity of apperception," an empty, formal unifying function whose occupation was *a priori* synthesis, and which was sharply distinguished from anything which might be called a "soul." With Husserl the pure I was again an empty, formal source of all intentionalities, a pure transparency devoid of depth; at least this was Husserl at the epoch of the *Ideen I*, although the *Cartesian Meditations* altered the matter in fundamental respects. But there has always been an opposing body of philosophers, empiricists, and now existentialists, for whom there is no I at all within consciousness; the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* demonstrates, they maintain, only that "there is thinking," an impersonal stream of conscious acts which need no I as their source or support. And finally, there is a third group which holds that while there is most certainly an I, it is not formal, nor empty nor even fully transparent to itself; it has certain

depths which are not accessible to its own direct reflection but can be "felt" or "touched" in certain experiences which engage the ego in its totality, or which shatter its own thin picture of itself. Jaspers and Marcel belong to this group. And so, while we began with a certitude, I think, we find at last that both the existence and character of this most certain of all things are questionable, or at least have been questioned. I propose then to reexamine the question, first briefly to ascertain that there is indeed an I or thinking subject; and then more extensively to follow certain clues as to its character in depth.

I. *The Existence of the Ego*

First then, is there an I? And, as it seems to me, Descartes was absolutely correct in reading the results of his reflection as giving an I. I need not attend to or notice my ego; it is perfectly possible to notice only certain acts of a thing; or, most frequently, we do not notice even the acts of thinking themselves but allow our attention to fall through to the object of which we are conscious. We are then "living in the world." Such is the freedom of attention to notice whatever it wishes. The destiny however of theories which deny either the subject, its acts of thinking, or an independent objective appearance, or which seek to identify one of these factors with the others, is invariably to reintroduce the denied feature under another name. Some idealisms, for example, which attempt to interpret the independent object of consciousness as itself an act of consciousness end up by distinguishing within "consciousness" two phases, a "subjective" and an "objective," whereupon the old independent, real object makes its reappearance but now dubbed "consciousness." And, with regard to the matter under discussion, theories which flatly deny the ego as origin, source, and center of consciousness end up in their courage embarrassed by a phenomenologically certifiable fact, the "mine." For is it not indubitable that it is the same I which *at the same time* perceives through a number of senses, feels emotions for what it perceives, and wills to act? And is it not equally certifiable that it is I myself which I remember seeing different things yesterday? And even though I am utterly mistaken

in this or that memory, the phenomenon of memory is the phenomenon of myself today recalling a past self; hence the phenomenon alone is sufficient to present the phenomenal meaning of an enduring I. But since we are concerned here only with the I as it appears, and *not* with an I hidden to itself, some posited substratum which in principle can never appear to itself, that is, is never acquainted with itself, the phenomenon and its structure is sufficient. Thus, if the I which is acquainted with itself phenomenally is acquainted with a self which is now conscious and is now conscious of having been conscious in a phenomenal past, in the name of what "real fact" is this structure to be denied? And as I have argued elsewhere, although a theory which credits in principle the deliverances of memory can very easily account for slips of memory, a theory which discredits memory in principle must necessarily deny the very *phenomenon* of memory.¹ Phenomenon does not connote illusion, but the givenness of a structure. If you like then, we shall be exploring here a dream, but it is a dream which includes within it such meanings as "fact," "reality," "error," "truth," etc.; in what sense then is it a dream?

To return then, the ego which is phenomenally acquainted with itself, is acquainted with itself as *owning* its present and its past acts; it says "mine" to them, and they are indeed its firmest possessions. In reflection then the ego grasps immediately the continuing stream of its conscious activity, a stream of acts which are themselves intrinsically diverse, encompassing memory, imagination, perception, conception, anticipation, feeling, volition, etc. All of these acts, themselves diverse, are recognized by the ego from which they proceed, as *its*. The ego then is the source and center of the streaming of its own conscious life.

Now there are a number of attempts to understand how all these acts, some in the past, some in the present, all numerically and qualitatively diverse, can be mine, that is, form a unity without a single thinking subject as their source. We shall look at three very briefly. The first is the associational theory, which holds that these diverse acts are mine simply by virtue of being

¹ "Memory," This Review, X, 1 (September 1956), pp. 3,27.

found associated together, that is, compresent or sequential. But such a notion can withstand very little dialectical probing. For if we suppress the I, we have left, of course, no principle of subjectivity; and so now, objectively considered, we must declare all those conscious acts to be mine which are compresent or sequential. But of course this is false, since there is no sense whatsoever in which all acts which are compresent in the objective world form parts of my consciousness. In a world in which the subject has been suppressed, all acts without qualification are either simultaneous with one another, or form part of a sequential stream; how then are we to understand that only a very tiny portion of all these events constitutes my consciousness?

Further, the only idea which the associationalist theory can employ to bind together all these acts is the simple and bare "and." My mind with its acts of consciousness is now a variety of acts which are simply "found" together, related to one another by the logical "and," either one after the other, or one at the same time as the other. But which of these discrete acts is supposed to say "mine" to the others? Or, if it is thought that the whole set says "mine" to each of its members, then we have turned the whole into a new act, independent of its members, a whole in a word which is no longer a whole at all but a fiction produced by a logical regress. It is clear that the relation "mine" is not reducible to anything remotely resembling the bare "and," a fact which is abundantly clear in other fields. If I own some property and call it mine, the situation would be described in the worst fashion possible as "I *and* some things," or rather two things, myself and my property, taken together, associated, or gathered into a summary whole, the owner and what he owns. For while "and" or association is the most external relation conceivable, representing nothing but the logical possibility of grasping together two discrete and unrelated things in one abstract totality, *mine* represents the most internal and intimate relation possible. Any discriminable entities whatsoever can be grouped together by "and"; but they are not thereby "mine," nor one another's, nor are they owned by their own summation.

If the bare principle of association cannot explicate the phenomenological datum that all my acts of consciousness are indeed

mine, neither can any principle of necessity which would bind them all together, without a subject, by some sort of mutual implication. All the acts of my conscious life are no more conglomerated together than they are implicated together as a triangle implies its properties or they the triangle. For, with regard to the same perceptual act, I can feel a variety of emotions, and for the same emotion, I may have a variety of perceptions and with regard to the same perceived situation, I may choose a variety of acts, etc. Further, a full perceptual act *does* necessarily imply an objective, independent appearance, but it is precisely that implied objective appearance which I do *not* claim as "mine," but regard as other to me. The relationship of mine is not that of necessity.

A third possibility is suggested by Sartre who rejects the ego as within consciousness. For Sartre, the evident unity of consciousness is sufficiently explained by the unity of its *intended object*. Thus the variety of actual perceptual acts focussed upon this lamp is unified through the intended lamp itself whose perceptual meaning is to be precisely an unending synthesis of actual and possible perceptions.² Partially following Husserl, Sartre maintains that it is the sense of the perceived thing as such to supply the unity of reference for all those perceptual acts which in principle can be directed to it. And while I should agree that perceptual acts are systematically related to one another through the role of the perceptual object supplying them with an identity of reference, it is equally clear, I believe, that this unity of reference is itself insufficient to account for the unity of my conscious field. For, first of all, we should then arrive at the comical conclusion that the variety of my conscious acts are *now owned by the perceived thing* rather than by me, since it is the source of their relationship. And, secondly, while it is true that at any time my perception is focally directed to a single thematic object, it is just as true that that single focal object is invariably and necessarily perceived within a *world* of objects', a world which forms no perceptual unity whatsoever, and is not itself a "thing" but

² Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*; New York: Noonday Press, 1957, pp. 38, ff.

rather an encompassing horizon of all possible perceptual things. If I look out of my window, I see not simply one thing but rather many things which in turn lead my perception on to other things, *ad infinitum*. These things are perceived by acts of perception which are all mine; yet the things are not one but many.

The truth is that all these attempts to unify consciousness without an ego or thinking subject end in the opposite of what they wish. Association turns out to be equivalent to the most external bond, disassociation; necessity implicates me in what is necessarily not me; and unity of reference dispossesses me of acts which are mine, in order to assign them not merely to one perceived thing, but eventually a world of things which is not even perceptually given. In the last case, however, other motives are at work; Sartre rejoices in his expulsion of the ego from consciousness, saying that at last phenomenology can no longer be reproached for pulling a part of man out of the world as a transcendental ego; now at last, he sings, we are *wholly* endangered within the world and anxiety can convulse us without limit. I shall argue that the subject ego is indeed transcendental, and can not be endangered by the world or anything in it.

But before exploring the subject, we should take brief notice of those thinkers who stoutly claim that they do not reflexively find themselves. But surely they are both looking for the wrong thing and looking in the wrong way. If we expect to see the self floating before consciousness as a small point of light, or a black speck, or perhaps an odd "feeling" we are surely looking for the wrong thing, and nothing of that order could possibly qualify as the self even if it should appear. The self must present itself to itself as a self and not as an objective other or datum. For if it appeared as an objective datum or other, I should then have to acquire evidence externally by I know not what means, that what was so appearing was indeed precisely I myself. Or, if we turn the same objectifying attention within, which we usually turn without on the world, a mode of consciousness which is not genuinely reflexive but prereflexive and necessarily directed to other objects, we shall never apprehend our own selves but only various data of what Kant called the "internal sense," in short, pleasures, pains, worryings, aches, thinkings, various vague somatic dis-

turbances, the so-called data of introspection. Paul Valéry, who spent ten years "looking within," finally exclaimed in despair that whenever he turned his attention within he could hear nothing but the rumblings of his bowels.

II. *Clues for the Transcendental Life of the Ego*

I shall now assume that there is indeed an I, a thinking subject which can assure itself of its own existence; but its character remains obscure. However, since its life consists of consciousness in all its infinite modalities, perhaps some clues can be derived from an exploration of certain general features of consciousness. And let me state my conclusions at once: in every concrete act of consciousness whether it be perception, emotion, or volition, a transcendental component can be discerned as a necessary factor for consciousness in its human sense, a transcendental component which issuing from the ego implies a *transcendental origin of the ego*. By "transcendental," I shall mean independent of any existent external reality and independent of the actual flow of conscious acts themselves; this transcendental factor reveals that the ego, insofar as it is the source of its own consciousness is neither in the existent world nor is it an epiphenomenon, part, element or factor of any mundane process or thing whatsoever.

If the ego is transcendental, then of course this is its essential ontological character which it must be capable of disclosing *throughout* its life, and not merely at some special moment such as before birth or after death, moments when it is *least* accessible to itself now. If the ego is eternal, then it is so eternally, which means including now. And if it has this ontological character, it should be capable of grasping it as soon as it authentically grasps itself. The transcendental character of the ego then is of such a character that it can be phenomenologically *revealed* to that ego at any moment, and not be a mere item for "belief" or "disbelief." Further, since I claim as mine *all* my conscious life, all of which issues forth from the ego directed to the world, all of these acts must be capable of disclosing the transcendental origin of the ego.

But there are notorious difficulties in the very project. I have alluded to one already; the ego must apprehend itself reflexively, but "reflection" is the name for two radically distinct

modes of self-consciousness, one of which looks *directly* at its own conscious life, thematizes it, objectifies it, and discovers nothing but the data of introspection. The other, which is essential for the meaning of this inquiry, is *inherently* indirect although no less intuitive. It is futile, I believe, to attempt to catch the ego at work by direct "gazing"; to roll the eyes backwards in the head is not to see the source of vision but simply nothing at all. On the other hand we are *certainly* aware of ourselves; hence, the reflection necessary is indirect, looking so to speak out of the corner of our eyes, trying to trace back to their origins all those features in our conscious life which we claim as essentially *ours*. The "mine" shall supply our clue. Still this indirect reflection is nothing but an attempt to clarify something which is hardly so arcane as the discussion might suggest. The self is *already* aware of itself as transcendental, even though it might not use this term, and expresses it as the primordial conviction that it is eternal. The child and the savage both exist in the certitude that they are immortal. We *later* lose this conviction in any explicit sense by what is called "experience," that is, the habitual turning of attention to things in the external world and to our bodies; in the world of external realities nothing eternal is visible, everything is coming to be and passing away, involved in birth and death. It is this massive deposit of experience which overlies the primordial conviction that the self is different. This objectifying habit then draws the only conclusion it can: the conviction of a transcendental origin for the ego was a childish, baseless superstition. I shall argue here that it is not, but is rather the final truth.

First of all, then, we can abstractly discriminate within the life of the self three conspicuously different modes of conscious act: (i) *cognition*, which either immediately and intuitively apprehends some object, as in perception, imagination, recollection, etc., or determines some object through inference; (ii) *emotion*, through which we feel values, as in love, hate, fear; and (iii) *volition*, in which we *decide* something, as in affirmation, denial, choice, resolution, etc. This is nothing but a provisional schema; I shall not argue its exhaustiveness, and nothing concluded here will depend upon it. Further, these modes of consciousness are distinguished only for ease of exposition. We shall

not assume that they represent concrete acts of consciousness which can occur separately. On the contrary, it seems obvious that with the possible exception of some limiting cases, *all* modes function in any concrete conscious act.

(A) *Cognition*. If we now begin with cognition, and select from the various modes of cognition the basic mode, perception, it may be possible to discover within it what we are looking for, namely, a transcendental intentionality. If I am simply perceiving a mountain, that is, living in and through this perception without any additional reflections, I shall simply be aware of a real mountain out there before me. I am engrossed in it, that real mountain, and if I have any awareness of my own act of perception it will be at best subsidiary. My awareness would be better expressed as "Mountain!" than anything like "I am now seeing a mountain." But if I now *reflect* upon my perception of the real mountain, the situation alters radically. For while in one sense, the mountain remains perceived and so the perception remains unaltered, in another everything receives a new interpretation. For now my own act of perception itself enters my consciousness in an explicit fashion, and with it the real mountain undergoes an alteration of meaning; for now, instead of simply being there, it is transformed into an *object for perception*, it becomes an "appearance" for the first time, an appearance or object which I *believe* to be the appearance of a real mountain. Hence in reflection, the mountain becomes a "datum" or "content" or "object" *for my consciousness*, and its reality becomes the correlate of an act of belief. Now it is a curious "correlate" since it is the very sense of "reality" to be *independent* of my consciousness. Nevertheless, the independence of the mountain must itself be consciously believed, if its reality or independence is to have any sense for me. If, further, I explicate what it is I believe when I believe in the reality of the mountain, I find that its independence involves the relative stability of the mountain in relation to my perceptual acts; the reality perceived has a life of its own, changes at its own rate, since it is not a mere adverb of my perception. Its existence does not depend, I believe, upon my perception of it. And further, in its independence, it will

have other properties than those it now offers me; it is not exhausted in its appearance, and it is really related to other real things eventually to form a "world" of real things. It finds its proper place within a horizon of realities stretching indefinitely beyond my present field of perception.

That present field of perception thus offers me certain determinate contents and appearances each of which has its *proper* mode of being; the shaped and colored thing I see, insofar as I actually see it, is independent of me precisely insofar as it is a determinate something. But what I actually see, as an intuitive content, I *take* to be the objective appearance of something more than what is intuitively offered; I automatically understand it to be the appearance of an existent reality. It is this reality of the thing which involves it in a world-reality which is *not* given to me in perception, but is rather the correlate of a belief. Thus numbers and other abstractions have their own proper and independent being, but they are not and are never taken as appearances of existent realities in the world. And imaginary objects are not taken as realities, but precisely as fictions. Conversely, if anything appeared which did seem to exhaust itself in its appearance, it would be interpreted as an imaginary object and unreal. The *meaning* of the imaginary is to be pure appearance, to conceal no hidden features, to form no independent world reality. The sense of the imaginary is to have nothing more in it than what I have put in it, implying the absurdity of looking for more. Hence I do not *inquire* whether a house I am now imagining is occupied or not; I know in advance that I can fill or vacate it at will. These are not empirical or contingent facts about perception, imagination, and conception, but form the *a priori* meanings of these acts, and it is in the light of these meanings that we try to determine in any given case whether we are indeed perceiving or only imagining, etc. We can of course be mistaken in any given case; but the mistake does not concern what it *means* to perceive or imagine, but rather whether this vague consciousness is in fact perceptual or imagining, or both at the same time.

The conclusion, then, is in fact a well-known one, that while every perceptual act when lived in believes in the reality of its object, reflection upon perception discloses that the real existence

of the intended object is not *given* at all, is not an object for intuition, but is the correlate of another mode of consciousness, *belief*. To be sure, the belief is not arbitrary or capricious; if the thing is real, as we believe, then it will show itself to us in an orderly and systematic series of perceptions, which will systematically agree with the perceptions of others. Hence the logic of belief in reality implies that we interpret orderly and systematic perceptions as evidence or clues for the reality of the object. But that reality is never itself given to intuition, and since it cannot be so given, Cartesian doubt or the Husserlian *epoché* may be exercised at any time without phenomenological inconsistency; no intuitive datum will be denied, if we withhold that belief. Husserl explored the matter in detail in his phenomenology; but the general conclusion is the common property of many epistemologies. With Santayana, for example, it is restated as the contrast between scepticism and animal faith. For Santayana, "material existence" is posited only through an act of faith, and can always be denied by a scepticism which restricts itself to the indubitable content of intuition.

We have now ended with the observation that while every perceptual act believes in the reality of its object, the real existence of the object and its implicated world can never form the *datum* for any intuitive, perceptual consciousness. The *reality* of the thing transcends and must transcend the perceptual content. Perception then is not perception without being infused with the transcending belief in the reality of its world; without that belief it reverts to dreaming or imagination. Hence the very *sense* of perception is possible only through a transcendental intentionality endowing its objects with the sense "reality." This sense "reality" is, as we have noted, a meaning, which must transcend any intuitive given content; it cannot, therefore, without absurdity, be regarded as "abstracted" from the data of perception. It is a meaning precisely transcendental to any such intuitive data; it is possible only as a belief *brought to* the data, and endowing those data with the meaning of being clues for an independent reality. Hence the sense of every perceptual act depends strictly upon a transcendental act of belief brought to its intuitive contents, not derivable by abstraction from them, and which those contents can

never adequately ground. And finally, it is clear that every realistic theory which supposes that since there is a world-reality independent of our perceptions, that that reality itself is the source of our belief in it, perhaps by stamping its meaning upon our senses or actually entering our consciousness in person, or by just exhibiting itself, in short all purely empirical, *tabula rasa* theories are *absurd in principle*. Consciousness does not and can not draw its *sense* of reality or its *belief* in it from any exposure to reality or from any *real* process at all; it must bring that meaning with it to intuitions, in order to give those intuitions the sense of being intuitions of reality. In Kant's terminology, reality, real existence, and world are all regulative ideas, incapable of being abstracted from data, but serving to give those data their sense of being the "data of real existence."

Within the heart of every perceptual act there is then a transcendental intentionality, a "belief" which animates the perception and gives it its sense of being the perception of something real. Such a belief penetrates perception through and through, such that every part of the perceived thing is also taken as a real part, and the englobing world is taken as a real world. Needless to say, all of this is not to be interpreted as a discursive inference; it is nothing but the implicit logic of perception by which perception is distinguished from both imagination and bare sensation. The real world in its independent existence then is a correlate of a transcendental act of belief brought by the ego to its intuitions, supplying them with their meaning, and incapable of being derived from them. It will supply us with our first clue that the ego itself has a transcendental origin and structure.

(B) *Emotion*. Acts of consciousness are intentional, that is, "aim" at something beyond themselves. Cognition aims at the truth of the object, and we have just argued that insofar as real existence goes, a transcendental intentionality is implicated in even the simplest acts of perception. Emotion on the other hand, does not aim at the literal truth of its object; emotion *feels the value* sustained by objects. The value which is felt is not itself an objective part of the object as it is for cognition. Stars are not made up of clouds of molecules and sublimity. Nevertheless it is

those fiery clouds which are sublime. The real object in its truth is an object for cognition; the value of the object is apprehended only through emotion, through love and hate. If then real objects are different from values, so is emotion different from cognition. Cognition moves ideally toward an intuitive apprehension of what the thing is, preserving however the distance between the knower and the known; it would ideally culminate in the pure spectator for whom all reality now appeared in its independent truth as what it was in itself. But emotion does not aim at its object in the fashion of a spectator looking at values. Love seeks to appropriate the good, and to shun the evil; to stare at good and beautiful things is the quickest way of obliterating their good and their beauty. And this occurs frequently enough when we visit museums; we are at last overcome with fatigue and boredom; and what had been exciting expressions, values, now collapse into mere cognitive objects, so many pictures or illustrations hanging on the walls. I now perceive everything I perceived before, I am not afflicted with any perceptual blindness, but the beauty is gone, and I now amuse myself by noting dates, information, or seeking the nearest exit. It was the emotions which became fatigued, not my perceptual powers. Similarly, to stare at a friend is itself an unfriendly act; it is to ignore his value. Emotions then do not stare at values or "cognize" them as curious objects; they are properly *moved* by them.

That values appear to us only through love or emotion is frequently denied by philosophers who feel that such a notion must entail the "subjectivity" of all values, that is, the relegation of values to the level of arbitrary tastes. But this particular conclusion would follow only if love were of the same nature as tastes, some sort of unaccountable "feeling" which arises in the psyche from unknown physiological causes, which differs from person to person, and which can make no claim to universal recognition. And so, anxious to preserve the universal validity of standards, they turn values into objective components of a reality accessible to pure cognition. Thus we come to a spate of vacuous theories which try to explain the beautiful through some quasi-mathematical formula, such as the Golden Section, or "greatest variety within unity," balance and opposition, etc., etc., in short, some

formula for objective properties which could be ascertained by a purely cognitive consciousness without emotion. But such theories end up in what they least desire, namely, the absolutely arbitrary; for having settled upon some pseudo-objective formula, the theory can no longer discover why that particular formula is indeed the formula of anything we feel is beautiful. Why indeed should this or that objective formula be felt as good, lovable, or beautiful? Thus such formulas take on the air of being private choices of the philosopher which can hardly claim the desired validity. Finally, to turn value into an objective component of reality has a curious logical consequence: things *have* value, or *are* valuable; but if the value is a constituent of the thing, then we slip into the regress of values having value which have value, etc., all of which multiplies words without sense. It is absurd to look for the value of value; value is what it is in the first place. One can inquire into the comparative values of things, and into which things have which values; but to inquire into the value of value is as sensible as to inquire into the reality of reality or the evidence of intuition. And so to attempt to preserve the universal validity of values by interpreting values as objective components or properties of things is both false phenomenologically as well as the worst way of achieving the desired end. Meanwhile, as we thrash around for the objective cognitive property of all good and beautiful things which needs only be known in cognition without emotion to appear as good and beautiful, we have neglected the only way in which values ever do appear to us, namely, through the emotions.

The general sphere of emotional consciousness is at least as complex as that of cognitive consciousness; but we can pick out two modes for analysis which will serve as exemplary for the rest, *desire* and *love*. Desire or appetite lives in its desire toward the desired. Insofar as I am simply thirsty, my thirst lives in a longing after what will quench it, the cold and wet, as Aristotle described it. Or I can happen upon a perfect rose in a garden and find it altogether pleasing. Each appetite, each desire is simply directed toward its proper object, and delights in finding it.

But our human emotional consciousness is hardly composed of these simple desires and appetites; in fact, it can well be doubted whether simple desires *ever* occur in human consciousness. For

with us, desires are invariably *modified* into another but related consciousness; in short, desire becomes love, repulsion becomes hate. Thus it isn't simply desires and repulsions which drive us mad, but love and hate. Desire becomes love and repulsion becomes hate, when they are transformed into infinite passions, that is, when the thing desired is felt to be *good*, and the thing which is repellent is felt to be *evil*, or when the pleasing sight is felt to be *beautiful*. The difference then between something desired and something good, is that the latter is subsumed under an *absolute* category, the Good, whereas desire does not even ask the question. Good, evil, beauty, ugliness, etc., are all absolute categories, pure ideals; to feel this particular thing as good is to love it from the point of view of the ideal; the ideal is necessarily absolute and infinite, and to love this thing as good is to light it up with an absolute fire. The good, the beautiful, the evil, the ugly are never in principle objects for the appetites; they remain ideal objects of love and hate; they are, that is, the intentional correlates of these particular emotions. The good can no more be apprehended by appetite alone than reality can be perceived by the eyeballs.

There are certain limited parallels with cognitive perception. *Sensation*, the bare registration of sensible variations is not perception which aims at *this existent thing*. Perception, as we have just seen, intrinsically involves the notion of reality, which is not a datum of sensation. With that notion, it perceives what it believes to be and what are realities. But pure sensation is never found within human consciousness except perhaps at certain extremities. Similarly, bare appetite, or pure desire, no matter how much some wish it, is never found in human consciousness except again at the edges; these modes are radically modified into love and hate, and with that modification, the object of emotional consciousness is transformed from the desired into the desirable or good; the simple desired is now felt to be good, which implicates the Good itself, the intentional end of love. Our emotional life is therefore penetrated through and through with what we might as well call "morality," that is, with the feeling of good and evil, the beautiful and ugly; and this penetration is nothing more than the modification which all desires undergo into love and hate. All

human emotional consciousness is under the aegis of criteria, of comparison, of norms and standards; and what are these but various formulations and consequences of good and evil, the proper objects of love? Hence also our longing to sink below good and evil or rise above it, only to find that we have but substituted another ideal for an old one, but not escaped the dominance of absolute value itself.

To return now to our chief theme, can it not be argued that concealed within any human emotional consciousness is a transcendental emotional intentionality aiming at a transcendental meaning, the good or evil, a meaning or value which *in principle* cannot be the object of appetites, but which nevertheless supplies our entire appetitive life with its moral significance? If the good is to serve as a *criterion* for the estimation of the objects of appetite, how indeed could it be itself one more such object? Love and hatred are transcendental passions, directed to transcendental ideals; they are not themselves particular appetites. And this appears with startling clarity in those cases where these passions are directed toward the *world as such*, that is, in world pessimism and world optimism.

I shall call "world pessimism" any form of pessimism so radical that it opposes not merely this or that arrangement of the world, but the world as such, any possible world, the essence of world. In the transcendental sentiment that the world is rotten, pessimism can then select out any necessary feature of worldliness and find it intolerable, or perhaps the very source of the infection. It might be the principle of individuation, as in Schopenhauer; or the distances which separate this from that as with those who, like Baudelaire, dream of *flying* not merely from here to there but out of the world altogether; or time may be the intolerable feature as with ecstasies who can not endure passing from moment to moment and wish history collapsed into one eternal summarizing vision; matter can appear as intolerably gross, heavy, and obscene; Jean-Paul Sartre experiences the *en-soi* as sticky and nauseating. Causality sets intolerable restrictions on wishes, and gamblers live in a fantasy of the omnipotence of thought where the power of wishing is sufficient to change the world. At the core of world pessimism is not some finite desire for its improvement, but rather

a negation which transcends not merely what has been experienced but what is in principle *experienceable*, the structure of the world as such. Hence as soon as a world is envisaged, it becomes an object of loathing. That such passions have nothing to do with any induction from actual experience but are transcendental in intention, encompassing the world-reality as a whole, is clear by extrapolation to the limit. Even Heaven, which should be found up to the mark, is now the scene of new horrors. Some would find the excess of light blinding, or offensive the presence of others enjoying the view. Satan felt the eternal *superior* presence of his creator insufferable, God always having to exercise *mercy* and *pity* to sustain his very being, and we are told he threw himself into another world, only to writhe in that too. Is it not the very essence of world which such spirits detest?

Transcendental passions are equally and more pleasantly visible in the opposite, world love, where everything is found good, that which has been encountered and that which has not; everything which is, was, and will be is embraced in a love which finds it perfect just as it is without alteration or criticism. Nietzsche aspired to this innocence, and Whitman wrote out of it; Kant is supposed to have died saying, "*Alles ist gut*"; St. Francis and many religious thinkers come to mind. Again, we find a passion which is in principle different from any appetite, which does not direct itself to any finite object and can find nothing short of the world-reality itself as its object. The magnitude of this object is a measure of the transcendental level of the passion; good and evil, in themselves, are transcendental meanings which could be carried only by the world-reality itself.

But love and its object, the good, function in every human evaluation, in a way analogous to the functioning of reality in every perception. It is the norm, criterion, or ultimate end which is implicitly activated by every desire and appetite; through this norm every object of desire is *modified* into a good or an evil; every such experience finds its implicit place and implicit rank through the function of the norm itself, which thereby supplies the conditions of moral feeling. This norm, the good, is the *a priori*, transcendental object of a transcendental passion, love; it is not and cannot be regarded as "abstracted" by "induction" from

objects of appetite, objects which without the good are neither moral nor immoral, but if already good *presuppose* that norm. Love and the good, hate and the evil, are intentionalities brought by the ego to appetitive experience, supplying that experience with a unique moral meaning. The transcendental passion of love then which animates every emotional consciousness supplies us with our second clue as to the origin and structure of the ego from which it proceeds.

(C) *Volition*

Some values, such as those of beauty, can be borne by the purely imaginary; it is sufficient if the mere appearance present the value to our emotional consciousness. But with moral values, clearly it is insufficient for them to be sustained by an imaginary world; that is, it would be *morally better* if the good deed were not merely imagined but actually done. Hence for the value to be completed, the bearer of it must be real. And when the bearer of it is not real, the value serves as an invitation for us to act, to bring into actuality that which might have the value. The love of justice thus is an incitement to act justly.

And, as the tradition has repeatedly made clear, *action* is not the same as *movement*. I can be bound and carried about, and while I am then moving I am not acting, and am *not aware* of acting but of being under compulsion. The compulsion can come just as easily from within as when a tic moves my face; I do not claim the resulting facial expression as mine, or as an expression. But I do claim as mine those movements which I initiate and control, which are either willed or consented to. Thus my body is mine primarily because I can move it, and its susceptibility to voluntary control is itself a phenomenological fact, providing that by "body" we do not mean "substance in the real physical world," a meaning which inherently and essentially loses itself in an indefinite number of hypothetical relationships and beliefs, but rather the body which I feel is mine, which I use, and with which I live in my experienced world. These two senses of "body" are of course related; and obviously we have but a single body; but the sense of body which is logically prior is that meaning "body I live with," for it must be from my life with it that any other more

abstract meaning can be derived. But it would carry us too far away from our present purposes to discuss these matters more fully. Suffice it to say then that in some very obvious sense, I do not find that I can will my hair and nails to grow and never dream of supposing I can. Nor do I claim these movements as actions. Nor, for the most part, do I beat my heart, as an action; I find it beating on its own, and most willingly consent to it. I can of course stop it at any moment, so it beats only for so long as I consent. We should not, I suppose, call this an action, although it is a movement which falls within the general scope of the voluntary. And moving up the scale of control, we find that our appetites are susceptible of *some* control although they have their given comparative strengths. Still these strengths are not fixed once and for all by nature, but to a degree can be "indulged" or "curbed." And so we have a degree of freedom over them although there are just as obviously limits as well. There are bounds beyond which no one can desire to eat more and under which no one would choose less unless he were at the same time choosing his own death. And more conspicuously, the limbs seem to have little or no natural movement of their own, but to be wholly at our voluntary disposition, although they too have their natural limits. The eyes can be rolled about at will, following our attention; and attention itself is a voluntary act. Many experiences seem to solicit our attention with a peculiar insistence, such as anything menacing or desirable; but these solicitations must not be understood as *compulsory forces*, since they express nothing more than a prior, pervasive, and non-deliberative choice on our part to live, to avoid pain, and to pursue the pleasant. A violent and insistent withdrawal of those prior choices reduces to nothing the solicitations of those experiences. Such a withdrawal is effected by a suicidal choice, or in a disciplined and cultivated apathy.

Hence any static morphology of the will is insufficient. What we find in fact is that at any moment when I am choosing, I am choosing upon a basis of other past choices, upon a mass of funded volitions and consentments. A cobbler chooses to drive a nail in the heel of the shoe not simply upon the basis of an isolated decision to pound now, but also upon funded decisions from the past: the promise to the customer yesterday to fix the shoe today, and that

upon prior decisions, to learn the trade, acquire the tools, to set up shop. And tracing these back we finally arrive at the most fundamental of all, the decision or consent *to live at all*, that upon which all other decisions rest as upon their premise. Now it should be noticed that this entire structure of choices and decisions although recognized as *his* by the agent, is not necessarily a result of *deliberation*. The sort of choice which results from deliberation is but *one, focal* mode of the voluntary consciousness and is not identical with the voluntary as such. Thus I will to live and can uncover this will behind all of my particular practical decisions; but I may never have explicitly deliberated the matter. *It nevertheless remains a free choice*, since under no circumstances do I apprehend that choice as a compulsory force over me. My will to live is very badly misrepresented if it is regarded as a "vital force" which more or less carries me along like a victim borne unwillingly on a raft down some raging river. My will to live is an affirmation of mine, one of my most intimate and precious affirmations; I may never have explicitly deliberated and chosen it, but I can explicitly and deliberately *renounce* it. It is therefore an expression of my freedom, and not an alien, external force.

Secondly, it should be noted that while any present deliberation presupposes as its ground a mass of funded decisions or consents, these funded choices are not forces over my present freedom but expressions of it. For it is as if my present freedom had to *pass through* these past choices to get to its present; the passing through, of course, is not explicit or discursive; nevertheless they must be implicitly affirmed if the present matter under decision is to be apprehended. I cannot choose to pound this nail, if I am seriously wondering whether to be a cobbler or not. However, at any moment, any one of these deeper commitments can be uncovered explicitly and thematically, and *can* be posed as a matter for deliberation. Nothing is fixed or frozen solid; life can present at any time a situation which can *question* any prior commitment whatsoever. Karl Jaspers calls situations which question our deepest and most fundamental commitments *Grenzsituationen*, crises which *may* serve to dredge up what we thought was decided once and for all, and to question us again as to exactly where we stand.

Always however as we revert to deeper and deeper levels of commitment, we rediscover what is most intimately *ours*; we never come upon anything remotely like a material compulsion or alien force. Or rather, when we do uncover such a compulsion (following one interpretation of psychoanalysis) and find an independent system of behavior beyond our control, the very uncovering of it is the condition for a possible new act by which I can now reject the choice lying at its root, and thereby restore my free control over myself. The deeper we go, the more profoundly we discover what we are, that is, what we have chosen to be. And *close* to the bottom is our affirmation of our own life with its characteristic ontological style. It is itself rarely the absolute basis since, as an affirmation, it also is revocable under certain questioning situations.

Most intimately mine, then, is my basic continuing affirmation of my own life, an affirmation which is free because always in principle *revocable*. No man *in principle* is a prisoner of his own life, and if *in fact* he feels himself bound to it, it is he himself who tied the knot. The affirmation of life can be withdrawn and is in fact withdrawn in two very different circumstances, despair, and sacrifice.

If the affirmation of life is hope, despair is the withdrawal of hope; but in both instances, we are confronted with a radical problem. For does either hope or despair know what it hopes for or despairs of? The answer seems clear enough if we confine our attention to finite successes and failures; this man hopes to get that job, or may despair of getting it. Here hope is equivalent to wish, and despair to disappointment. But the hope and despair which lie at the foundations of life are directed toward no such finite purposes. I should maintain that there is absolutely no finite experience which would supply the goal and "satisfy" that hope which is identical with the affirmation of life itself; nor is there any finite failure which is identical with the despair which is properly suicidal. Finite events may be the *occasion* for a renewal of hope or for precipitation into despair, but only insofar as those finite events are *interpreted* as meaning more than themselves, that is, insofar as they function symbolically for the absolute goal of hope and despair. These absolute goals themselves cannot be

identified with any particular experience. A sign of this is the fatuity of any answer we may give ourselves to the question: Why are we living? The answer need only be stated for it to appear at worst preposterous and at best questionable. And all our habitual philosophic formulae such as "happiness," "pleasure," "success," "to love and be loved," "to be of service to others," "to be saved," "to adore God," "to comprehend all," etc., etc., must necessarily ring hollow; they appear adequate only insofar as they are given a resonance and meaning wholly beyond what they say. In short they are but symbols indicating an unformulable end. "Hope springs eternal," that is, *may* spring eternal; and it springs eternal because it is in principle *indefeasible* by any finite failure; similarly, despair is equally indefeasible by any finite success. The truth is that neither hope nor despair, properly so-called, has anything to do with an empirical calculation of successes or failures; hope soars highest in the blackest hours; and despair settles in during the sunniest. These are then intentionalities which animate or destroy life but are not in the least products of it. Like all transcendental intentionalities, they have their a priori origin in the ego, and express its ontological superiority to life and finite experience.

The ontological height of the ego is most gloriously revealed in heroism, where the self revokes its own most precious life in favor of a value it deems superior. The self, acting according to its most authentic and intimate decisiveness, can sacrifice what is its own for others, and thus exhibit to the most inveterate naturalist that its freedom issues from an origin higher than life. The naturalist invariably interprets heroism as a kind of mindless madness, where the ego is overpowered by "emotions," that is, by the effects of slogans, edifying phrases, and the childish wish to be spectator at its own funeral. But these "explanations," which issue more out of the desire to debunk if not degrade, than out of any spirit of clarity, are not taken seriously by the naturalists themselves, who weep along with the rest of the world when they read of or see heroism. Heroism makes visible to all the transcendental source of the self; how indeed can the freedom which is heroic be regarded as the product or reflection of vital drives when it is precisely these which are to be sacrificed? "But the animals die

for one another"—which is true, and so perhaps they are heroic too beyond what they know; or rather, since we have no very firm access into their consciousness, and assume they act upon instinct, they should be analogized to the waves of the sea, where one falls so that another may rise. But the heroic thing in heroism is not the objective disappearance of one individual for another, but that it is *chosen*. It is the factor of free choice which radically transforms the meaning of the event; and indeed if one wave *freely chose* to fall so another might rise, we would then have the same astonishing phenomenon as we have in self-sacrifice. Nor is this meaning cancelled out when the hero returns home after the war to become the town drunkard, ne'er-do-well, loafer; how can one find anything within village life comparable to the one moment when the whole was at stake? We must regard it as sufficient to demonstrate once within life a standpoint and origin transcendent to it.

Hope, with its concomitant possibilities of despair and heroism, rests then at the bottom of every life and is the premise of every action. It is a free transcendental intentionality animating and discernible in every particular act. To choose life, to reject it, or to sacrifice it, are those radical free acts upon which human life rests; the choice of life is however the most *abstract* choice and is hardly separable from the choice of a *style* of life, and thus we proceed to reconstruct the living structure of all those funded volitions, consents, and choices which constitute the massive and implicit ground of this present living choice now. A radical and ultimate freedom, then, supplies the third clue to the transcendental origin and structure of the ego from which it proceeds.

III. Conclusion

Animating every perception is the belief in the reality of the thing perceived and in a real world; animating every human emotion is a love for a Good which never appears; and animating every free act is an indefeasible hope in what can not be formulated. Now is it too much to see in these transcendental intentionalities simply three expressions of one and the same freedom? In all three, an act supervenes upon the pure given, the experienced, the

finite, to give a sense to that given which it does not, as given, carry by itself. The perceptual given is taken as an appearance of the real; the pleasing and gratifying is felt to be good; this or that is decided through a pervasive hope. The sense and meaning, then, of the given is supplied through an intentionality which "fits" the given without being determined by it.

Now further, cognitive belief, emotional love, and active hope are all existential intentionalities; a purely eternal principle could obviously *believe* in nothing, love or wish to possess nothing, and hope for nothing; in place of belief, there would be intuitive vision "*sub specie aeternitatis*"; in place of the eros inherent in love there would be adoration; and hope would be modified into fulfillment. It is much as if an eternal ego then when it directs its own structure and "attention" to existence brings with it these transcendental intentionalities. Its existential knowledge, perception, is not an intuitive vision of reality, but necessarily aspires toward it; the difference is measured by its belief; its pleasures are not susceptible of adoration, but precipitate the maddening love-hate which would hold on to them forever all the while wishing for something else; and its actions are all predicated upon a free choice by which the ego binds itself to life, for it knows not what reason. In all three intentionalities we can, I believe, see the essentially split character of the living self, half in the world and half out of it. Human existence is not the purely "empirical" purely "finite"; it is precisely the irony and ambiguity of a *transcendental principle existing*. Perhaps the unformulable goal of its hope is to return again to its own proper mode of eternal being, but now carrying with it the fruits of its life. The curious twist by which hope turns into nostalgia, has been remarked too often for it to be insignificant. If poets see nostalgia for the eternal everywhere, should philosophers be content with less?

The transcendence of the ego is not itself, of course, a contingent property; if it is transcendent, then indeed it is so through its *essential* character. So, just as it is the essential character of finite things to come to be and pass away, and therefore not have eternal being, it is the essential ontological character of the ego to be eternal, if indeed it is transcendental to life and experience as it seems. We have been looking at the phenomenological evidence

that it is eternal, transcendental and "immortal" just as it primordially believes.

But man as a whole is not a transcendental ego; he is more like those souls in the Platonic myth which have chosen their lives and are now living them. Hence, in contrast to naturalistic analyses, it seems more plausible to regard man as a miserable god, divine in his affirmation of reality, his love of the Good, and his freedom to choose and renounce existence; miserable and ludicrous precisely in his separation from these very ideals.

Northwestern University.

EXISTENCE AND HISTORY

CALVIN O. SCHRAG

TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHERS have argued that the problem of existence is one of the central problems of philosophy. In certain contemporary philosophical circles, both abroad and in the United States, there has been a renewed interest in the problem. Some of these contemporary philosophers, such as the existentialists, are concerned solely with the question of human existence; others, such as Paul Weiss, are concerned with existence as a more general category of interpretation. Philosophers, for whom the horizons of the philosophical enterprise extend beyond linguistics and logical analysis, find in these contemporary discussions not only a healthy renewal of interest in a basic philosophical problem but also seminal insights which cast new light on issues which heretofore have remained obscure.

The central task which defines the intention of my investigation has to do with a statement and further elucidation of some of the central issues arising in an analysis, description, and interpretation of human existence. My argument throughout will be that human existence must be understood from an historical point of view, and I will seek to delineate the peculiar methodology and distinctive categories of interpretation which are demanded by such an approach. The human self is historical and must be understood through its history. Ever since philosophers have taken history seriously there has been an increasing awareness that any philosophy of human existence, if it is to remain true to the immediately given data, must be rooted in man's concrete, historically lived experience. This development of the historical consciousness has added a new dimension to man's attempt to understand himself in his existence. But it has also posed certain unavoidable questions for the philosopher. Chief among these is the question concerning the relation of history and ontology. Is an ontology of historical existence possible? Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the seminal historical thinkers of the modern age, answered the above question in the negative by arguing that existence, as an

historical *Erlebnis*, is never more than a discontinuous succession of subjectively lived experiences. He thus bequeathed to his historically minded successors the difficult problem of reconciling history and ontology. Does the concrete-historical, by virtue of its particularity and subjectivity, render impossible any rational clarification? Or is the concrete-historical in some sense a bearer of universal structures which define the ontological condition for historical existence as such? This is the problem of our investigation. Stated in its broadest formulation, our question has to do with the possibility of an ontology of human historicity. Are there discernible structures of being which underlie and qualify man's concrete historical actualization? The intention of the author is to show that such an ontology is possible. This will be done by clarifying the methodological procedures and developing the categorial analysis which is required by such a program.¹

The point of departure for any philosophy of human existence resides in an interrogation of the concrete-historical, for it is the concrete-historical as the locus of personal decision and commitment which constitutes the very stuff of human experience. It is on this level that the self first confronts itself. The self initially finds itself as a going concern preoccupied with concrete activities. Primitive self-awareness is an operation-event, or a process of entertaining and pursuing practical projects in a concrete historic

¹ On this point I am in full agreement with Paul Weiss in his contention that existence is intelligible. However, I disagree with his judgment that "this contention stands in opposition to the claims of the existentialists" (*Modes of Being*, [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958] p. 198). With the possible exception of Sartre, the existentialists do not deny that existence possesses structures of intelligibility. Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* consists of an explicit attempt to delineate these intelligible structures, which he refers to as *Existenzialen*. And already in Kierkegaard we are informed that "an existing human being does indeed participate in the Idea" (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. David Swenson, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941] p. 295). The confusion arises, argues Kierkegaard, when one attempts to mediate thought (Idea) and reality (Existence); when one forgets that "he is not himself an Idea" (*ibid.*). But the observation that man participates in the Idea clearly suggests that for Kierkegaard existence is intelligible. The difficulty in Kierkegaard, and in most of the existentialists, is that the implications of this insight remain undeveloped, but this is not a difficulty intrinsic to the program of existentialist philosophy as such, as Weiss seems to suggest.

situation. I will refer to the mode of awareness which characterizes this level of the concrete-historical as *historical participation*. Historical participation is a pre-cognitive or pre-reflective mode of awareness in which the self is first aware of its existence and the existence of other selves, through its acts of involvement. The reality element in this historical participation consists of a series of decisions which bind the self in commitment to family, occupation, vocation, community, nation, and religion. This is the level of the concrete act of existing—the level of man's *primitive* awareness. Self-awareness, on this pre-cognitive level, is an awareness of one's *participation in existence*—a participation relative to certain biological, psychological, and sociological factors which circumscribe the self's activities. For example, in the concrete immediacy of my historical participation I find myself in a situation in which I experience melancholy or boredom. The experience of this melancholy or boredom occurs on the level of a pre-cognitive or pre-reflective immediacy. I am experiencing this boredom through direct participation. On this level of pre-reflected immediacy the awareness and the activity are one. There is no distinction between a subject which is aware and an object of the subject's awareness. The subject-object dichotomy as an epistemological distinction has no relevance on this level of experience. The self is aware in and through its activity of participation alone.

But there is another mode of awareness in man's historical self-understanding. This mode of awareness I shall call *historical reason* so as to distinguish it from historical participation. Historical reason as distinct from historical participation is a mediated or reflected immediacy rather than a pre-cognitive or non-reflected immediacy. Historical reason in its reflective operation seeks to "read off" from the concrete historicity of the experiencing self the universal structures which underlie this concrete historicity and denote its existential possibilities. In my historical participation I find myself in a particular situation experiencing melancholy or boredom; through the operation of my historical reason I am able to universalize and abstract the immediacy of my experience and hold myself out, so to speak, and see myself objectively as this melancholic or bored self, which in its concrete historicity is

subject to the possibilities of these two forms of existential disquietude. In historical reason the noetic distinction between subject and object has limited applicability. The applicability is limited because the term, object, when applied to the self is in no sense to be understood as an object in *rerum natura*. Through the reflective operation of historical reason the self becomes a *logical* object but never a *cosmological* object. The self becomes objective to itself so as to universalize and conceptually clarify its subjectivity. But the self remains an historical subject and can never be objectivized as a cosmological object. Kant had already shown this in his transcendental dialectic where he argued for the primacy of the subject and the inability to derive the subject from the categorial scheme. The intrinsic historicity of the self precludes any objectivization through which the self is understood as an instance of finite substance in general. It is for this reason that the cosmological categories of substance and attribute are inapplicable to human existence. (This does not, however, vitiate their applicability to the realm of non-human nature which is at least relatively immune from historical becoming.)

The distinction between historical participation and historical reason can be elucidated further by the observation that historical participation experiences existence from the inside, while historical reason seeks, insofar as it is possible, to look at existence from the outside. Historical reason proceeds by way of analysis, description, and interpretation of the contents of historical participation, and thus seeks to elucidate the particularity of the concrete-historical in thought modes which have universal validity. This elucidation by way of analysis and description constitutes the touchstone of the phenomenological method—the method which must be consciously employed by historical reason if it is to arrive at the original data of experience. Phenomenology seeks to describe man's immediate lived experience as it shows itself (*phainesthai*) in the concrete act of existing. The guiding motif of the phenomenological method was already formulated by Husserl in his classical maxim: "*Zu den Sachen selbst*" (to the data themselves). Phenomenology, as the name implies, seeks to discover the *logos* or the intelligible structures in the phenomena. But insofar as the phenomenon under consideration in an ontology of

human existence is the concrete, dynamic, historical participation of the subject, the describer can never achieve a neutral vantage point outside the dynamic process. A description of existence can never be the detached and impartial description of scientific objectivity, insofar as the describer is at the same time the subject matter of the description, and as such is concretely involved. Phenomenological description is always inextricably bound up with the pre-conceptual self-understanding arising out of man's immediate preoccupations. Hence, there is no historical reason independent of historical participation. Historical reason without historical participation is empty, and conversely, to keep the Kantian symmetry, historical participation without historical reason is blind. As soon as reason loses its foundation in the historic situation then it becomes a species of pure, abstract, reified reason which is finally irrelevant for a phenomenological description of existence; as it did, indeed, become in the later Hegel. In Hegel's *Science of Logic* we see reason abstracted with a resounding violence from the dynamic process of existential becoming, and the concretely thinking subject evaporates. The existentialism of Kierkegaard constituted a valid protest against Hegel's abstract and reified reason. Kierkegaard again placed reason back into existence.

Historical reason, in its effort to penetrate the particularity of the concrete-historical, seeks to discern certain universal structures which qualify the self's concrete historical actualization. This is possible because the concrete-historical is the bearer or the foundation of the universal. Self-knowledge involves seeing the universal in the particular. The self, through the operation of historical reason, "reads off" from the particular and concrete act of existing the universal structures or universal possibilities which constitute the ontological horizon of the self's ontic or concrete preoccupations and concerns. These universals of historical reason must not be confused with Platonic universals understood as ideal essences. So also they must be clearly distinguished from Aristotle's class concepts, differentiated into genera and species, culminating in the *infimae species* as the definition of the particular. Even aside from the inapplicability of Aristotle's cosmological interpretation to the datum of history, his mode of analysis presents problems of its

own. Actually the *infimae species* never does constitute a definition of the particular. Aristotle himself recognized that there must be a jump from the *infimae species* to the particular, resulting in the curious situation that what for him is primary in the order of being remains unknowable. The thesis which I am suggesting is that the universals of historical reason be understood as *interpretive categories, denoting structures of actualization, present in the concrete, which qualify the existence of the concrete in its real becoming*. They are structures which are given in the subjective or lived experience of the concrete existent, and it is in this subjective experience that they find their ultimate validation and justification. This is the final meaning of Kierkegaard's doctrine of truth as subjectivity. Historical universals are not derived through any inferential knowledge. They are "read off" directly from man's concrete experience through phenomenological investigation. And they can be "read off" because they are given in the concrete and ontologically rooted in the concrete.

There is a sense in which one can speak of the universals of historical reason as *transcendental conditions* of man's concrete historical experience. In using this language I have of course betrayed my debt to Kant's transcendental method, but this really ought not surprise one insofar as all phenomenology, whether that of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, or Otto, stems from an underlying *transcendentale Philosophie* which found its first elaborate expression in the thought of Immanuel Kant. As Kant in his transcendental aesthetic and his transcendental logic sought to derive the forms of intuition and categories of the understanding which would provide the indispensable conditions for knowledge of the empirical world, so a phenomenology of existence seeks to delineate the transcendental elements which make possible the structuring of concrete historical existence. A transcendental condition, in a phenomenology of existence, denotes the horizon of real possibilities which structure the self in its dynamic historical actualization. It describes the *being* of that self which has history. "To exist" means to be subject to certain qualifications of becoming, which are apprehended through historical reason as the transcendental or underlying conditions for direct historical experience. Indeed, it is these transcendental conditions as qualifica-

tions of becoming which make the self's historical experience what it is. These transcendental conditions, which I will seek to delineate, include the notions of temporality, finitude, non-being, freedom, anxiety, guilt, resolve or courage, creativity, sympathy, and love. Each of these notions must be subject to a careful phenomenological description if one is interested in elucidating the data of human experience. I will discuss only a few of these notions, attempting to show briefly their ontological significance.

However, before proceeding to a delineation of some of these notions, a further point of clarification is needed. I have spoken of the historical universals as REAL possibilities. The adjective, REAL, simply distinguishes them from IDEAL possibilities. The universals of a phenomenological ontology, as we have already suggested, are not Platonic ideal essences, nor must they be confused with Kantian ideals of reason. The relevant distinction involved is the distinction between the mode of reality and the mode of ideality. Phenomenological or historical universals are morphological or descriptive structures, but not prescriptive ideals. They define the horizon of actual reality but not the region of ideality.² They are the real possibilities inherent in the process of actualization of existential being. This does not mean, however, that they have no relation to ideal possibilities. In fact they do, insofar as value judgments are unavoidable in existential actualization, pointing to a differentiation of being into ideal essence and real existence. But the task of the phenomenologist of existence, *qua phenomenologist*, is to analyze and describe the real possibilities in existence. He can make no pronouncements either for or against a value system or set of ideals. He can describe the aware-

² The modal distinction between actuality and ideality has been sharply formulated in Weiss's *Modes of Being*. Actuality comprises all substantial entities individualized in their spatio-temporal field. Ideality is the realm of abstract possibility—in abstraction from actuality and existence as well as from God. The all-inclusive ideal possibility, (which is an idealization of actuality, existence, and God) is the Good. The Good, and ideal possibilities as such, have a nature and status of their own. They are universal essences which are ingredients of actuality, but are distinct from the act of existing. A real possibility, as another species of possibility, is "what in fact can be" (p. 106), and as such is bent toward realization, and hence, unlike an ideal possibility, is subject to the contingencies of historical becoming.

ness of the ought and the awareness of the estrangement between the "is" and the "ought" as it is disclosed in the phenomenon of conscience, but he cannot provide the valuational content or material. His descriptions are trans-moral.

Temporality emerges as a fundamental ontological element or historical universal in a phenomenology of existence insofar as it is time which gives existence its peculiar historical character. Whereas space is the indispensable category for the understanding of the phenomena of nature, time is the indispensable category for the understanding of history. The self in its historicity always experiences itself as arriving from a past and moving into a future. In every moment of self-consciousness the self holds within itself a past. Through this past the self is already "given" to itself in both its actualized and non-actualized decisions. I *am* those concrete possibilities which I have chosen, but I also *am* those possibilities which I have neglected to choose. Human being, as Plato had already suggested in the *Sophist*, is constituted both by what is and what is not. Both the actualized and non-actualized possibilities of my past constitute my "givenness" or my destiny. This is what Heidegger has called the "facticity" (*Faktizität*) of human reality. Man discovers himself as an historical event which has arrived from a past through which he has been shaped and given form. There is a sense in which man's real essence resides in his having been, and thus Hegel's assertion that "*Wesen ist gewesen*" would seem to be fundamentally valid. But temporality not only qualifies my existence as having been; it also qualifies my existence as being-not-yet. Existence has pastness but it also has futurity. The self anticipates possibilities which it can actualize in its freedom. Selfhood is remembering that which one has become and anticipating that which one is yet to be. It is thus in temporality that we find the basic structure of historical existence—a structure which can be expressed most adequately in terms of a set of polarities. The self as historical existence is a polarity of past and future, givenness and projection, necessity and possibility, destiny and freedom, memory and anticipation. It is because of this temporal structure that any reductive naturalism is unable to disclose the immediate experience of our concrete historicity. Nature is bound to space and as such has its being independent of

temporal and historical becoming. Insofar as there is a time of nature it must be understood as a dimensional expression of space. Natural time, derived through a coordination of successive instants with a continuum of spatial points, must consistently be differentiated from the time of subjectively lived experience. Natural time is objectively measured clock time which becomes the basis for chronological calculations. This was already expressed in the Greek concept of time defined as *chronos*. Historical time, as distinct from natural time, is subjectively apprehended time, or time experienced from within as the "right time" or the opportune moment for the fulfillment of human projects. This historical or human time was expressed in the Greek concept of time defined as *kairos*. The time of nature is objective, regular, and reversible; the time of history is subjective, unique, and irreversible. The concept of historical time underlies Bergson's notion of *durée*, and is given a literary expression in the "stream of consciousness" technique found in the novels of Joyce and Faulkner. But as historical time is falsified if it is understood within the confines of the categories of nature, so also natural time is falsified if it is understood historically or existentially (Heidegger comes perilously close to the latter). Neither naturalism, in which history is ultimately reduced to nature, nor historicism, in which nature is reduced to history, can become world-views without doing violence to the breadth and diversity of human experience.

If temporality provides the basic structure of the self as historical existence, then the self can properly be understood as the actualization of possibilities or the actualization of freedom. Indeed, the self may be defined as historical freedom. In its historical freedom the self stands out from its destiny and is projected into its possibilities of becoming which it seeks to actualize. This actualization occurs through repeated acts of decision. Decision or choice thus becomes a universal condition of human existence. To exist means to be confronted with a future which demands that one choose between alternatives. The existentialists, and particularly Sartre, have devoted close attention to this phenomenon of human existence. Man is what he chooses to be. Man constitutes himself in his choices. And choose he must. Avoiding a set of alternatives on the grounds that one does not wish to commit one-

self is itself a choice—and it is a choice that may have profound implications. It is in this sense that man is condemned to freedom. We have suggested that this freedom involves an actualization of possibilities. This must not be construed to mean that man has a given, self-identical or fixed essence which houses the possibilities that seek actualization; nor is there an inbuilt *telos* within the network of his possibilities. The being of human reality is determined by the selection of possibilities, and there is no perduring substantial form or self-identical essence beyond the process of selection itself. Selfhood is never given in a final and finished manner. Selfhood is a process of attainment. The self is always expanding and undergoing modification in its projective self-actualization. It is continually in the process of transcending that which it has already become. This is the principle of creativity and novelty. The existing self is always adding new determinations to its being. The dynamism of historical becoming precludes any description of existence in terms of self-identical essences or stable forms. This dynamic quality of existence which makes creativity possible has been given studied attention in the process philosophies of Whitehead and Weiss. In Whitehead's organic cosmology "event" replaces "substance" and "morphological description is replaced by description of dynamic process."³ The being of an actual entity resides in its becoming. "*How* an actual entity becomes constitutes *what* that actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming.' This is the 'principle of process.'"⁴ Similarly in the thought of Paul Weiss we find an accent on vitality, dynamism, and creativity in his doctrine of existence. "The Existence it encloses is the source of the Actuality's vitality; it is what makes the Actuality effective, dynamic, able to act and interact."⁵

Temporality, freedom, and decision are three basic structural categories of historical existence. Indissolubly linked with these categories are the categories of finitude and non-being which make

³ A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

⁵ Weiss, *Modes of Being*, p. 223.

possible a conceptual clarification of guilt and anxiety. For an adequate understanding of finitude it is important to distinguish its essential and existential qualifications. Certain varieties of existentialism have tended to blur this distinction with the result that guilt is understood in terms of a metaphysical necessity. But finitude and guilt are not implicative concepts; only *existential* finitude and guilt are implicative. Existential finitude implies temporal self-actualization and temporal self-actualization implies an inevitable sacrifice of possibilities which is guilt. When the self, in its initial act of freedom, "passes" from its essential finitude or potential perfection to its existential self-actualization, then the potential perfection is lost and ever beyond the possibility of full realization. Paul Weiss, in his *Modes of Being*, points to this existential finitude and its inevitable guilt when he writes: ". . . even the fullest realization of the Good, one which makes use of all powers whatsoever, will fall short of a full realization of the Absolute Ideal."⁶

Man actualizes himself temporally through the exercise of choice in his freedom. But the range of his choices is limited. Not all concrete possibilities are relevant possibilities for the same self, nor are all relevant possibilities ripe for actualization. Becoming a trapeze artist may not be a relevant possibility for the Carnival's Fat Man (although it may later become one). But even within the range of one's relevant possibilities the act of decision involves an inevitable exclusion or "cutting off" of some possibilities which might have been but are not. In choosing one possibility I am always not-choosing another. Choice involves an inevitable sacrifice of possibilities, and it is thus that I become guilty. Existential finitude implies self-actualization and self-actualization implies guilt. This guilt must be properly understood as *ontological* guilt so as to distinguish it from religio-moral guilt (or sin) understood as the alienation of man from God, and also from the psychological concept of neurotic guilt understood in terms of "guilt feelings" or self-condemnation which arises from a violation of a social norm or behavior pattern. The guilt of which the phenomenologist speaks is both a trans-moral and trans-psycho-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

logical category. It has to do with the existential condition of man *qua* man.⁷ In every act of choice in which I concretize a possibility I am excluding other relevant possibilities which structurally are constitutive of my being. (The criterion of relevance, again, is not determined by some pre-established self-identical essence, but arises only from the interplay of circumstances in my historic situation; that is to say, it is *contextually derived*.) Choice thus involves a cancerous intrusion into the horizon of my being. This cancerous intrusion is non-being, which must be understood not in terms of the Latin *nihil absolutum* nor the Greek *ouk on*, but in terms of a *relative* or *me-ontic* non-being. The latter, a central interpretive concept in both Western and Eastern philosophy, is the non-being of Plato's *Sophist*, Augustine's *Enchiridion*, Schelling's *Of Human Freedom*, Berdyaev's *Destiny of Man*, Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, and Tillich's *Courage to Be*. Guilt for its final clarification must be seen as the intrusion of existential non-being into the realm of being, and this, we remember, was already Augustine's definition of evil. Guilt is rooted in non-being—the threatening encroachment of a reality which is a non-reality—the non-chosen relevant possibilities in my past and the relevant possibilities in my present and future which I will not be able to choose, but which nevertheless are constitutively a part of me. Guilt, ontologically understood, is the guilt which arises from the non-being present

⁷ It is thus that the analysis and description of ontological guilt is the peculiar task of the philosopher, as the analysis and description of religio-moral guilt is the peculiar task of the theologian, and the analysis and description of neurotic guilt is the peculiar task of the psychologist, or specifically, the psychotherapist. The question concerning the relationship of these three types of guilt is a real one. I would suggest that religio-moral guilt or sin and neurotic guilt be understood as *concrete* or *ontic* expressions of man's self-actualization, as he experiences himself in a concrete dis-relationship with either God or his socio-psychological environment; whereas ontological guilt has to do with the *universal* condition of man's self-actualization. In this respect religio-moral guilt and neurotic guilt are distinguished from ontological guilt. However, we must also distinguish between religio-moral guilt and neurotic guilt. In whatever its specific expression, neurotic guilt arises from the individual's inability to accept and deal courageously with his ontological and religio-moral guilt. In this respect ontological and religio-moral guilt are distinguished from neurotic guilt.

in my actualization—the inability to actualize all my relevant possibilities.

Anxiety constitutes another universal or structural category of historical existence. In its historical projectedness whereby the self exists into its future possibilities, it becomes anxious over that which it can become. Anxiety is dread of the future which arises from the self's awareness of its freedom to shape and mold its future being. Freedom is thus a pre-condition for anxiety. Only a being which has a consciousness of freedom can experience anxiety. But not only is the self anxious about its future; it is also anxious about its past. The self can become anxious about a neglected or sacrificed possibility which, had it been actualized, would have given the self a different destiny. This anxiety concerning the past is given a literary expression in Whittier's couplet: "For of all sad words of tongue or pen/ The saddest are these; 'It might have been.'"⁸ Also the self becomes anxious over past possibilities which it has actualized but which it seeks to avoid in the future. Insofar as the past constitutes a structural moment of the self, these actualized choices are part of the self's being. They are objects of anxiety in that they are ever-present as repeatable possibilities. Hence, the self becomes anxious not only over that which might have been and is not, but also over that which has been and might be repeated. Thus, again, we see that the structure of temporality is basic for an interpretation of existence. The self is anxious concerning its temporal actualization in which it apprehends itself as an historical possibility of becoming, and thus confronts the non-being present in every choice. Anxiety can therefore be properly understood as the confrontation of non-being. This is the final meaning of Kierkegaard's statement that "anxiety and nothing regularly correspond to one another,"⁹ and Tillich's assertion that "anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing."¹⁰

We have sketched only in brief some of the structural categories which emerge in a description of historical existence. Our

⁸ Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, trans. Walter Lowrie, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) p. 86.

⁹ Paul Tillich, *The Courage To Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 35.

primary concern has been to elucidate the status of these descriptive concepts and explicate the methodology employed in their delineation. A thorough analysis and systematic elaboration of some of these descriptive concepts has already been developed—e.g. temporality, guilt, and anxiety in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, sympathy and love in Scheler's *The Nature of Sympathy*, and courage in Tillich's *Courage to Be*—but others still await careful phenomenological examination.

In our discussion we have emphasized that the data for the delineation of these universal structural categories is provided by man's concrete historical participation. This is the point which needs be doubly underscored. The point of departure for phenomenology and ontology—and ontology is possible only as phenomenology—is the concrete facts of historical existence. In this respect phenomenology is the only true empiricism. It is on the level of man's concrete, lived experience that reality discloses itself. This was Kierkegaard's continuing argument against Hegel. But what Kierkegaard did not furnish in his existential elucidation is a delineation of the universal structures which underlie man's concrete historicity (although he does not exclude the validity of such a delineation; indeed, in every one of his assertions such a delineation is implied). The task of any future phenomenology is that of clarifying the structures of human subjectivity or human historicity. This clarification assuredly demands the operation of reason, but reason is always the reason of an existing subject involved in an historic situation. Reason can never be abstracted from the self's historicity. The self reasons in its concrete history and through its reasoning seeks to clarify its historicity through phenomenological description and ontological analysis. Its universal concepts or structural categories emerge from the historical itself. Classical metaphysics was ineffectual in dealing with the problem of human existence precisely because it did not take history seriously. Man was understood in terms of cosmological categories, drawn from an interpretation of nature, which remained opaque to man's concrete historical becoming and personal freedom—precisely that which makes man human. Man is that being who has history, or more precisely expressed, man is that being who is historical. To say that man is a being who *has* history is to

suggest that man is some kind of substratum which has history as one of its properties, as a stone has color as one of its properties. In the self's existence as immediately experienced there is no underlying, enduring, self-identical and hidden substratum upon which the individual characteristics of the self are founded. The positing of such a substratum is neither logically nor experientially necessary. The self is its history. It is a process of actualization, remembering a past, anticipating a future, and deciding in the present what it is to become.

In conclusion I shall attempt a further and final clarification of my views on existence through a comparison with the analysis and interpretation of existence presented in Paul Weiss's *Modes of Being*. Throughout the discussion I have expressed agreement with Weiss on some central points, such as the intelligibility of existence, the dynamic and vitalistic character of existence, and the existential indelibility of guilt. But at the same time I see my position as rooted in a philosophical attitude fundamentally different from that of Weiss. The central difference turns on the philosophical relevance of the historical. For all that Weiss has to say about history, I am not sure that he has taken history seriously. The philosophical attitude of Weiss is summed up in his statement: "Whether we wish it or not, we must, we do think cosmically."¹⁰ My philosophical attitude is summed up in the statement: "Whether we wish it or not, we must, we do think historically." These different attitudes bear significant consequences for the formulation of our respective philosophical programs.

As a cosmological thinker in the rationalistic tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, the later Hegel, and Whitehead, Weiss has his sights set on a possible philosophical system which provides the unifying perspective through which the different facets of human experience find their final conceptualization. For Weiss, as already for Hegel, whatever stands outside the system is unconceptualized (*Unbegriffen*), and thus stands outside of reality itself. Hence Weiss, as was Hegel, is driven to formulate a system. This system is a general and universal statement of the whole of being as it is differentiated and exhausted in four distinctive and

¹⁰ Weiss, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

irreducible modes.¹¹ And in this universal statement of the whole of being the historical as a facet of human experience is understood as an expression of the cosmological categories of the system. This is necessitated by the fact that for Weiss the traditional cosmological category of substance is an interpretive concept for human existence. It also follows from Weiss's understanding and use of reason as a neutral, detached, and objectifying reason which can function independently from the contingencies of man's historic situation. And, finally, it follows from Weiss's apparent acceptance of the classical formula of truth: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. The historical self, in the final analysis, is known only as a formalized set of relations which are the object of the abstractive intellect.¹²

As an historic thinker, in the more voluntaristic tradition of Augustine, Scotus, Kant, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, I would argue that *man's existence as an historical possibility can be clarified only through the historical itself*. The self-understanding of man in his existence is achieved only through an interrogation of his concrete history, and not via an abstract, cosmological interpretation. This self-understanding of man in his personal and social history is rendered possible through the operation of an historical reason which is always bound to man's historic situationality. Weiss and I are in agreement that existence is intelligible, but we differ in our understanding of the *kind of reason* that makes existence intelligible. In Weiss's system reason can function in a purely neutral and detached manner. In my analysis reason is indelibly historical. Reason without history becomes hollow. Philosophical truth concerning existence thus discloses itself in the process of historical becoming. *Indeed, philosophical truth is historical disclosure*. Hence, an application of the classical formula, *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*, not only remains insufficient but may entail a distortion of the truth of existence. Truth is *disclosure* rather than *adequation*.

If man's reason is always reason-in-an-historic-situation, then a unifying perspective of reality formulated in terms of a cosmo-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 542-548.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 526-529.

logical system can never become a possibility. Human reason is incurably finite. The demonstration of this constitutes the profound insight of Kant's transcendental dialectic. This insight has been re-enforced in contemporary thought by existentialists who see human reason not only as finite but as existentially fractured and fragmented. Hence, the only possible ontology is an ontology of human finitude and human estrangement; which is to say, an ontology of historical existence. What I have offered in the foregoing discussion is a suggestion concerning the outlines of such a possible ontology.

Purdue University.

A THEORY OF SYSTEMS: A ROUGH SKETCH

GEORGE KIMBALL PLOCHMANN

IN THE HISTORY of western philosophy, certain groups of ideas stand out—ideas that we think hold together and present some kind of whole, so that they are closer in their collected assertions than they are to others in groups outside them. We may call these groups "systems." Now if we could agree just where to look for these systems, then classification of them would be fairly easy, and we could number the ones already composed and quickly identify any newcomers. But the historians are by no means agreed on just what counts as a system—all the work of one man, for instance, who is held to be a philosopher; or the *characteristic* work of this man; or all his ideas of a *certain kind*, which in turn closely resemble the ideas of his pupils and successors. The difficulties, however, in deciding precisely whether a man is to be called a philosopher in the first place, or in deciding which versions of his notes and treatises to accept as essentially his definitive doctrine, or in delimiting schools of philosophy to which many men have contributed, cause many historians to desist from trying to decide just how many systems there are, or even how they might positively be distinguished.

(This is a question, by the way, that obtrudes itself chiefly in philosophy, not in science—we speak loosely of the Ptolemaic scheme, which was superseded by the Copernican, or the Newtonian, which yielded place to the Einsteinian. But these are not quite usual examples in the history of astronomy and physics; and we should be surprised, for instance, to be asked to compare the physical systems of Edmund Halley and John Herschel, or those of Lord Rutherford and Sir John Cockcroft. Their work, important and original as it may be, simply lacks that striving after total distinctiveness which seems to be the mark of the philosopher, of Epicurus against Plato, of Hobbes against Descartes.)

Both amplitude and complexity characterize systems, along with this distinctiveness. We expect systems to be wider in scope

than are any of the sciences, even to the point where we expect a system either to comprise or to engulf several of these sciences: to make them into its component parts or to transform them into something more "philosophical." We do not think of this comprising, even, as being a mere addition of similar pieces, but rather as being an interlocking of unlike ones—the system has a unity, we may say, but it is the unity of a family rather than of a box of beads. Then too, unless a system bears at least marked traces of a clearly-defined metaphysics, a logic, of some sort of theory of nature, an ethico-political doctrine, and of something about art, it would hardly be for us a real system. True, we may object that Spinoza has no system because he says little or nothing about art, but he is so rich both in the other topics I have listed, and in suggestions which could lead to a philosophy of art, that I do not take the omission in his case to be fatal.

And to pass for a moment from the scope to the complexity, let us say briefly that the means of achieving the interlocking of the sciences making it up is to connect the very most essential portions of these sciences—their principles. We can safely assume, I think, that a system derives its uniqueness among the intellectual works of man by virtue of the alternate superordination-subordination of principles in its many parts—so that what is a leading principle in one of the constituent sciences, e.g. mass, becomes quite secondary in another—not false so much as derivative or even useless. What makes a system a unity is that in spite of the varying fortunes of many of its principles, none of them is actually contradicted and disproved *within* the system;¹ for thoroughgoing contradictions we must look to *other* systems. But what about metaphysical principles—do these too suffer the partial eclipses of, say, mathematical or physical or ethical ones? I reply, yes, they do. For although metaphysicians, at least, think of metaphysical statements as somehow more generally valid than any others, still a principle cannot be laid down which will also be enunciated and valid for all the sciences together—for if it

¹ I mean here contradicted in *exact* meaning. Many philosophers have stated principles which they have subsequently transcended. But the very act of raising a discussion to a higher level involves departure from the precise significance that the principle formerly possessed.

were, then these distinct sciences would, in respect of their common use of that principle, be no longer distinct. If metaphysics were indeed a master science, legislating for all others, a list of metaphysical questions could be drawn up in order to determine the entire content of the rest of the system. But although each question asked in any science possesses metaphysical *interest*, and can in part be discussed metaphysically, still the hope of making the broadest principles completely determinative of all lesser (special) ones is bound to be forlorn. Principles that interlock in the way I have described do not lend themselves to derivation from any single primary source.

So much, in rough and ready fashion, for what a system must be, what it must contain. We need now to consider how we can even entertain the supposition that there are more systems than one. As soon as we have said that there is a common world to which all systems (or most systems) relate, we feel we have somehow partly committed ourselves to a system. For we have, to begin with, uttered an important statement about the way things are, and we may also have given a broad hint that this world is complicated, for it will require a system to give an adequate account of it. Saying that there is a world partly dependent upon, and partly independent of, a system, seems to imply the rest of our commitments to the metaphysics we shall include in our system. Yet the mere concept "world" (or indeed any other concept) is but one of many, and a plurality of independent principles, and therefore concepts, is required for a system. Consequently, although one makes a start upon a system with such an assertion, it is only a bare start: methods and further concepts are yet to be determined. A definition of *what* the world is, appears no more clearly than the barest glimmer of dawn in the eastern sky.

On the other hand, a system has a certain scope, magnitude—reach. But it does not already, in its first enunciation, need to be extended to include every relevant fact of the world; rather it must exhibit the process of expansion by which its principles are shifted in predictable ways so that more and more facts can be clarified and the possibility of still further expansion shown. The system, to wrench a metaphor from modern astronomy, is finite but unbounded: finite because you can always decide whether a

given proposition is part of the system (on either historical or logical grounds,² or both); unbounded because the inclusion of new and unfamiliar propositions will require the philosopher's own justification, proceeding from an unpredicted selection from among his principles.

However, on account of this very reach, a system soon runs into conflict with others. It predicates a certain comprehensiveness, as well as infallibility—this is true even of the so-called skeptical systems too—of itself, and though it may hold true and hold everywhere, still the existence of single propositions denying one, some, or all propositions of this first system is an undeniable historical fact. And it is no less a fact that whole other systems exist which presuppose that the first one is riddled with falsehoods.

The problem of the clash of systems has much the same logical base as that of the clash of individual propositions, though a system, being so much more elaborate, must be more carefully treated. The opposition between "All men are mortal" and "No men are mortal" is easy enough if you make the assumption that "men," "are," and "mortal" are being used in the same sense in these two statements. In two systems, however, in one of which we find it asserted that "The teacher should do his utmost to build (right) habits" and in the other "The teacher should never allow a habit to form,"³ we are not permitted any simple true-false judgment, or any true-doubtful-false one either; for first we must

² I realize that this will cause trouble in the minds of those who take Gödel's proof to mean that there can be no ground for concluding that any given proposition can be proven or excluded when a deductive set of propositions is being constructed from a group of primitives. However I am not in the least sure that philosophers who have developed systems in *my* sense would all feel that it is necessary to build their work precisely in this way—fresh material can be brought in as occasion requires. Although Russell, in his expounding of the system of Leibniz, attempts to show that virtually all of latter's doctrines can be deduced from five major assumptions, still he and Whitehead, in their *Principia Mathematica*, are forced here and there to abandon that very same hope, and to suppose certain other axioms to be true. The dialogues of Plato contain ever so many new dialectical twists, smuggled in after the customs inspector has closed the last satchel; and in the *Republic*, dialectic is explicitly viewed as working both from and to principles.

³ Here I have in mind chiefly the educational principles formulated respectively by William James and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

have provided ourselves with the assurance that the one statement denies *precisely* what the other one asserts, and that therefore the propositions which deductively lead to the false one will be discredited wholly, and that those to which it leads will be left hunting for other justifications.⁴ Yet the fact remains that after we are satisfied that this proposition, "The teacher should never allow habits to form" does actually contravene that other, or if not that there is some other proposition in the second system which does contravene it, then the laws of contrary opposition will immediately apply. So, in fine, the identifying or resolving of oppositions between these parts of systems—the statements—is in some respects a matter of propositional logic, and in some respects a matter of terminal logic—semantics. The semantical portion requires great patience, as systems differ in the methods which lead from concept to concept, differ too in the other concepts which furnish the contexts to whatever is under discussion, and accordingly differ in the prominence and suppression of the individual principles upon which the systems rest. Hence it is not possible to be certain that apparent, verbal oppositions are at the same time real, conceptual ones, until one has suffered through much *connected* comparison of what is said.

But the great question then remains: If two men differ, seemingly, and yet upon closer inspection it turns out that they are not using all their relevant terms in precisely the same way, is it *still* not possible that one of them is right in his assertion *because* he has got his terms in better order than has the other, because, that is, he has used a better method for giving them meaning? Must the old positivist principle of tolerance always apply: that as long as a man is consistent and can make himself understood to others, he must be permitted the freedom to express himself in any way he chooses? Now there is a doctrine of semantics, at least as old as the *Cratylus*, that objects and acts are not ticketed with their naturally right names, even though it is indeed better to give them some kinds of names rather than others. I do not wish to controvert this doctrine. Certainly names are applied, not

⁴ This comparative scrutiny of systems has been one of the valuable contributions of Richard McKeon, and one of the most strenuous disciplines of his distinguished teaching.

detected. But it would seem anyway that the very demands of consistency would imply two things: firstly, that names could not be used so narrowly that an infinity of them would be required in order to express the essential character or properties of a thing; and secondly, that a name could not be used so broadly that it would cover the essence of more than one kind of thing, unless explicitly advertised to do so. We make this demand, then, that when the names have the same signs, and are intended to attach to the same things or the same properties or aspects of things, there the precise definitions which these terms receive will be the same each time the terms are used. Each time they are applied to things, in other words, they will be applied in the same way, not more broadly or narrowly, not more literally or metaphorically.

And now to take an additional, more metaphysical step: the definitions given to the terms must be such as will state real, specific, intellectually discriminable aspects of the things defined. They must not be mere arbitrary determinations, still less incidental concomitants of the names as signs. As long as we allow definitions to be mere typographical conveniences, we may receive warm thanks from publishers and printers, but not from those who wish by using language correctly to penetrate to the nature of things.

I would suggest, then, that in order to compare two philosophers, one of whom says "p" and the other "not-p," we should take two steps, not one. First we should find out whether their disagreement is conceptual as well as verbal, because if we are in doubt about this we cannot possibly apply the principle of contradiction except in the most mechanical, unphilosophical way. And second, we should bend every effort to discover whether the concepts contained in these two sentences are suitably attached to the things conceived. That is, that their definitions are clear in their parts and in the assemblage of these parts, hence can correspond with the aspects of the essential natures of the things defined. (We do not ask, of course, about parts of terms, because logically there are no parts to these: only about the parts of *definitions* of these terms or names can we argue.)

I am here proposing what might be thought of as a new principle, a new law of terms, if you like, and I recommend titling it the principle of exclusive univocation. What it amounts to is

this: that if a term is rightly imposed, that is, if its definition is wholly defensible, than no other usage of that term will be equally defensible, and if one philosopher uses his term univocally, whoever differs from him cannot be employing his term with the same degree of univocation.⁵ No doubt you will say that this is a kind of heuristic goal, that it is an ideal of discourse often sought but rarely achieved. To which I answer that so is the principle of contradiction. We talk glibly in our logic classes about the fact that "q" and "not-q" cannot both be true; but in how many actual instances is a proposition denied in *precisely the same sense* as that in which it is affirmed? It takes a great deal of smart reasoning to be sure, and the assurance is based, first of all, upon a prior certainty that the terms are in fact univocal. Thus these two principles, while logically independent because dealing with different matters, are addressed to a common problem.

Of our two philosophers who differ, then, concerning the definitions, hence concerning the intrinsic meanings of the names they used, it might turn out that both have been deficient in achieving proper application. And then their differences would be conceptual, as well as purely verbal but, although in contravention of each other, so that a principle of contradiction could quite clearly apply, both would be equally inadequate. In that case, though, both would have a lingering claim to the truth, they could not be shown to be wholly false, until a third philosopher could be found against whose univocal terms and true assertions the two substandard ones were shattered by the simultaneous application of our two principles.

The comparison of philosophic propositions (and by this I mean of propositions closely corresponding in two or more than two systems) is therefore exacting, and to the extent that I have just pointed out, provisional. We do the best we can with any

⁵ This is emphatically not to say that a *word* can have no more than one meaning ever (for "run" is permissibly used as noun and, in a different setting, as a verb, the two meanings being distinct but yet suggestively alike); or that a thing can receive no more than one name (for this thing is both cat and mammal); or that every name must be applied to the same mode of being (for surely it is different to "be" a cat from what it is to "be" black); or that ideally there would not be a plurality of colloquial languages.

two propositions, having assured ourselves that their constituent terms are as nearly identical as possible. But having lifted these from their respective two systems, frequently we must evaluate them in the light of a third or even a fourth. But impatience is not justified—eventually we shall find, not only the best of a set, which is natural, but it will also turn out to be a clear statement, clearly applied.⁶ The recognition of propositional inadequacies, and the calling down of a plague on two houses, or even three, does not imply, necessarily, the calling down of this same plague upon all philosophy. It stands to reason that however persistently critical we may be, we need not necessarily be skeptics as well.

This means, then, that when we examine systems, we examine them primarily for what they say *at each point*, not for how well they hang together—indeed their compendancy, which is essential to their nature as systems, is chiefly for the sake of connecting meanings in the mind of the reader in such a way that the precise sense of *this* proposition which he is learning will be inescapably clear to him. And along with this sense, at least the possibilities of its being true.

If, then, the principles of contradiction and of exclusive univocation are defensible and true within a single philosophic system, and hence applicable to propositions outside that system because philosophy in general is not limited in its range, it follows

⁶ For instance I think of the many points of opposition between Locke and Berkeley—on the simplicity of perception, the objective being of what is perceived, the character of time, space, and motion. I hope it is more than a mere prejudice that I feel that they were both onesided and quite loose in the meanings they have given to the fundamental terms in which their propositions are couched. But merely to weigh inadequacies against each other will do no more than stimulate the mind to look for truth in other formulations, either one coming from a stranger or from oneself. The transcendental theory of Kant would, I think—I do not insist upon this—be one in which a more precise and balanced application of terms is capable of leading to statements whose philosophical defense is less strained, and less monotonous. Perhaps it should be added, and not at all sarcastically, that if one feels that Locke and Berkeley missed the point, and that no one else has given answers better than theirs, it behooves one to commence creative work on one's own account, and furnish univocally constituted statements against which the errors of predecessors can be more nicely measured. Some novelty is always possible, and while not all thinking improves over the old, yet it is one function of the old to stir up the new.

that these principles are applicable to statements within other systems as well. In other words, we can legislate regarding the standards to be met not only by casual scribblers and gabblers on the street corner, but by propounders of systems opposed to our own as well. Secondly, if it be true that we must look primarily to the meaning of names and consequent sense of propositions, it should be argued that not every philosophic system is equally successful in giving truth to its propositions. The reason is that between men, terms or names are sometimes held constant, but more often they vary in meaning, and between two systems, where the number is extremely large, it would be by the merest chance that agreements could be made and kept. Thirdly, it should follow from this that every system is to be judged chiefly for what it asserts, the truth-values of its several propositional components, rather than merely for the way it hangs together. Its consistency can be determined by applying a few tests of logic, rather tiresome tests, to be sure, which take a great deal of time, but not otherwise difficult. But determining the truth or falsity of the parts is something else again, and requires much metaphysical as well as logical insight.

And because it seems that to find the coherency of parts is what one would do rather to a painting or a drama, not to a set of ideas purporting to be true and purporting to falsify everything inharmonious with them, I must say that many customary traditional ways of reading and estimating systems seem to need revision. We often hear that all philosophic statements prior to a given writer are absorbed into his more comprehensive thought, or that all systems have much truth in them because of their internal compendency, or that systems consist of almost nothing but nonsense because of semantic principles from which they are deduced are incurably weak. I am opposed to each of these three ways of interpreting the history of philosophy, and I think that one of the chief tasks of metaphysics is to show exactly how the individuality and distinctive truth of each proposition can be preserved for study, regardless of the shifting character of contexts round and about it. This is not a quarrel between the old chestnuts about correspondence and coherence; both of these need such modification that they become virtually indistinguishable from the

other.⁷ But it is a challenge to those who think of philosophy as consisting of several alternative systems, to be divided only into those which are relatively adequate and those which are relatively inadequate, and who then leave it up to the reader to take his pick from among the candidates of the better sort. I am hoping to preserve philosophy both as process and as result, both the intensity of speculation and the systematic construction, and this can be done only if we look to an argument as a chain of individual links, *each* of which says something about a real world, and each of which must ultimately be judged in terms not of some overall construction or ordering of knowledge, but in terms of its *inner* parts, coherence, and truth.

We often have a limning of philosophy as a whole, of the great philosophers as having said the same thing, not merely about some one topic, but about *every* topic—in fact, it is somehow easier to feel that they unite in all topics more than they do on any particular one. Yet I wonder whether that is metaphysically sound. Similarly, the great systems may easily exert the same broad force and impact upon us, for they are about problems which verbally are often closely alike, and conceptually are capable of a good deal of mutual alteration and translation. We think of systems as modes of explanation which *ought* to bear, each one of them, the same relation to the world. And because they are taken to be wholes, and because wholes have parts, it is presumed that these parts too must have the same function. So we find historians saying that although the parts of systems, i.e. the doctrines and arguments are not precisely the same in statement, nevertheless they at least have analogous *functions* within the system, which somehow, by a reasoning almost circular, serves to make the systems equivalent. This is tantamount to saying that if the fin is like the leg, and the gills are like the lungs, the fish is like the man.—But can this be true in anything but the broadest sense? And I say also that if philosophic systems all treat of a common world, it does not mean that they themselves are the same, any more than that Homer and Hesiod both wrote the same book

⁷ And both have actually received this modification at the hands of their ablest proponents.

simply because both recounted the histories of the familiar gods.

So we have a plurality of systems, and we know too that not all of them are on the same footing. We can go back to our original question, where do we find systems, or *any* one system? Quite obviously a system cannot lie in a single concept, and if we take "monism" or "realism" to be a system, we are wrong to the precise extent to which we do not realize these to be labels applied to groups of ideas from outside, hence useful only when we have already identified and collected the components of these groups. The same goes for pairs and triads and tetrads of concepts: some persons have attempted to place the history of philosophy in a set of tetrads, for instance, in which the actual and the potential play against the together and the separate, or in which certain characteristic attitudes towards the relations of parts and wholes gives the entire ground for classifying the history of philosophic ideas. I am against this, for reasons that by now should be evident. Although four terms will generate a small handful of propositions, these propositions are insufficiently representative of a system as a whole, and moreover violate the primary requirement which a system must meet, namely that not all principles within it will enjoy exactly the same status throughout. Nor does a system lie in a single propositional principle, like the law of identity, or a single argument like the ontological proof. It is thus left, I think, that we find a system in groups of developed sciences. I unbend on this question enough to allow that hints of sciences can be used to fill out a system where they are clear.

It should follow from my remarks on the fixing of meanings, however, that the chances that several persons could together construct a system would be of the smallest. What we have then, with the so-called Pythagoreans, with the Platonists, with the Thomists, with the positivists, analysts, and all the rest of the philosophic dogs that hunt in packs, is a series of resemblances, and we can at most say that these men form schools, but not systems. To say that all the writings of a group of men, whether contemporary or successive, hang together as a system, is to strain our credulity, simply because their demonstrated agreement upon one proposition or a handful of propositions is insufficient to imply

their agreement upon all the principles by which other propositions can be shown to be necessary and true.

It remains, then, that we must ordinarily look to the writings of some one man to find a system; but to how many of these writings? The accidents of publication, as any harried professor well knows, are such that the putting of words into print is only the faintest sign that his thoughts are fully conveyed to the public. Diaries, letters, lecture notes issued in blue or brown booklets or in papyrus rolls may offer very solid clues to a man's thinking. Yet I know of no simple way to decide what should belong: it is the measure of the scholar's philosophic taste that he knows what to include—a half-book on the correction of the understanding but not one on Hebrew grammar, for instance, or a discussion of tar-water therapy but not one on the founding of an academy of arts and letters in Bermuda. There is, however, the standard of widely varied but interlocking principles adequate to the interpretation of any single given proposition regarding the nature of the world and of man, and any falling-off from this implies a laziness on the part of the philosopher or of his scholarly interpreter. I do not think it a contradiction of what I have said before if I now remark that the task of the interpreter is in the first instance to be as generous as possible by including as much material as will guarantee a coherency (if such can be found) in the writings of his subject. For although we judge the system in terms of the truth of the single propositions it contains, nevertheless the system is also developed through its internal consistency and reaches its full stature through inferences by its creator.

I do not know how many systems there have been, but certainly not all of even the best candidates for the honor of being systems are systems in precisely the same respect—I cannot believe, for example, that if Aristotle produced a system, then so did Hume produce exactly the same *kind* of thing.* Their conceptions of

* I have deliberately picked two men who are innovators in philosophy as examples, in order to be able to bring them into close correspondence. It should be added that however one wishes to show that there is a stream of philosophic history, still, many diverse roles have been played: creators, interpreters, readers, preservers, expounders, scoffers—all have had their say or have kept an obliging silence.

philosophy were too different, as were their other interests in life, their abilities, their circumstances. It seems a pity, therefore, to array systems in a single horizontal set, all on the same footing, yet it appears unthinkable to arrange them in a unitary hierarchy, ranging from best to worst. Rather an *interrupted* hierarchy, in which, for example, the system occupying third place is a slightly different kind of thing from that occupying second, would be more suitable—if what we get out of one system is a different kind of argument, and a different selection of kinds of true propositions, this would seem the likeliest grouping. Or put it that the classification must be what for want of better expression, I call organic, where the head balances the feet if we think of gravity, underbalances if we think of locomotion, and overbalances if we think of intellection. The organic classification of systems might easily still find one of them to be best, but would not condemn the others simply because they did not set out to do precisely the same thing—or praise them equally for the very fact of starting from a handful of different premisses.*

* A word here about sources. If individual propositions and arguments generate controversy, how much more must a whole system set off sparks!—And how much more must essays written about the attitude we should adopt toward all systems be open to objection from every side!

Like Socrates, who distinguished two classes of accusers, the earlier, who had had great influence and were difficult to identify, and the later, who had had less evil effect but were easy to name, I suppose that an essay like the present one can claim two sets of forebears—Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Whitehead, on the one hand, and on the other a group of men, quite diverse in their own approaches, who have specifically discussed the problem this paper considers. One might almost say that Richard McKeon has made it his life work, and I acknowledge cheerfully, but with the right to dissent, the debt to several of his books and papers. See, for example, "Propositions and Perceptions in the World of G. E. Moore," which forms chapter 17 in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, edited by P. A. Schilpp for The Library of Living Philosophers. Also, and more comprehensive, is the paper, "Philosophy and Method," from *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 22 (October 25, 1951), pp. 653-682. A slightly different contextual problem is faced by him in "The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism," *Modern Philology*, Vol. XLI, Nos. 2 and 3 (November 1943 and February 1944). "Dialogue and Controversy in Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (December 1956), is a dialectical analysis of dialectic. Some of his older papers, such as "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity," *Modern Philology*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1 (August 1936), give important clues to his method of

It has sometimes been said that we pick the philosophy with which we feel most comfortable, and that although there are differences in aim and degrees of precision, still it is a matter for open choice, as if systems were household appliances or beauty queens. I cannot hold, though, that such a desperately important matter as the representative sum of true or false statements about a world and about themselves, together with the guides to generating all

interpretation. The reader should not neglect *Freedom and History*, a slightly longer exposition of this method, now applied to conceptions of history and human evolution. It was published in New York by the Noonday Press in 1954.

I have also gained much from Newton P. Stallknecht and Robert S. Brumbaugh, *The Compass of Philosophy* (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1954), and from their *The Spirit of Western Philosophy* (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1950). Brumbaugh's own inquiries, as published in his "Preface to Cosmography," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (September 1953), and as expounded in one or two as yet unpublished papers, are extremely interesting. On a lower intellectual level we have Robert M. Hutchins, *The Great Conversation*, which forms the introductory volume to *The Great Books* collection, published in Chicago by *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Inc., in 1952. The second and third volumes of that set are, of course, the massive Syntopicon, entitled *The Great Ideas*, and were prepared under the direction of Mortimer J. Adler, with introductory discourses by him to each of the 102 ideas receiving place there. I think most persons would have mixed feelings about this venture, but it is impossible to leave off a perusal of these volumes without some new sense of the richness and diversity of philosophic thought—and of a wrongheadedness in it here and there. I have always thought of Ernest A. Moody's *The Logic of William of Ockham* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935) as a very clear expression of the problem of opposition of two systems. There are a number of extended passages in *Modes of Being*, by Paul Weiss (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958) which treat of the theory of systems, the most illuminating of which are to be found on pp. 378-86, and 542-8. Mary Whiton Calkins' familiar *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (New York: The MacMillan Co., fifth revised ed., 1933) is mistitled, I think, but not misguided, though no doubt her classification of systems seems one-sided. William Kent has written an interesting article, "Classifications of Philosophies," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. L, No. 19 (September 10, 1953). There are some valuable hints in Lewis E. Hahn's "Metaphysical Interpretation," *The Philosophical Review* (April 1952). And so on for a very long list. If one is looking for it, the question of systems almost leaps out from every single page of philosophic literature. It is necessary, however, to reserve the right to withhold acquiescence to what is said. But the ethics of refutation requires, I believe, much longer treatment of individual statements, and I prefer in a brief essay to avoid recording objections in one step which should very likely take eight or ten.

other like statements, can be taken as a question involving arbitrary, or even a serious moral, choice. If the sophists were wrong in holding that any proposition is indifferently true or false, so are those who think that each of us takes or leaves a philosophy only because of predilections and biases. If philosophy is activity leading to necessary propositions, and it is, then the motive for "doing philosophy," to borrow from Wittgenstein, must be an engulfing desire for truth, not merely for intellectual and temperamental comfort—and least of all for the curing of pains in the head.

Southern Illinois University.

JOHN DEWEY:
PHILOSOPHER OF EXPERIENCE ¹

JOHN E. SMITH

IN RECONSIDERING Dewey's philosophy during the year that marks the one hundredth anniversary of his birth, we should attempt to do him the only honor which philosophers ought to acknowledge, namely, to consider his ideas as sufficiently important to be the subject of continued interpretation and critical judgment. Philosophers, to be sure, always desire to be understood and to communicate with their contemporaries, but much as they wish to be understood, philosophers would rather have their ideas discussed in a critical yet sympathetic fashion. To attempt this appraisal upon the basis of a clear notion of what a philosopher has wanted to say is the most substantial tribute that can be paid to him. And in carrying on the critical dialogue we will be working toward a clearer understanding of the present and the factors that have made it what it is.

Let it be clear at the outset that in reappraising Dewey's thought we have to do with no minute philosopher. In breadth of interest and range of thought he belongs with the great comprehensive thinkers of the past. And in contrast to many thinkers both in his own time and since, he had a constructive program. Philosophy for him meant more than analysis, even though analysis is an important part of the philosophic enterprise. Dewey's constructive philosophy has too often been lost in polemic discussion. I subscribe to the confession made some years ago by Ernest Hocking in which he said that he began to understand Dewey when he started reading him for enjoyment and not for the purpose of showing that he was all wrong! As Dewey's work shapes up in historical perspective, it assumes a great substantiality. One may

¹ Originally one of four lectures delivered at Yale University in honor of the one hundredth anniversary of Dewey's birth. These lectures will be published by the Liberal Arts Press under the title *John Dewey: Philosophy and the Experimental Spirit*.

disagree and one may correct, but in comparison with philosophy of a wholly technical and professional sort, Dewey's large-minded approach to genuinely philosophic questions places him among philosophers of stature.

I will single out the concepts of evolution and experience for special attention because I want to show how the evolutionary idea—what Dewey called the “biological contribution” to philosophy—shaped both his theory of experience and his general outlook on things. In focusing on the meaning of experience, I want to make clear the manner in which Dewey's broader or reconstructed view formed the basis of a metaphysic of nature and a conception of man's place in the universe. It is especially important that we take notice of the criticism leveled by Dewey against the view of experience bequeathed to us by the British tradition in philosophy from Locke to Bertrand Russell. And in so doing we shall have occasion to remark on the positive resources which are contained in Dewey's broader conception. It will be possible, moreover, to show in what comprehensive fashion Dewey elaborated his ideas into a full blown metaphysical scheme. With this before us we shall be in a position to put several critical questions aimed at assessing the adequacy of Dewey's philosophy for the present situation.

I. *Evolution*

Should the theory of evolution ever lose its grip upon the scientific mind, it might be rehabilitated almost at one stroke by citing the fact that in 1859 the evolutionary process brought forth both the *Origin of Species* and the philosopher whose ideas were to prove so remarkably well adapted to its main thesis. John Dewey hailed the publication of Darwin's work as “marking an epoch in the development of the natural sciences”² and he was not slow in claiming that the prominence given to change over fixity in the theory of evolution was bound “to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics and religion.”³

² “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy” in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*, New York, 1910, p. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Dewey was stimulated by the idea that the very title of Darwin's work represents an abrupt change and an about face; by long association the term "species" denoted fixed forms in the universe and the theory that these forms themselves have origins meant, for Dewey, a protest against the past and a vote in favor of change over fixity. The emphasis here placed upon change and its omnipresence is at the heart of Dewey's picture of existence as precarious and perilous, characteristics which drive us at once to a concern about the future. Closely connected with the primacy of change is the idea that everything must be understood as *in the making* and not as once for all *finished* or *made*. If things are in the making, Dewey reasoned, perhaps we ourselves can have a hand in the process.

Change means development and this in turn means a process moving in some direction. A philosophy of change must attend both to the mechanism of individual changes and to the direction which they take. Dewey understood Darwin's theory of organic adaptation through constant variation and the elimination of harmful variations through struggle to mean the directing of attention away from *ultimate* purposes and toward an *intramundane* type of explanation. The general or pervasive character of nature can be understood from within its confines; there is no need to transcend nature. Explanation must become a piecemeal and retail affair focused on specific changes and specific outcomes. Attention and energy should be directed to the specific alone, a prescription as binding upon philosophy as upon the natural sciences. "Philosophy," wrote Dewey, "forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them." This is what I shall call the *dominance of the focal point*; the idea that reflective thought is called forth and fully determined by the occasion of a specific problem so that its whole being consists in the resolution of the focal point or problem that brings it into play.

A constant undercurrent in Dewey's thought is suspicion of speculation directed toward what he called "wholesale" problems. We have, he thought, neither time nor resources for dealing with such questions; the relevance of every idea or inquiry to the focal point is always decisive. Dewey is interested in change only in so

far as it has reference to human purposes. He is interested in specific changes because he wants to know how they "serve and defeat concrete purposes." As creatures bounded by an evolving environment and yet seeking to shape it in accord with their own aims of living and of living well, man's concern for changes, he thinks, is directed by the way they view the bearing of these changes upon the issues of life. There is thus an ineradicable teleology in Dewey's conception of things; nature turns out to be a most human affair. For reflective beings the processes of nature are not just there in the form of brute fact; they take on the traits of being harmful or beneficial according as they support life or render its survival precarious. Thus concern for special changes is simultaneous with concern for knowing what their outcome will be and how they take place so that we may be able to use such knowledge to anticipate and control the course of events. Concern for anything other than the specific distracts attention from the attack at hand and weakens our effort.

The contribution of Darwinism is the establishing of the primacy of change and the banishing of ultimate origins and finalities; the focus upon specific problems and changes; the discovery of the outcomes of such change for the purpose of inserting ourselves and our knowledge into the stream of things so as to influence the results in accord with human plans and purposes; the shift of interest in philosophy away from wholesale and ultimate questions.

If we are to succeed in a world of struggle we must have a weapon both for defense and attack. For Dewey, experience is that weapon and indeed this is exactly what he meant by saying that experience is a method, a way of going about things.

II. *Experience*

It is no secret that modern thought, and not only philosophical thought, has been dominated since the 18th century by the appeal to experience. When Locke and other figures of the Enlightenment challenged rationalism in thought and hereditary authority in politics, they did so in large part in the name of experience. Experience became the touchstone of all theories and all claims to knowledge. It was, however, not long before the demands of a critical self-consciousness led to thoroughgoing ana-

lyses of the nature of experience, and to inquiry into the grounds of its claim to be the final criterion. In the face of such criticism, the empiricism of Locke and the British school—what Dewey called the classical theory of experience—continued to dominate the philosophical scene. The key to Dewey's metaphysic of nature is to be found in the fact that his own theory of experience represents a thorough criticism and rejection of most of the classical view. This crucial fact and its implications have still not been sufficiently understood.

Dewey's emphasis upon science as *method* and his consequent stress upon the operations required for experimental science have led many to suppose that Dewey's empiricism is the same as that of so-called scientific or logical empiricism. This is an error. Dewey was an empiricist; this was his repeated claim, but he was not an empiricist in the sense of the term that would define and link together in one common tradition the succession of thinkers from William of Occam through Hume and Mill to Bertrand Russell. This being the case we are led once again to the topic of experience and to Dewey's understanding of its nature.

In a paper written late in his life, Dewey wrote:

For many years I have consistently—and rather persistently—maintained that the key to a philosophic theory of experience must proceed from initially linking it with the processes and functions of life as the latter are disclosed in biological science.⁴

No more explicit statement could be given to show the connection between Dewey's theory of experience and the biological setting of life. Unless we start with the conception of an organism interacting or carrying on transactions with the environment, we shall never understand Dewey's metaphysic of experience.

In an important but not very frequently read essay, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," Dewey asserted: "experience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of doing and suffering."⁵ From this text we can grasp the leading idea of the entire theory. Experience is a dynamic or temporal affair which is reciprocal and constituted by all the modes of intercourse between a conscious

⁴ *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. Schilpp, p. 530.

⁵ "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" in *Creative Intelligence*, Dewey et al., New York, 1917, p. 37.

being and the environment, both physical and social. The view here expressed is as important for the negations it implies as for what it positively affirms; it is a criticism of older views as well as a program for the future. It was his aim not only to show the shortcomings of the older interpretation but at the same time to establish the closer relation of his own theory to the actual facts.

When he considered what experience meant for the classical empiricists, Dewey came up with the following five-fold description: first, experience means *knowledge* primarily; secondly, it is a *psychical*, subjective or mental content; thirdly, it is largely confined to the *present moment* although it may also be taken as the record of past or finished fact; fourthly, it is all *particular* and without connective tissue between its atomic items; finally, experience stands as a *contrast domain* to thought and it is set over against reason as something other than conceptual thought. We can see in these characterizations the antithesis of his own view at every point.

On the *first* count, experience for Dewey is not exclusively an affair of knowledge, nor should it be understood as if it were exclusively material for science. Knowing is an activity that goes on within experience and is controlled by the conditions of empirical inquiry, but the organism also sustains other relationships with the environment and these equally belong to experience. Since Dewey did not identify knowing with either experience or consciousness, knowing could not be ubiquitous. On the *second* count, experience is not taken as exhausted by what is immediately present to an individual or private mind; the behavioristic drift of Dewey's philosophy rules out such an interpretation from the start. By contrast Dewey took experience, except on its purely qualitative or esthetic side, as all *public fact*. And this feature is dictated by the function that experience is to perform. As an instrument or tool for shaping the environment, experience could not be taken as a private affair; control demands a means that shall consist of public, impersonal and intersubjective content. In *Reconstruction in Philosophy* Dewey even defended the development of a purely mechanical conception of nature as a necessary stage in our becoming aware of the possibilities of controlling nature. As long as natural things were viewed as having their own

teleological interiors man was prevented from treating them as objects of control; taking nature as a mechanical system was a necessary stage in the development of instrumentalism.

On the *third* count, Dewey was uneasy over the passivity attributed to experience on the classical view. Experience as merely the passive reception and record of the present datum seemed to him no more than an opportunity lost. The secret of Dewey's instrumentalism lies in his view that the present (and the past also as retained) is not chiefly for observation, but is to be *used* by us in a strategic way; from it we have our only chance to obtain a foothold on the future, which alone counts. Taking experience as merely the record or duplication of present fact would spoil the instrumentalist program; our task is not to conform to the world but to transform it through the renewal of intelligence.

On the *fourth* count, Dewey could not accept what he termed the "particularism" of classical empiricism. In their programs for clarifying our ideas, Locke, Berkeley and Hume all sought to trace them back to their appropriate sensory data and thus to establish a one-to-one correlation between terms and impressions or ideas. In so doing they came to regard the ultimate or primitive data of experience as distinct, clear-cut first person awarenesses that are everlastingly singular in character. Dewey objected to such translation on the grounds that clear-cut sense data are actually the result of reflection and intellectual refinement; his charge is that a "reflected product" is being identified with what is supposed to be experientially primitive. Moreover, Dewey could not accept the atomism implicit in this approach. If experience is composed of atomic data it is deprived of its own connections and transitions; this made it possible for rationalists to reintroduce relations as the peculiar contribution of the mind. It is difficult to be sure how far Dewey's objection here is based on the conviction that the classical view distorts the actual facts and how far he wanted merely to find a way of preventing rationalists from capitalizing on the omissions of sensory empiricism. But whatever the answer to that question may be, he had a further reason for his view and it takes us back again to the biological orientation. In a striking use of scientific theory to support a philosophical thesis, Dewey claimed that the fact of survival in the human species

is incompatible with experience as atomistically interpreted. "No living creature," he wrote, "could survive, save by sheer accident, if its experiences had no more reach, scope or content, than traditional, particularistic empiricism provides for."⁶ Here Dewey joins hands with the advocates of "radical empiricism," the contention that experience is never of isolated singular fact, but contains relations or connective tissue within itself. Survival requires some command of things and this is impossible without knowledge of the extended and temporal working of nature and especially of the network of relations existing between its parts. If experience did not embrace this knowledge and disclose such relations but gave only a report, a sort of mental duplicate, of purely present and particular occurrences, it could not serve as the needed instrument for success. The future can neither be anticipated nor controlled by a mere image of the present in the form of discrete, singular data.

On the *fifth* count in Dewey's critique we have a point that refers to all the others. He rejected the idea that experience is a single subject matter—the domain of sense—which is to stand as different in kind from and in contrast with thought. For him all statements of the form "experience is X" where "X" means a single quality, object, or kind of datum, are incorrect. Experience cannot be identified with any of its proper parts and it is no longer the given in contrast with concepts. Dewey's main concern was that experience taken in this way must inevitably exclude inference, the activity of reason. For Dewey's program this exclusion would be disastrous; experience in its main significance is *connected meaning* enabling us to handle processes and their outcomes; if it excludes the connections of inference it must again be reduced to the reception of disjointed singulars. An intelligent being does not merely *react* to the environment, but he is capable of *responding* to it; mind is the response to the doubtful as such. But response involves both an apprehension of the connections between presently discriminated items and the relations to the past from which they come no less than to the future in which they issue. All of this involves inference and other activities of thought. In

⁶ *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. Schilpp, p. 544.

thus making essential to experience the activity of the thinking mind, Dewey proved himself a good Kantian. Unlike Kant, however, Dewey claimed to learn all these things from the biologist; Kant, it might be recalled, though he had himself made actual contributions to natural science, had a higher regard for philosophical reflection.

The answer to the question, "What is experience?" is given in the form of a complex description of what goes on when an intelligent organism stands in thoroughgoing interaction with the environment. The result is a vast complex of objects, qualities, events, meanings, or habits which determine some future response. And when experience is controlled by the method of the sciences it yields that knowledge of the workings of things which furnishes us with the power to shape the course of events. Experience has many facets; in the nature of the case it cannot be identified with any *one* sort of thing. It embraces not only science and art, but morality, politics and religion at the same time. If at times Dewey appears to give to experience a singular or differential meaning by identifying it with a method for control, that is because he shared with William James the belief that method is neutral and does not of itself commit us to special theses about the nature of things. It is difficult to understand what leads anyone to suppose that methods remain free of assumptions and that they invariably enjoy protective neutrality. When someone tells us *how* to obtain something he is assuming that he knows the general sort of thing he is after and has some idea of where it is to be found. To suppose that one-sidedness and special pleading attaches only to results and conclusions and not to methods has been one of the most cherished fancies of the entire pragmatic tradition.

Before leaving the topic of experience a word is in order concerning the seeming disappearance of the individual experienter on Dewey's view. I shall return to this point later on; here we need but note the impression shared by many that Dewey's dominantly social interpretation of experience as public fact makes it difficult to locate the individual for whom experience is an actual fact. It is true that Dewey sought to deal with this problem by means of the doctrine of pervasive quality and what he called having *an* experience; the esthetic dimension, it would appear, makes

room for the individual and the private. But even in this context Dewey retained his suspicion of the private; emotions, he wrote, "are not, save in pathological instances, private,"⁷ but are occurrences in the development of experience to some issue or conclusion. This seems to place the most individualized of all experiences once again in the public context where it falls under the dominant motive to control events.

Dewey used with considerable success his doctrine of method for the purpose of establishing continuity between knowing and evaluating in the ethical sense. And this he could achieve because he viewed each as a process aiming at some sort of control. Connecting the scientific and the esthetic, however, is more difficult because the esthetic is not supposed to be a matter of instrumentalities at all, but of intrinsic finality. The esthetic for him must either lose the consummatory value claimed for it, or we must admit a genuine, individualized, final center of experience. Thus our difficulty in locating the individual who has first person experience stems from the fact that even in the esthetic dimension Dewey is not always able to avoid slipping back into his thoroughgoing instrumentalism.

We may come to our third theme, Dewey's metaphysics. It is clearly impossible to set forth even a skeleton outline of the substantive position contained in Dewey's most comprehensive metaphysical book, *Experience and Nature*. But we shall nevertheless use it as a guide in the development of our third theme. The persistent neglect of that important book has been largely responsible for the truncated view of Dewey's philosophy that has been entertained no less by his followers than by his avowed critics.

III. *Metaphysics*

Dewey developed his position into a full blown metaphysical system which he described as naturalistic empiricism. There can be no question that in the final construction of his naturalistic philosophy, Dewey was guided largely by the evolutionary idea and the reconstructed conception of experience. Each determines

⁷ *Art As Experience*, Capricorn Books, p. 42.

an aspect of his theory of nature and of his view of man as a creature firmly planted in the natural process.

At the outset of *Experience and Nature* Dewey distinguishes between philosophy and metaphysics; "if we follow classical terminology," he writes, "philosophy is love of wisdom, while metaphysics is cognizance of the generic traits of existence."⁸ The upshot of this distinction is that metaphysics should mean the delineation of the most general and pervasive traits exhibited by anything that exists, whereas philosophy is bound up with the basic aims and strategy of life. Existence and individuality, event and relation, function and structure and many other categories become the appropriate concern of metaphysical analysis. Dewey objected vigorously, however, to the idea that the pervasive structure disclosed by analysis is to be set off as a timeless realm more real than the world of contingency and change. He objected, moreover, to metaphysics taken in any sense other than the one he had set out. The aim of metaphysics is to arrive at a structural catalogue; there is to be no synthetic interpretation of things by selecting any one aspect or feature as the clue to the unity of the whole.

He repeatedly maintained that the generic traits of existence are themselves involved in time and change and that man is related to these features of nature in a practical way. This fact shows us that metaphysics is not enough; if man is to succeed and improve his lot in a precarious world he needs what Dewey called the wisdom that is philosophy as well. This latter note is sounded with special force in his final chapter where he returns again to the connections between philosophy and metaphysics. There we see emerging the idea that philosophy is essentially *criticism*, that is, appraisal and judgment directed toward goods or values. The aim of philosophy as criticism is the relating of different aspects of experience to each other and the reflective discovery of genuine or lasting values as distinct from what is trivial or evanescent. It is in this way and at one stroke that Dewey settled accounts with the classical conception of philosophy as love of wisdom and intro-

⁸ *Experience and Nature*, p. 51.

duced into his system a wisdom which is not knowledge but which cannot be separated from knowledge.⁹

But howsoever we interpret the wisdom that is philosophy, we still need further clarification as to the relation it bears to metaphysics, the relation that is between the wisdom that is to guide life and the pervasive or generic nature of the universe in which it is to be lived. We come here to the heart of Dewey's philosophical vision and it makes no difference by what name we choose to call it. The principal point is that for him there is a vital and practical relation existing between the generic traits of the universe on the one hand and the issues of life and death faced by those who live in it on the other. Dewey described this relationship as raising the "most far reaching question of all criticism" and as the problem of problems for reflective thought—the relation between existence and value. If, for example, we discover precariousness as a trait of all things, that fact by itself has no more significance than that of a trait noted and recorded. When, however, precariousness is seen as connected with the concrete situations in which men choose, live and die, it takes on, says Dewey, "that fear of the Lord which is at least the beginning of wisdom."¹⁰ All, then, finally turns on man, the emphasis in Dewey's philosophy which led Santayana to accuse him of natural impiety. To the extent to which natural process affects us or we intervene in natural process, the situation becomes decisively related to values. As if to secure the point more firmly, Dewey writes :

The more sure one is that the world which encompasses human life is of such and such a character (no matter what his definition), the more one is committed to try to direct the conduct of life, that of others as well as of himself, upon the basis of the character assigned to the world.¹¹

If we stand off and try to view Dewey's vast and complex philosophy without regard to the technical apparatus of philosophers, we see an enormous spread of nature, of things and processes, of powers and their effects; these constitute the environment in its non-human aspect. And we see man, the being with intelli-

⁹ *Experience and Nature*, p. 409.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 413.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 413-14.

gence in whom the human predicament, as Dewey says, "becomes aware of itself." That is the whole picture, nature and man. There is no third party and indeed man is so completely a part of nature that it often seems as though there were no second party. Nature is an evolving affair, filled with change and marked by precariousness and instability; man has experience, that product of his mind and his transactions with the environment containing within itself both the knowledge born of science and the wisdom of philosophy that is supposed to guide him in its use. Living, then, becomes the grand strategy of seeking to *control* the passage of things so as to make life not only sufficiently stable for survival but to enhance its quality and enjoyment through the cultivation of those lasting goods discovered in experience and approved on reflection. The futurism of Dewey's thought is dictated by this grand strategy; every present has its being as an opportunity for discovering the secrets of things, how they work and where they lead, so that we may gain power over the future. On this reading life is not so much lived as it is taken by storm. There is an experimental spirit and a restlessness hanging over it all, for in the final reach there is no fulfillment in Dewey's universe; one never possesses, but is always on the way to possess. The past is gone, the present is unstable and pregnant with care; besides, the present is but an instrument for the future and the future never comes. For every present is analyzed not in terms of what it is, but rather by reference to what it *will do* and we are once again put off to the future. The point is most clearly illustrated in the case of the knowledge process. Dewey always distinguished between *having* and *knowing*, the former meaning direct, present experience. But if we ask whether *knowledge* is ever *had* as distinct from the having of "an experience of knowing" Dewey would have to answer in the negative. Knowledge is never had, but is always infinitely postponed; what we can have in the present is an hypothesis or theory the meaning and justification of which always lies in the future.

It is impossible to expound or interpret philosophical ideas without giving at least implicit critical judgment, but implicit criticism is not enough; appraisal of a more positive sort is called for. I shall, therefore, focus upon three issues raised by the themes I have set forth. And in considering these criticisms we do well to

bear in mind that insofar as Dewey stands as *the* American philosopher for the first half of our century at least, we pass critical judgment upon ourselves.

The first issue concerns whether Dewey was right in his insistent and persistent claim that man must forswear what he called "wholesale" questions in favor of specific or retail problems. How far, in other words, is it valid to admit what I have called the dominance of the focal point. Are the so-called 'practical and urgently focused predicaments the only human concerns? In considering this question we must begin by admitting that Dewey's aim in emphasizing the specific and piecemeal problem is clear and not without its measure of truth. We have limited resources and limited opportunities for strengthening our hand; much of our energy must be directed toward meeting the immediate challenge of the environment. No effort is to be wasted on inquiries into large "useless" questions such as why there is evil in the world, whether there is God, how one and the same individual can retain identity while still changing from day to day. As far as this goes we may accept his doctrine of the need for intelligent attack upon the evils and threats of the environment. But a major difficulty at once confronts us: how shall we determine what is *relevant* to resolving the piecemeal problem and indeed how shall we know when it is resolved? To what extent are ultimate and apparently useless questions at the heart of a difficulty which seems overwhelmingly specific and practical? No natural science will answer these questions all by itself.

It is not, however, merely a matter of showing the *practical* relevance of wholesale or ultimate questions; this can always be done and Dewey at times acknowledges the point himself when he thinks of reflective thought as criticism. But more important, ultimate questions point to our human concern for some understanding about aspects of our life and world beyond the reach of what is taken into account by a philosophy directed only to the instrumental control of things. The only point in Dewey's thought where an attempt is made to transcend the instrumental attitude is in esthetic; this is the one aspect of experience that is offered *for itself* and not as a means to something else. But we may well ask whether the esthetic is enough; there are in addition large ques-

tions of a *distinctively moral* nature that are not the same as choice between technical alternatives, and there are problems perennial in metaphysical analysis and speculation to say nothing of the concerns of religion. What are we to do in the face of the persistent human demand—I almost said *natural* demand—for answers to such questions as whether an individual is responsible for a world and a self he never made; whether human purpose and choice are but the inner appearance of a supposedly real world composed only of physical events; what are we to make of the fact that the universe contains a self-reflexive or self-representative being in the form of self-consciousness; whether there is self-dependent being? These are questions which the philosopher cannot avoid because, if I may borrow a phrase from Dewey, they belong to the "problems of men." But they will be ignored, as indeed they were by Dewey, from the standpoint of a philosophy acknowledging only specific problems and the instrumental response.

The second issue is closely related to the foregoing; it concerns the theory of experience and especially whether Dewey's interpretation of it as an instrument and public fact does not mean the disappearance of the individual self or experienter. In making the criticism I must confess to a certain ambivalence; on the one hand I hold that his account of experience conforms more closely to the facts than does the classical theory. His account, it must be admitted, brings within experience much that is actually encountered but which had to be denied experiential status on the classical view. On the other hand, however, Dewey went so far in the direction of behaviorism or the translation of experience into external, public fact and function that the individual experienter becomes insignificant. The individual and the private always made Dewey uneasy; it is not that he denied either, he was too good an empiricist for that, but he wanted to keep them confined to a place where they would do no public damage. He intended to provide for the privacy of experience by his theory of art and through what he called the enhancing and enriching of experienced goods. But when it comes to experience as the instrument of weapon of attack on the environment, privacy and individuality are of no account. The fact that an individual self is always the locus of experience, that experience, as William James put it, is always

somebody's experience, somewhere and somewhen, is not taken seriously; as either overt behavior or impersonal public fact, experience virtually closes with nature, and the individual is forced to abscond into the realm of art.

It is no accident that Dewey was forced to acknowledge this deficiency in the face of psychological criticism. In reply to Allport's questions concerning his psychology, Dewey candidly replied: "I am obliged to admit what he says about the absence of an adequate theory of personality."¹² And the reason offered by Dewey in his own defense was his desire to avoid "spiritualistic" theories of the self as individual substance. But even if we admit the inadequacy of the concept of substance, surely the problem of locating the unity and identity of the individual self remains. This problem cannot be resolved, as William James' entire philosophical development testifies, by a purely functional theory. Every functional theory of the self ends by translating it into activities of a sort which only a center of consciousness can perform. "I would point out," Dewey wrote in 1939, "that I hold that the world 'subject' if it is to be used at all, has the organism for its proper *designatum*. Hence it refers to an *agency of doing*, not to a knower, mind, consciousness or whatever. . . ." ¹³ I confess that I fail to follow when I am told that a person is not a consciousness or a knower, but, even more, I fail to understand how an "agency of doing" can become aware of itself, how it can remember and how it can become divided within itself.

How, for example, are we to understand the divided self as an unhealthy or undesirable state of affairs unless we presuppose an underlying unity and center of the self? Dewey could not really introduce such questions into his theoretical treatment because for him all theory is instrumental to further control; if the answer to a given question does not contribute directly to the manipulation of a portion of nature it is of no account. The more a problem relates either to the ultimate constitution of things or to the interior life of an individual self, the further removed it is from the surface of public fact and the less powerful would be its theoretical solution for the control of the environment. But not all human problems

¹² *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. Schilpp, p. 555.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 542.

are directly a matter of overt and external control of things; some of them have to do with the interpretation of individual life and its purpose. When these "useless" questions are neglected, they do not simply evaporate; on the contrary, they take on an explosive urgency just to the extent to which they are ignored. And if all the available intellectual discipline for treating them is at work elsewhere, we should not be surprised when others seek to resolve the problems confronting the individual, his freedom, his purpose and his life in the world in what appears as an irrational way. We earn the right to criticize these attempts at solution only when we are seeking to answer the same questions. To refuse to raise a question is to forfeit the right to assess the answers offered by others.

The third and final issue concerns the nature and function of metaphysics itself. Dewey repeatedly rejected what he took to be the main distinction behind classical metaphysics, the distinction between appearance and reality. He was fond of saying that the proper contrast to appearance is not reality but disappearance. The point of his rejection is that no one aspect of things and no one portion of experience can be taken as the clue to or as definitive of the exclusively real so that everything else is reduced to the domain of appearance. Selective preference must be overcome; nothing special or limited can be elevated to an absolute position. Everything must be taken into account and given its due, and the singling out of any one thing or trait as a clue for interpreting all the rest appears as hopeless partiality and special pleading. Now when such a thesis is advanced in the contemporary world it has an undeniable democratic tone which commends it to many; it especially satisfies our interest in remaining neutral in the face of those hard problems which cannot be solved in what appears to be a final or definitive way. But our concern is neither with the overtones of such a view nor with the fact that it satisfies a current interest, but with the question as to whether it is true and most adequately expresses the nature of metaphysics. I believe that it does not and for two main reasons.

First, there is no point whatever in bothering our heads over the general nature of things if the only conclusion at which we shall arrive is one we know well enough in the beginning, namely,

that reality is a quite miscellaneous collection of things related in some fairly constant ways. We scarcely need metaphysical inquiry to achieve that result any more than we would need it to conclude that whatever is, is. Without a differential standpoint or interpretative principle such as organism, matter, selfhood from which we attempt to understand reality in its wholeness, we have no insight and ultimately no philosophy. I do not say that the interpreting principle need imply any static monism; I wish only to point out that a radical pluralism will not do as an adequate metaphysical principle because it can never get beyond repeating in the form of what purports to be a critical conclusion the fact known to all at the outset, namely that reality contains as many things as it does in fact contain.

Secondly, it is not merely a matter of making a plea for the employment of a differential principle of interpretation in philosophy, but rather of pointing to the unavoidability of such a principle. Hegel, for example, surpassed all philosophers in his attempt to avoid a limited or special vantage point from which to estimate the whole, but if we attend to what actually happens in his system we find that he was actually asking for a special principle rich enough to interpret the whole of reality. This principle in his system is self-consciousness or spirit; on any interpretation what we are given is certainly a differential principle. It is not in fact different with Dewey's own philosophy. For all of his criticism of absolutes and of an ultimate context, Dewey's naturalistic empiricism does not avoid a vantage point from which it interprets reality as a whole. A great deal of the power of Dewey's thought in American life has in fact been due to the circumstance that he did not follow his own prescriptions. Dewey's thought is deeply involved in a differential principle governing the interpretation of the whole of nature and of man's place in it; the biological situation—the interaction of organism and environment plus the mutual adjustment required for survival—furnishes the key to understanding the human predicament; experience in the form of science provides us with the exclusive instrument for coping with it.

Dewey's view of what he called the human predicament is thoroughly dependent upon taking biological theory as the clue to man's place in the universe. Existence changes and is precarious;

the environment is not all favorable to the sustained life of man; as a peculiar type of biological organism man is capable of experience or the attainment of public knowledge. When shot through with intelligent method, experience can intervene to control the environment and thus make possible the turning of nature's processes to human ends. This basic vision controlling the whole of Dewey's philosophy is itself totally dependent upon taking one aspect of the full situation of man in the universe and using it as a clue to the nature of the whole. The biological and the social, as Dewey repeatedly stressed, determine his outlook; if they had not he would have produced no philosophy but only a social theory.

I cannot pass over the problem of selective emphasis without a final word about the most glaring form in which it is raised by Dewey's thought. For Dewey the name for the real is Nature and we are often told by him that no differential meaning should be attached to the term. Nature is all there is and we must not suppose that the concept of nature derives its meaning from the contrast situation in which it stood in the traditional "great chain of being" where it was bounded by man at one end and by God at the other. But if the term "nature" is to have no differential meaning and simply denotes "whatever is" then it is gratuitous. For we encounter persons and poems, tables and chairs, hopes and fears. All are real and stand in need of analysis and interpretation, but exactly what is contributed by using the term "Nature" to denote all these different kinds of things? The term "Nature" is far from innocent. By it Dewey means to denote the environment including man and perhaps all their potentialities, but nothing more. That nature, however, taken in some differential sense exhausts reality, Dewey has nowhere shown.

Negative notes need cause no embarrassment on a commemorative occasion. For what better tribute to a distinguished philosopher can one offer than the attempt to think his thoughts after him and thus to become engaged in a critical way with the problems he has faced? We respect most those philosophers we take seriously enough to criticize.

Yale University.

COPERNICUS—AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

JAMES HADEN

I

SCHOLARLY EVENTS of the past few years point rather clearly to the beginning of a deep and necessary alteration in the whole tone of expounding and discussing the development of philosophy and its role in the growth of civilization. Signs which one might have interpreted as tokening the actual arrival of this change have appeared earlier, but they have proved superficial and false harbingers. The change referred to is the effective enlargement of the conception of the history of philosophy to contain the history of science. Despite the sporadic gestures by some historians of philosophy in this direction,¹ despite the vogue attained by an occasional book like Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*, despite the glibness usually present when, for example, Kant and his self-professed "Copernican Revolution" are expounded—despite all these, the shallowness and inconsequentiality of the ordinary teaching of a history of philosophy program has been plain.

One cannot blame all this on the dead hand of, say, the Aristotelian conception of First Philosophy, although that and other classic positions have played their part. It can hardly be held that those who doctrinally profess allegiance to the conception of philosophy as created in the image of science have helped much more than they have hindered. Accepting the older, orthodox account of the course of previous philosophic thinking as detached

¹ Thus short chapters on Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton in Friedrich Jodl's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (1924); the net effect is not a powerful one, however. In what may well be the most widely used general history of philosophy in this country, B. A. G. Fuller's *History of Philosophy*, the references to science and its relation to philosophy are uniformly jejune. This is true even of the latest revision, by S. M. McMurrin (1955). Hugh Miller's *An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy* (1947), is a rather interesting attempt at improving the situation. Of course until a sound and thorough basic text receives wide use, the old habits of thought will persist, to the disrepute of philosophy.

from science, they have been happier demonstrating their predecessors' vulnerability than in reshaping that account fruitfully. There is a vacuity about the pronouncements of men so eminent—and diverse—as Bertrand Russell and John Dewey (to name only two), which renders their extensive influence unfortunate in many respects.

Whitehead's intentions were entirely in the right general direction, and the warmth of his sympathies and the shrewdness of his insights triumphed over the paucity of the historical materials available in the first two or three decades of this century. Many of his historical judgments have become almost implicit in a large range of later thinking. But, after all, from the standpoint of professional provincialism, he did have the cachet of the professional philosopher, which accounts for his influence in philosophical circles. The new sign which is appearing is that a different sort of study is receiving currency and status. A commonly found example is Herbert Butterfield's *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800*.² In view of the fact that in ten years Butterfield's book has attained the position of being widely read and quoted, we can on the basis of the normal cycle of these changes expect that ten years hence one like it will have gained universal acceptance.³ If we look, then, at certain works now appearing, we should be able to foresee the shape of thought and practice concerning the history of philosophy one or two decades hence.

II

If we make a fairly detailed comparison of Butterfield's *Origins* with two more recent books, Alfred Rupert Hall's *The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific*

² London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1949. A revised edition was published in 1957, without major changes. The revisions reflect some newer work in the field, and wider reading on Butterfield's part. The net effect is to add to the list of men mentioned, and to bring out somewhat more forcefully the magnitude of the reaction to Aristotelianism. But the author's premises and conclusions remain the same. References hereafter are to the first edition, unless otherwise stated.

³ Probably not canonization, however, since Butterfield is a professional historian not a philosopher.

*Attitude*⁴ and Thomas S. Kuhn's *The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought*,⁵ we can gain a useful retrospective estimate of Butterfield's work, which is worth doing because of the increasing acceptance of that particular book among the general academic audience. The comparison can perhaps most fruitfully be made at two levels: first, with regard to the specific topic which all three treat (although Butterfield and Hall cover additional topics), namely, the origin, nature, and effects of the Copernican cosmology; and second, the more diffuse problem of what constitutes a scientific revolution.

Let us begin by sketching out the history of Copernicus' work as Butterfield presents it. He begins⁶ by summarizing a medieval cosmology as pictured by Dante, although once the exposition turns to Copernicus no use at all—comparative or otherwise—is made of this particular system. Apparently this non-functional foundation represents the influence of the older humane, literary tradition.

Given the later elevation of Copernicus to the position of sole and final alternative to a benighted and fossilized Ptolemaic compilation of errors⁷ the problem for the historian viewing Copernicus afresh is to explain why his theory met with such indifference on its promulgation.⁸ Butterfield's method is to emphasize Copernicus' conservatism.⁹ The main evaluative effort is put into showing that in all respects Copernicus' reputation for novelty and modernity has been over-inflated. He was "not a great observer"; in fact, he created artificial difficulties for himself by uncritically accepting the whole body of previously recorded observations, including erroneous ones.¹⁰ His object was to reconcile all these within one theoretical framework.

⁴ New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1954. Beacon Paperback edition, Boston: Beacon Press, 1956.

⁵ Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957.

⁶ P. 15⁺ ff.

⁷ The emotional power of this now traditional though erroneous interpretation is probably traceable to Galileo, as will be shown.

⁸ Cf. p. 48.

⁹ Not only discursively; the title of the whole of Chapter Two is "The Conservatism of Copernicus."

¹⁰ P. 22.

Specifically, he was motivated by four considerations. The less important were his uneasiness over conflicts of opinion among theoretical astronomers, and his tendency to "neo-Platonic sentiment"¹¹ about the sun. More important were his irritation with Ptolemy for resorting to devices such as the equant¹² which derogated from the perfection of the circularity of astronomical rotations, and his feeling that the Ptolemaic system was redundant in the number of rotating spheres it demanded.¹³ Copernicus' theory, therefore, turns out to be "only a modified form of the Ptolemaic system."¹⁴ And in fact, it is shot through with difficulties. The new hypothesis was to be argued for "on the fact of its greater economy, its cleaner mathematics and its more symmetrical arrangement."¹⁵ While it did actually permit simpler calculations of astronomical motion, "some of the economy is rather an optical illusion of more recent centuries."¹⁶ We are intuitively inclined to feel that the effort required to rotate the entire set of fixed stars is considerably more than that needed to rotate the earth. But on the Aristotelian scheme, the earth was the heaviest object, sluggish and inert, whereas the ethereal element of the stars was weightless and moreover inclined by nature to revolve.

Yet the main weakness of Copernicus' cosmology lies elsewhere. He was recommending the abandonment not so much of the Aristotelian *astronomy*—since an elaborate apparatus of spheres in perfect circular motion¹⁷ was basic to his way of think-

¹¹ P. 24.

¹² The equant was a Ptolemaic innovation to save appearances, in which the sun's orbit was considered to be centered on the earth, but the orbital velocity was variable. The constant factor was the *angular* velocity of the sun's motion relative to a point displaced from the earth. Kuhn's explanation of this, with diagrams, on pp. 69-70 of *The Copernican Revolution* is clear and full.

¹³ Or at least some versions of it. As Hall points out, the renaissance compendium *Margarita Philosophica* (1503) spoke of the same number of spheres as Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus* (1543). Cf. Hall, *Scientific Revolution*, p. 16.

¹⁴ P. 25.

¹⁵ P. 26.

¹⁶ P. 27.

¹⁷ Copernicus even seems to have been a believer in the post-Aristotelian extreme physicalization of the spheres into impenetrable crystalline

ing—as of Aristotelian *physics*. The physical coherence of the universe is rendered irrational, at least by comparison with the older explanation; Copernicus' chief failure lay in the makeshift alternative he tried to provide. For him, geometry is the decisive factor. All matter strives toward sphericity, and all spheres have an inherent tendency toward rotation. Copernicus tries to make this account serve both as an explanation for the diurnal rotation of the earth and for the stability and motion of the solar system.

It clearly never approaches the dimension of a working substitute for the whole dove-tailed Aristotelian cosmos, while it nonetheless "attacks Aristotle's physics on matters of the profoundest principle."¹⁸ Butterfield, though, never makes it very clear just what the attack is. As a result, Butterfield leaves us with a curiously divided view of Copernicus: on the one hand a man who was asking his contemporaries to make the "tremendous" sacrifice¹⁹ of the whole Aristotelian cosmology in exchange for mere geometric simplicity, and on the other a man who has made a "colossal" synthesis²⁰ based on his almost obsessive "passion—for circularity and sphericity."²¹ As a result, Copernicus' original ineffectiveness appears the fruit of his isolation from the mainstream of scientific development. He is

one of those individual makers of world-systems like Aristotle and Ptolemy, who astonish us by the power which they showed in producing a synthesis so mythical—and so irrelevant to the present day—that we should regard their work almost as a matter for aesthetic judgment alone. Once we have discovered the real character of Copernican thinking, we can hardly help recognizing the fact that the genuine scientific revolution was still to come.²²

Copernicus having thus been disposed of, it is incumbent on Butterfield to locate the forces of the "genuine scientific revolution"

substances. But for all his concern over the perfection of circularity, Copernicus' universe turned out to be not quite heliocentric. This meant that there was no tangible body at the center of motion, a definite problem for the physical, rather than mathematical, type of thinking represented by Aristotle and his followers.

¹⁸ P. 30.

¹⁹ P. 27.

²⁰ P. 29.

²¹ P. 30.

²² P. 30.

elsewhere. The full significance of his having begun the book with a chapter on the 14th century impetus theory becomes clearer. For him, the line leads from Buridan and Oresme and the Parisian school of physics to Galileo by way of Brahe and Kepler, instead of through Copernicus. The crucial period of the revolution, according to Butterfield, opens a generation after Copernicus' death in 1543, and reaches full intensity when the volatile Galileo, "provoked by taunts" and "goaded to scorn by university colleagues and monks, turned his attention from questions of mechanics to the larger problem of the Aristotelian issue in general."²³ In his *Dialogues On the Two Principal World-Systems*, composed in 1625-29, Galileo used Copernicus as a club to beat his opponents. With Galileo the new dynamics first married the new astronomy, and only then was a full-fledged substitute for the Aristotelian cosmology available. But even Galileo's solution was badly flawed (his great confidence in an erroneous theory of the tides, by which he believed himself to have proved the rotation of the earth, is a case in point), and this transitional period exhibits a "dubious, intermediate" state²⁴ until the publication of Newton's *Principia* in 1687.²⁵

What then is the overall impression left by Butterfield's exposition and interpretation? As we have already noted, Copernicus' place in the scientific revolution becomes minor and almost peripheral. At most he is another cosmic mythologist. His special world-myth is one powered by an extreme, mystical enthusiasm for things circular and spherical. His was a deep-dyed conservative spirit, which dared too much and too little, and hence accomplished nothing truly great. Galileo succeeded by treating the heavenly bodies as terrestrial ones rather than the reverse as did Copernicus.²⁶ But even Galileo is treated fairly coolly, and the

²³ P. 60.

²⁴ P. 64.

²⁵ I have condensed the argument of Butterfield's Chapter Four, "The Downfall of Aristotle and Ptolemy" more than I have that of Chapter Two. He discusses several additional factors, such as the religious debates and Galileo's use of the telescope, which contributed to the transition. Note that Butterfield claims originality for his synthesis of what he deems the crucial stage in the downfall of the Ptolemaic system (p. 48).

²⁶ P. 61.

completion and termination of the whole movement resides only in Newton. Hence we should speak of a Galilean revolution, or perhaps a Newtonian revolution, if we were to follow Butterfield's account.

III

With the exception of greater modesty concerning the period covered, the title of Hall's work suggests a close correspondence with Butterfield's older book. Both Hall and Butterfield are in fact associated with Cambridge University, and the former expresses a debt to the latter for his stimulus and teaching. But there the comparison ends. Butterfield was giving a series of lectures; he was conscious of advancing slightly into unfamiliar ground both for himself and for his audience. His chapters are in the main self-subsistent essays, deliberately making no attempt at maximum coherence. Hall on the other hand, is writing to be read, and by an audience more prepared (thanks to Butterfield and others). He is concerned with the unity of the picture he presents, for he calls it a "character study" ²⁷ of the scientific revolution, although he does not intend it to have the unity of all-inclusiveness. In other words, he is not writing so much a "history of science" as an extended essay in the history and nature of an idea.

Hall sees Copernicus as "a superbly equipped theoretical astronomer," ²⁸ a man esteemed by his contemporaries, and one "of genius and originality." ²⁹ At the same time he had a "strong sense of physical reality" ³⁰ and he was motivated by the discrepancy between his physical view of the reality of crystalline spheres in perfect circular motion and Ptolemy's "cheats" such as the equant point. For him the doctrine of *De Revolutionibus* was no mathematical hypothesis; the cautious preface attached to the book asserting this was not from Copernicus' hand. Hence for him the relation between mathematics and physics, distorted in favor of mathematics by Ptolemy, cried out to be brought back into harmony.

²⁷ P. xi.

²⁸ P. 53.

²⁹ P. 61.

³⁰ Pp. 53-54.

His "genius and originality" lay in opposing the common sense of his age by asserting the heliostatic theory and its physical consequences, but apart from this,

all Copernicus' astronomical thought is thoroughly medieval. Truly he reformed the medieval universe, because he brought its pattern into a new order, but he introduced no new doctrine concerning its composition or the deeper logic of its various appearances.³¹

Hall lists eight merits of the Copernican theory as compared with Butterfield's four: (1) it was somewhat more economical conceptually, although this has been exaggerated; (2) the fixed stars were truly fixed, thus limiting problems of prediction to the planets; (3) the planets operated under a uniform mechanism, and their motions were not causally affected by any extraneous factor, such as the mysterious necessity for a numerical factor exactly equal to the sun's period of revolution in the calculations for each of the five planets; (4) the relative sizes of the planetary spheres first became calculable; (5) the peculiarities of Mercury and Venus were explained by their special status of being between earth and sun; (6) the "stations" and retrograde movements of the planets were seen as simply illusory; (7) equants and irregularity of revolutions were removed, and circularity restored; (8) the calculable fluctuations in apparent size of the heavenly bodies corresponded more closely to the observed fluctuations.³²

Why were Copernicus' arguments for a moving earth not compelling in their contemporary scientific setting? "It is an obvious principle of logic that the unknown cannot be demonstrated from the unknown. Measured by this standard, Copernicus' arguments in favour of heliocentricity are illogical." He desired to assimilate the motion of the earth to the principles of physics—i.e. Aristotelian physics—but he reinterpreted the physics of that period partially and obviously speculatively. "He is forced to allege that gravity, a tendency to cohere, is a universal attribute of spherical bodies. He questions whether rest is inevitable to the elemental earth, and motion to the weightless heaven. Contemporaries can hardly be blamed if it seemed to them that physics has been distorted to fit a newly imagined astronomical

³¹ P. 63.

³² P. 64.

theory." In short, even though Copernicus' calculations had removed much of the speculative quality which had attached to the heliocentric hypothesis when it was first proposed by the Greeks, he himself attempted to support his position by a speculation even more gauzy than heliocentrism had been when he took it up. Again, the lesson is that "the new astronomy demanded a new physics,"³³ which Copernicus did not supply, in order to carry conviction.

But Hall's final estimate of Copernicus deserves to be quoted in its entirety.

In the sheer majesty of its mathematical achievement *De Revolutionibus* is traditional, but it is a grandly conceived and meticulously executed demonstration of the comprehensive powers of a new hypothesis. To recalculate every motion and every anomaly from the crude observations in accordance with an entirely original pattern was a task never previously attempted. Secondly, it is impossible to escape the compelling power of Copernicus' intuition. Like many other original thinkers, he uttered the truth for the wrong reasons. His work did not form the basis of modern positional astronomy, and within a hundred years the doctrine of the spheres no longer played a part in serious science; and yet his major premise was essential to the development of both terrestrial and celestial mechanics. His generalship was medieval, but the fruition of his victory lay in the future. Lesser men might debate the logic of solar and terrestrial motions while an imaginative mind could fasten upon the harmony, the irresistible neatness and dexterity of the Copernican pattern . . . Men of power and vision could learn that the new system, though incapable of rigorous proof in detail, contained a transforming conception. The constitution of the fertile line of advance at any particular moment is not always clear in scientific investigation; Galileo and Kepler found it in the Copernican hypothesis. In their work Copernicus' intuition that the earth is a planet—it can hardly be called a reasoned judgment—was justified.³⁴

If one compares this evaluation with that of Butterfield, the striking difference is not so much one of dispassionate description as the reflection of a radically different conception of science and thought. One man's "mythopoeia" is another man's "transforming conception." Butterfield's notion, despite the fact that he comes from the side of general history, is far more positivistic than Hall's. We shall return to this difference later.

³³ P. 67.

³⁴ P. 68.

To sketch the comparison a bit further, Hall also notes the silence of indifference which fell on Copernicus' system for about a generation, and he also admits that "it was with the wider philosophical perspective of Bruno, and the wider scientific range of Galileo, that iconoclasm assumed a massive, threatening character."³⁵ It was Galileo who saw that "the science of motion and the just appraisal of the results of observational astronomy were the twin keys to an understanding of the universe."³⁶ But though Galileo's creative activity in science was thus a unity, it still must be said that his work in mechanics far outweighs his much more notorious and publicly influential writings on cosmology.³⁷ But even in his *Mathematical Discourses and Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sciences*,³⁸ in which he expounds his new mechanics, "unlike his predecessors Galileo consciously assumed the attitude of a publicist and partisan."³⁹ And not unlike Butterfield, Hall launches on his extremely subtle and elegant analysis of Galileo's mechanics from the starting point of the theory of impetus. The discussion contained in this chapter⁴⁰ is carried on through an illuminating comparison between Galileo and Descartes, and only then does Hall turn in the following chapter to a consideration of the dissolution of Ptolemaic astronomy in the 17th century.

He outlines four steps in the post-Copernican, pre-Newtonian development of heliostatic astronomy: (1) criticism of prevailing cosmologies to dissolve prejudice against allowing motion to the earth; (2) revision of physical theories to meet objections (this step is deemed most important); (3) acquisition of qualitative astronomical observation, for instance of novae and comets; (4) exact quantitative observation suitable for recalculating planetary orbits to scotch the sentiment in favor of circularity.⁴¹ Galileo contributed heavily to the first three.

Although Butterfield never discusses Newton's work in full, he indicates that his estimate of Newton is extremely high, and that

³⁵ P. 74.

³⁶ P. 75.

³⁷ P. 75.

³⁸ 1638.

³⁹ P. 76.

⁴⁰ Chapter III. The Attack on Tradition: Mechanics.

⁴¹ P. 106.

in Newton all the perplexities and errors of earlier physical thinkers are laid to rest. Hall devotes a chapter to "The Principate of Newton," and offers his own evaluation. If one takes a comprehensive view of the several branches of science, it would be "misleading to suggest that the career of Isaac Newton represents the peak of the scientific revolution, the point at which the transition from renaissance to modern science became complete." Aside from his disinterest in the biological sciences and his attachment to alchemy and Biblical interpretation, Newton was too detached to serve as the typical man of the scientific revolution. He "saw the ideal of scientific truth serenely, as an end attainable by the application of methodical principles; it provoked in him no warm revulsion against established errors, no enthusiasm for a hopeful shift in the course of civilization."⁴³ Still, relative to the physical science of the 17th century, he does represent a peak of achievement. In fact, the

comparative stagnation in the eighteenth century of those aspects of physics which had seen most revolutionary developments in the seventeenth is a measure of Newton's success in extracting the quintessence of knowledge from those scientific procedures which the seventeenth century had developed most highly; for long it seemed that in those aspects no other procedures, and no greater knowledge, were possible.⁴⁴

IV

Thomas S. Kuhn's book on the Copernican revolution is by virtue of its initial design considerably more detailed in its discussion of Copernicus than either of the other two books. The sheer fact of its existence, however, testifies to the author's conviction that Copernicus' work was genuinely revolutionary in some sense, and this tends already to set him apart from Butterfield and ally him more with Hall and with tradition. Kuhn says at the outset concerning *De Revolutionibus*, that it "could only be assimilated by

⁴³ P. 244.

⁴⁴ I can only mention here the most satisfactory and comprehensive recent re-evaluation of Newton. It is *Franklin and Newton: An Inquiry into Speculative Newtonian Experimental Science and Franklin's Work in Electricity as an Example Thereof*, by I. Bernard Cohen. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1956.

men able to create a new physics, a new conception of space, and a new idea of man's relation to God."⁴⁵ Stated more specifically, the Copernican Revolution means three things: (1) a reform in the fundamental concepts of astronomy; (2) changes in other sciences to reconcile them with Copernican astronomy; (3) contribution to a transition in Western man's sense of values concerning himself in relation to God and the universe. Kuhn sets himself to trace in detail this plural significance of Copernicus' cosmology, treating all as of equal importance. Kuhn believes the chief novelty of his book to lie in this endeavor to focus widely separated areas of human thought through this one lens, and conversely to show how one proposal can have multiple significance.

His approach is a spacious one, beginning with a lengthy account of the nature and utility of the older, simpler "two-sphere" universe, consisting of the earth as a small stationary sphere centered within a larger rotating sphere inscribed with the stars.⁴⁶ He is concerned to make impressive the persuasive character of this cosmology, and to show that the Greek and medieval arguments which could be offered in support of alternative theories were far weaker than those in favor of the two-sphere view.

These alternative cosmologies violate the first and most fundamental suggestions provided by the sense about the structure of the universe. Furthermore, this violation of common sense is not compensated for by any increase in the effectiveness with which they account for the appearances. At best they are no more economical, fruitful, or precise than the two-sphere universe, and they are a great deal harder to believe.⁴⁷

To make so good a case for the earlier view clearly contributes far more fully to the formation of an appreciative attitude toward Copernicus' work than does a brief mention that the Greeks had developed anticipatory theories in which the earth moved, or a sketch of Dante's cosmos. Kuhn goes on to show in even fuller detail, however, how the problem of rationalizing planetary motion becomes crucial for the two-sphere theory.⁴⁸ What emerges is the

⁴⁵ P. vii.

⁴⁶ Cf. *The Copernican Revolution*, p. 37.

⁴⁷ P. 42.

⁴⁸ In doing this, he gives a thorough exposition of the concepts of epicycles, deferents, eccentrics, equants and the like, well illustrated with

enormous complexity of the epicycle-deferent planetary system—which actually never quite worked—in comparison with the clean-cut simplicity and persuasiveness of the underlying two-sphere cosmos. As a result, what to Butterfield looked like mere medievalism in Copernicus becomes a great deal more intelligible. Kuhn sums up his initial account of the prevailing two-sphere universe theory together with the epicycle-deferent planetary theory by citing its three achievements: (1) initially they were highly economical and fruitful, apparently guaranteeing their basic soundness; (2) this apparent truth formed the thought patterns of a whole generation of astronomers, who in turn transmitted and propagated it through teaching and writing (which Kuhn calls “the bandwagon effect”); (3) it formed a fruitful guide for work on problems outside astronomy; “by the end of the fourth century B.C. it had been applied not only to the problem of the planets, but also to terrestrial problems, like the fall of a leaf and the flight of an arrow, and to spiritual problems, like the relation of man to his gods.”⁴⁹

By the latter point he means primarily the world-view of Aristotelian philosophy, and there is a full chapter on Aristotle’s physics and astronomy. One of the important conclusions he draws is the interlinked character of astronomy and terrestrial physics. “Observations and theories developed for one become intimately entangled with those drawn from another.”⁵⁰ The tenor of his exposition is favorable to Aristotle, since he attempts seriously to see Aristotle directly and not through the spectacles of later ideas. As he remarks,

the primary source of Aristotle’s authority lies, I believe, in [an] aspect of his thought which . . . is . . . difficult for the modern mind to recapture. Aristotle was able to express in an abstract and consistent manner many spontaneous perceptions of the universe which had existed for centuries before he gave them a logical verbal rationale, but which education has suppressed in the adult world of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.⁵¹

clear diagrams. For the reader who comes on these terms in Butterfield, or even in Hall and finds them not very comprehensible, Kuhn’s exposition is most useful.

⁴⁹ P. 76.

⁵⁰ P. 85.

⁵¹ P. 95.

Considering, then, the many "indirect consequences of the earth's stability and uniqueness, consequences that have been repeatedly illustrated but by no means exhausted in this extended discussion of the multiple functions of a central stable earth in the Aristotelian world view," it can be seen that "precisely these consequences and others like them . . . make the Copernican Revolution a revolution. To describe the innovation initiated by Copernicus as the simple interchange of the position of the earth and sun is to make a mole-hill out of a promontory in the development of human thought." ⁵²

The long and tortuous process of recasting the Aristotelian tradition then occupies Kuhn's attention, the first three chapters of his book having made a strong case for the plausibility of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic system. Between Ptolemy and Copernicus, he says, there was "much intense though spasmodic scientific activity and it played an essential role in preparing the ground for the inception and success of the Copernican Revolution." ⁵³ In this phase of the change, Kuhn considers the assimilation of Aristotelian cosmology by the Catholic Church, pointing out that prior to that time the Church had not had any official cosmology and that the efficacy of the reworked Aristotelian view can in part be accounted for by the crudity of Biblically based systems like that of Lactantius (fourth century) and Kosmas (sixth century). But the rediscovery and absorption ⁵⁴ of Greek science necessarily lacked perspective, and the tension between Aristotle's qualitative, spherical astronomy and the Ptolemaic quantitative, epicyclic astronomy, appeared as internal to a putative unitary body of "ancient wisdom," rather than as reflecting a shift in ways of thinking from the Hellenic to the Hellenistic eras. Criticisms of Aristotelian thought, in many cases strikingly anticipatory of later developments, were made by scholastic thinkers, in particular by the fourteenth century nominalist school of Paris, where Oresme and others worked out the impetus theory of motion. "Thirteenth-century metaphysics rivals Aristotle's in profundity; fourteenth-century physics and cosmology exceed Aristotle's in depth and logical coherence." ⁵⁵

⁵² P. 93.

⁵³ P. 99.

⁵⁴ Itself "revolutionary" for both Christian thought and Greek science.

⁵⁵ P. 123.

Astronomy, on the other hand, lagged behind. Not until the middle of the fifteenth century did Europe produce an indigenous and technically proficient planetary astronomy. The important result of this is that "to Europeans of Copernicus' generation planetary astronomy was, therefore, almost a new field, and it was practiced in an intellectual and social environment quite different from any in which astronomy had been practiced before."⁵⁶ On the one hand the Renaissance intellectual turbulence was in full flood, and on the other the expansion of practical activities, such as long-range navigation on voyages of exploration, made astronomical reform more and more imperative. Copernicus himself, consulted on the pressing problem of calendar reform, had averred that the current observations and theories did not permit the design of an adequate calendar.⁵⁷ Recovery of authentic Greek manuscripts of Ptolemaic astronomy showed that errors and difficulties could not be laid at the door of a decline in astronomical skill during passage of the lore through the Arab world.

The final factor in the "conceptual stage setting for the Copernican Revolution"⁵⁸ is Renaissance Neoplatonism, which is "explicit in Copernicus' attitude toward both the sun and mathematical simplicity."⁵⁹ As Kuhn notes, the puzzling thing is the absence from this stage of explicitly astronomical properties. But here Kuhn's interpretation of the nature of science is operative. "Their absence," he says, "is just what makes the setting important. Innovations in a science need not be responses to novelties within that science at all."⁶⁰ Not until after Copernicus' death were any potentially revolutionary new astronomical data available. "Any possible understanding of the Revolution's timing and of the factors that called it forth must, therefore, be sought principally outside of astronomy, within the larger intellectual milieu inhabited by astronomy's practitioners."⁶¹ Copernicus took up where Ptolemy left off, but in the intervening millenium and a

⁵⁶ P. 123.

⁵⁷ P. 125.

⁵⁸ P. 131.

⁵⁹ P. 130.

⁶⁰ P. 131.

⁶¹ P. 131.

half "the very process of rediscovery, the medieval integration of science and theology, the centuries of scholastic criticism, and the new currents of Renaissance life and thought, all had combined to change men's attitudes towards the scientific heritage that they learned in school." ⁶²

After devoting a full half of his volume to the groundwork for the Revolution, Kuhn details Copernicus' own contribution in a single, long chapter, and then deals with the history of its assimilation. He freely admits difficulties and incongruities in interpreting *De Revolutionibus* and its reception, but he sees that they are problems inherent not simply in Copernicus' period and work, but in any other "major conceptual upheaval in the sciences." ⁶³ The principal difficulty is precisely the one noted by Butterfield and Hall, namely the "apparent incompatibility between that text and its role in the development of astronomy." ⁶⁴ For such an allegedly revolutionary book.

it is a relatively staid, sober, and unrevolutionary work. . . . In every respect except the earth's motion the *De Revolutionibus* seems more closely akin to the works of ancient and medieval astronomers and cosmologists than to the writings of the succeeding generations who based their work upon Copernicus' and who made explicit the radical consequences that even its author had not seen in his work. ⁶⁵

Kuhn concludes that the book's significance lies "less in what it says itself than in what it caused others to say." ⁶⁶ But the significance of this statement also lies in what one does with it. If one proceeds to dissolve Copernicus into a bodiless blend of a Greek overenthusiasm for circularity on the one hand and a myth with which Galileo could castigate his opponents on the other, one employs a type of reductionism. But Kuhn's approach is to interpret *De Revolutionibus* "by looking simultaneously to its past and to its future" ⁶⁷ while at the same time noting that the pivotal role of apparently innocuous texts in the development of scientific

⁶² P. 132.

⁶³ P. 133.

⁶⁴ P. 134.

⁶⁵ P. 134.

⁶⁶ P. 134.

⁶⁷ P. 135.

thought is "relatively frequent and extremely significant." ⁶⁸ How this can occur is the principal problem of this climactic chapter.

Copernicus' contribution and innovation lay in one thing: a detailed *mathematical* account of the astronomical consequences of the earth's motion. ⁶⁹ "For the first time a technically competent astronomer had rejected the time-honored scientific tradition for reasons internal to his science, and this professional awareness of technical fallacy inaugurated the Copernican Revolution." ⁷⁰ There were two main defects of the existing astronomy: first, its "diffuseness"—i.e. the profusion of variations and modifications of the basic Ptolemaic epicycle-deferent system made by technical astronomers to provide greater accuracy—and second, its continued inaccuracy despite the changes. Copernicus felt these as monstrous blemishes, precisely because his radical Neoplatonism did not permit him to hold "merely that the problem of the planets could have no solution that was simultaneously simple and precise." ⁷¹ And the existence of a long body of rationalistic scholastic criticism undoubtedly helped Copernicus to evolve "parallel criticisms for his own field." ⁷²

While for Copernicus the main problem was that of an exact mathematics of planetary motion, he considered it necessary in launching his discussion to open with a set of non-technical arguments designed to meet possible objections based on the traditional physics and cosmology. The trouble here is that the arguments are "profoundly unconvincing." ⁷³ Of the First Book of *De Revolutionibus* Kuhn says:

Its very weaknesses foreshadow the incredulity and ridicule with which Copernicus' system would be greeted by those who could not follow the detailed mathematical discussion of the subsequent books. Its repeated dependence upon Aristotelian and scholastic concepts and

⁶⁸ P. 134.

⁶⁹ P. 143.

⁷⁰ P. 138.

⁷¹ P. 140.

⁷² P. 140. Kuhn has previously quoted with approval Whitehead's comment: "Faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology." Cf. P. 122 n.

⁷³ P. 144.

laws show how little even Copernicus was able to transcend his training and his times except in his own narrow field of specialization. Finally, the incompleteness and incongruities of the First Book illustrate again the coherence of traditional cosmology and traditional astronomy.⁷⁴

It is not this part of *De Revolutionibus* that constitutes the revolution; in fact, "had Copernicus' cosmological First Book appeared alone, the Copernican Revolution would and should be known by someone else's name."⁷⁵

It is the First Book, with its "incompleteness and incongruities"⁷⁶ that contains the arguments for the sphericity of the earth and the circularity of the planetary orbits which Hall and Butterfield have judged unconvincing. As Kuhn repeatedly points out, it is this section of the work which is accessible to a lay reader, while the remainder "is too mathematical to be read with understanding by anyone except a technically proficient astronomer."⁷⁷ At best the statements of the advantages of the heliocentric theory can be stated only qualitatively at this point of the book, and hence the real justification for it remains obscure.

Kuhn is no less emphatic than the others as to the inventive poverty of Copernicus in the area of physical explanation for his universe. His physics "is a singularly incongruous theory . . . and in all but its most incongruous portions, it is a relatively unoriginal one."⁷⁸ The theory of the motion of bits of matter dissociated from its parent sphere was anticipated, and more successfully, by Oresme. But despite all this, Kuhn believes that Copernicus is not discredited; his problem and his solution lie elsewhere, and the chief reason for dwelling on his inadequacies is to show how profound his revolution actually was, in that it had eventually to extend into the realm of physical concepts and to undermine ancient confidence in the finitude of the universe.

Kuhn then takes up the problem of restating the formidable technical innovations of the later part of *De Revolutionibus*, building up again from the two-sphere universe described earlier and

⁷⁴ P. 144.

⁷⁵ P. 184.

⁷⁶ P. 144.

⁷⁷ P. 133.

⁷⁸ P. 153.

then adding a moving earth and its companion planets. He indicates briefly but clearly the complexity of Copernicus' final solution, in which the earth revolves on a circle whose center revolves slowly about a point which in turn revolves on a sun-centered circle⁷⁹ and the other planets require complicated compound orbits referred to the earth rather than simply to the sun. In sum, Kuhn agrees with the others that "Copernicus' system is neither simpler nor more accurate than Ptolemy's."⁸⁰

Whence, then, its importance? According to Kuhn, it lay in convincing a few of Copernicus' successors, notably George Joachim Rheticus (1514-1576), Thomas Digges (c. 1546-1595), and Michael Maestlin (1550-1631). The latter was in turn Kepler's teacher. Others, such as Erasmus Reinhold (1511-1553), who calculated by Copernican methods "the first complete astronomical tables prepared in Europe for three centuries,"⁸¹ exploited Copernicanism without overt acknowledgment. The principal advantages of the new system were not practical, though, but aesthetic, and Kuhn wishes to stress this. Certain qualitative features, such as retrograde motion, are more neatly dealt with; the account of the motions of Mercury and Venus is vastly superior; the planets are for the first time unequivocally ordered in terms of relative radial distance from the sun. As Copernicus himself said in his prefatory letter, "the orders and magnitude of all stars and spheres . . . become so bound together that nothing in any part thereof could be moved from its place without producing confusion of all the other parts and of the universe as a whole." Elsewhere he speaks of the "clear bond of harmony in the motion and magnitude of the spheres" revealed in his system. And Kuhn adds, "the sum of the evidence drawn from harmony is nothing if not impressive,"⁸² provided one can comprehend the technical body of *De Revolutionibus*. Hence the chief appeal was less to the layman or even to the sternly pragmatic type of astronomer than to "that limited and perhaps irrational subgroup of mathematical astronomers whose Neoplatonic ear for mathematical harmonies

⁷⁹ Cf. p. 169, with diagrams.

⁸⁰ P. 170.

⁸¹ P. 188.

⁸² P. 180.

could not be obstructed by page after page of complex mathematics leading finally to numerical predictions scarcely better than those they had known before."⁸³ The revolution rested on the insight of those few who could discern the potentialities inherent in what was still a clumsy and inefficient theory in external appearance.

For Kuhn, Copernicus is neither the last of the ancients nor the first of the moderns, but rather "a Renaissance astronomer in whose work the two traditions merge."⁸⁴ The single new concept of his work was that of the planetary earth and the new astronomical harmonies consequent on that view. His contemporaries saw this, and those he converted took just this from him and tended to ignore the traditional concepts in which he embedded his innovation. Consequently they found themselves confronted with a new set of problems arising from the heliocentric astronomy. "In the pursuit of these problems the Copernican Revolution was completed, and a new astronomical tradition, deriving from the *De Revolutionibus*, was founded."⁸⁵ Taken in the proper perspective, as uncovering a fresh set of fruitful problems, Copernicus' work loses its paradoxical character. "The *De Revolutionibus* seems incongruous only to those who expect to find the entire Copernican Revolution in the work which gives that revolution its name," Kuhn asserts, and goes on to add, "such an expectation derives from a misunderstanding of the way in which new patterns of scientific thought are produced."⁸⁶ Finally, Copernicus' personality of dedicated—even blinkered—specialist in mathematical astronomy, should be taken into account. Only such a man could have been "so perturbed by discrepancies of a few degrees in astronomical prediction that in an attempt to solve them he could embrace a cosmological heresy . . ."⁸⁷ and blink the many crudities of his makeshift physical substitute. Most important is his detailed technical study of the mathematical consequences of the earth's motion. This is Copernicus' real contribution.

⁸³ P. 180.

⁸⁴ P. 181.

⁸⁵ P. 182.

⁸⁶ P. 183.

⁸⁷ P. 183.

Thus Kuhn interprets Copernicus' work so as to demonstrate and preserve its traditional revolutionary character, while still accounting for the puzzling features of its content and reception. He follows this central analysis with two chapters carrying the story of the revolution down to the time of Newton. Here he shows some marked divergences from Hall and Butterfield. Kuhn's treatment of the religious controversy arising from the new doctrine is brief though provocative in his explanation of its main features. He passes from it to a more extensive consideration of astronomical developments which constituted the important extensions of and improvements on Copernicus' original theory. Here he deals with Tycho Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo. Of the three, Galileo receives the least attention, and only his telescopic discoveries, which Kuhn admits are only dubiously confirmatory,⁸⁸ are covered. Kepler's Laws, on the other hand, are described as "the astronomical culmination of the Copernican Revolution."⁸⁹ Kuhn's final account of Copernicus' character is so framed that it joins naturally to the acceptance of Kepler as his primary heir.

Since, however, the *terminus ad quem*, Newton's *Principia*, is admitted to be the culmination of more than the astronomical developments, one would expect to find a fairly full discussion of the rise of mechanics. Instead of this, however, the discussion turns on the concept of "corpuscularism" from Descartes to Newton, the mechanism of the motor forces of the solar system, and concepts of gravity. Within the Newtonian universe

the questions raised by Copernicus' astronomical innovations were at last resolved. . . . What the Aristotelian universe had done for earth-centered astronomy the Newtonian universe was to do for Copernican astronomy. Each was a world view that tied astronomy to other sciences and related it to non-scientific thought; each was a conceptual tool, a way of organizing knowledge, evaluating it, and gaining more, and each dominated the science and philosophy of an age.⁹⁰

Because of the power and completeness of the Greek world view, if Copernicus had not audaciously made the first successful scientific break with a main element of the prevailing cosmology,

⁸⁸ P. 224.

⁸⁹ P. 231.

⁹⁰ Pp. 261-264.

the subsequent growth of Western thought, not only in astronomy, but in almost every intellectual sphere, might well have been quite different. Hence Newton's synthesis does indeed turn on Copernicus' work. "The creation of the need [for a new universe] and the aid supplied in its fulfillment are the contributions to history that constitute the Copernican Revolution."⁹¹

V

All three, Hall, Butterfield, and Kuhn, agree that a scientific revolution has taken place, and that it is revolutionary because the character of science itself has altered, and because the ramifications of that alteration have extended into virtually all regions of contemporary life and thought. If one asks, then, *what* it is that has emerged, one would hope to receive from all three a reasonably clear-cut characterization of modern science. Without such an attempt, there is danger that basic confusions will corrupt any broad generalizations concerning science and modern life.

Butterfield's response to such a query is curiously unsatisfying. As an historian his concerns have frequently been religiously oriented; here he tends to stress the effect of the rise of science on the prevailing Judaeo-Christian patterns of thoughts. (This may account for the non-functional exposition of Dante's universe referred to previously.) He concludes that the scientific revolution depends in part on changes in intellectual and emotional attitude toward matter and pure mechanism. Where previously men were intent on miracles—evidence of "divine caprice"—in the 17th century "a difference of feeling marked a transformation in human experience; for it is clear that it was now rather the aspiration of the mind to demonstrate divine order and self-consistency."⁹²

In discussing Harvey, he remarks "we seem to have touched

⁹¹ P. 264.

⁹² P. 106. In his revision, Butterfield amplifies this passage to note that miracles themselves are meaningless without a confidence in the normal orderliness of the universe. And beyond this, many of his other additions are designed to enlarge the account of the revolt against Aristotle quite aside from any religious adaptations or assimilations of him. Thus the new edition points up the orientation of the old without altering it basically.

on something like the genuine scientific revolution at last." ⁹³ He seems to mean this set of characteristics: (1) scrupulous observation; (2) willingness to hold an accepted theory in jeopardy; (3) de-Christianization of the world-view through adoption of a mechanical interpretation of nature; (4) experimental test of hypotheses; (5) measurement and quantification; (6) attainment of an outlook which affords a fruitful basis for further, answerable questions (e.g. "What it [the blood] carries, and why, how, and where it takes up its loads, and how, where, and why it parts with them").⁹⁴ Experiment does not take a very prominent place, however, since he calls the revolution "most significant" ⁹⁵ in astronomy and mechanics, and experimentation is impossible in the former while the crucial development in the latter is the geometrization of space. Galileo's thought-experiments are not crucial experiments in the sense that much of Harvey's work was for instance, yet mathematization is the device by which experiment ceases to be what it had always been before—"an affair of wild and almost pointless fluttering," irrelevant, fantastic, capricious."⁹⁶ But his overall conception of the role of mathematics remains at a low level.

Butterfield gives little general discussion of working concepts in the sciences, hence one must try to infer his central view, if any. Did Butterfield avoid such an analysis because he was writing in an area where he was not by training familiar with the working concepts, or because his approach to historical writing in general is a positivistic one which lays weight on detail and fact rather than abstraction and generality? Curiously, while he disclaims his ability as "general historian" to deal with modern developments in the sciences, he does feel capable of coping with those of the 17th century revolution; perhaps he thinks that the older concepts are either simpler to grasp or so widely disseminated and absorbed that it is otiose to analyze them from a general standpoint. Both of these seem wrong assumptions on his part, but their effect is reinforced by his historian's caution. To eschew or to severely limit hypothesis and abstract concept in normal is historiography

⁹³ Not having found it in Copernicus, as we have seen.

⁹⁴ P. 47.

⁹⁵ P. 72.

⁹⁶ P. 79.

but not in science; that this attitude might be so seriously at odds with the procedures of science itself as to distort an historical interpretation of science is a possibility which deserves consideration. In any event, Butterfield's lack of technical appreciation, especially with regard to mathematics, has served him ill, and it is a pity that his book should give the lay reader the impression of having been more informed than it actually is concerning the nature of science. Close reading reveals an underlying nebulosity on many points.

Kuhn goes further in the direction of an essential account of science than Butterfield does. He is, of course, operating chiefly in the realm of cosmology, and does not dwell extensively on more restricted concepts. But he does hold—and cogently—that to understand a particular event, such as the emergence of Copernicanism, is to understand something about science as such.⁹⁷ And there is a tendency, through the progressive unification of smaller regions of inquiry, such as optical or magnetic theory, for all scientific developments to contribute to a cosmological scheme. As Kuhn comments,

By explaining the physical relation between man's habitat and the rest of nature, they integrate the universe for man and make him feel at home in it. Man does not exist for long without inventing a cosmology, because a cosmology can provide him with a world view which permeates and gives meaning to his every action, practical and spiritual.⁹⁸

Science, for Kuhn, is the search for explanations of observed phenomena.

Economy as a purely logical function, and cosmological satisfaction as a purely psychological function, lie at opposite ends of a spectrum. . . . Words like "explain" and "understand" apparently refer simultaneously to the logical and psychological aspects of conceptual schemes.⁹⁹

The introduction of a psychological factor may seem to cloud the philosophical problems of interpreting the science, but it arises out of the historical frame of reference. Kuhn is trying to account for a vast and fundamental shift in human concerns and activities. If

⁹⁷ Cf. p. 4.

⁹⁸ P. 6.

⁹⁹ P. 38.

one stays within any given stage of conceptual development, the logical factor becomes paramount, but even when one has noted logical deficiencies, there still remains the problem of why these should have impelled anyone to labor to rectify them. Kuhn points out that a scientist derives satisfaction from believing a cosmology to be true; only then does it rank as explanatory regardless of its logical ingenuity. When a scientist commits himself to a conceptual scheme, he commits himself to expect the "additional, but as yet unobserved, properties that the conceptual scheme predicts."¹⁰⁰ This stress on the taking of a conceptual scheme as at least very nearly true runs counter to interpretations of science which prefer to dwell on the formally hypothetical status of scientific principles, but may it not be closer to accounting both for the reluctance with which old schemes are abandoned or modified as well as for the fervor with which new ones can be proposed? And this was Kuhn's historical problem.

The logical economy of concepts is not so much discussed separately as illustrated in his detailed analysis of cosmologies ranging from the primitive "two-sphere" model to the post-Copernican ones of Kepler, Brahe, and Newton. We have already seen that one of Kuhn's main theses is the role of the exact technical thinker with his mathematical tools, in the shift from world view to world view. Nothing similar to this is found in Butterfield. But because Kuhn deals more fully with the relations of exact science with other fields—religion, philosophy, and the like—and because of his presentation of science as a dynamic process fraught with both success and error, the net impression is a much warmer one than that made by Butterfield's book.

One derives from Hall's book a clearer view of what science is than from the other two. This is interesting, especially in view of the fact that he expressly disclaims even any single indispensable "scientific method."¹⁰¹ "A scientific approach to problems," he says, "must be the sum of its many aspects—experimentation, mathematical analysis, quantitative accuracy, and so on—varying according to the nature of the problem."¹⁰² Hence his working

¹⁰⁰ P. 39.

¹⁰¹ Cf. p. xiv.

¹⁰² P. 185.

definition of natural science is quite broad: "Natural science may be defined sufficiently for my purpose as the conscious systematic investigation of the phenomena revealed in the human environment, and in man himself objectively considered."¹⁰³ Science had its earliest beginnings in "the coalescence of these three elements in man's attitude to Nature—empirical practice, magic, and rational thinking."¹⁰⁴ Magic is finally expelled in the 17th century, pure empiricism only by the 19th century. The result is modern science, which demands rigorous standards in observing and experimenting; which excludes spirits and occult powers, dealing only with material entities; which distinguishes firmly "between theories confirmed by multiple evidence, tentative hypotheses and unsupported speculations; and which "presents, not a possible or even a plausible picture of nature, but one in which all available facts are given their logical, orderly places."¹⁰⁵

This last aspect is that of explanation, which Hall deems the function of science. Medieval science, imperfect though it was, was true science, because it "offered a system of explanation, closely related to the facts of experience and satisfactory to those who used it, giving them a degree of control over their natural resources and allowing them to make certain predictions about the course of future events."¹⁰⁶ Because the Greeks discovered the power of generalizations, "in essence, the Greek notion of scientific explanation . . . did not differ from that of modern science."¹⁰⁷ In both cases a phenomenon is first accurately described, then related to the series of general universal truths. The shift to modern science lies in the types of universal concepts constituting the series, and the methods of recognizing them with certainty. Choice of the latter is governed in part by possession of a critical frame of mind, as opposed to credulousness, and the demand that the questions guiding the investigator be such as to receive "a single, unambiguous response."¹⁰⁸ The essential change from the

¹⁰³ P. xi.

¹⁰⁴ P. xii.

¹⁰⁵ P. xi.

¹⁰⁶ P. 33.

¹⁰⁷ P. 160.

¹⁰⁸ P. 174.

Greek or medieval approach to the former lies in the current recognition that causal analysis is actually in terms of concepts gotten either by construction or by generalization from some observable phenomenon; hence "the great methodological discovery on which the scientific revolution flourished" is that "explanation and description have no really distinct significance in science."¹⁰⁹ Causal explanation is therefore resolved into logical pattern. Here there is an obvious difference from Kuhn's position.

Given this situation stemming from Galilean science in particular,¹¹⁰ experiment cannot confirm the whole intellectual structure, since in the analysis on which the latter rests one finds concepts which are not simply given in observation but which are "ideas or mental constructs which help to form the world-picture."¹¹¹ These are generated at least in part from a pre-existing philosophical outlook, and are justified by their utility in ordering the facts of experience. The philosophical frame is not itself subject to scientific test, and hence changes in it are not analyzable in the same way as more restricted changes within theories.

Hence, the final implication of this condition appears when we ask "the crucial question of the scientific revolution . . . 'Why do men commit themselves to one kind of proposition about nature rather than another?' "¹¹² We find that "men's thoughts and actions were modified in ways that we simply cannot ascribe to the results of observation and experiment. . . . We cannot exclude from science, which is rational, the influence of factors which are irrational."¹¹³ Science, construed historically, must be interpreted partially in non-formalistic terms, and it appears as "an expanding framework of exploration, not the cultivation of special techniques."¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ P. 176.

¹¹⁰ The quoted statements are taken from Hall's chapter entitled "The Principles of Science in the Early Seventeenth Century." It is a nice discussion of the philosophy of method in an historical frame.

¹¹¹ P. 175. The example given is that of acceleration, where the basic concepts of space and time as they function in the theory are arbitrary constructs.

¹¹² P. 365.

¹¹³ Pp. 366-7.

¹¹⁴ P. 30.

Hall's account is thus in many respects similar to Kuhn's, but because it ranges over several main branches of natural science it can give a clearer picture of the character of scientific inquiry. Hall is the better writer of the two, but Kuhn writes with more gusto and is sometimes for that reason more stimulating and suggestive.

What is probably the most widely read book of the three, Butterfield's *Origins of Modern Science*, is the most deficient in its grasp of the central problems; the main token of this that we have elicited is his divergence from the other two on the problem of the Copernican revolution. It seems certain—to revert to the idea with which we began—that in the space of several years Butterfield will be replaced by Hall or by an equivalent book; by then still newer volumes will be appearing, rendering even these obsolete. Progress will lie not so much in the accumulation of more data concerning the period discussed in these books, but in a closer assimilation of what we now have to more abstract studies in the logic—and the psychology—of science. It behooves anyone interested in historical studies in philosophy to do what he can to reduce the usual lag in diffusion and acceptance of current work in the history of science.

VI

There is one further question which may well be set down here as a kind of coda; the last word on it is far in the future. George Sarton has been indefatigable for decades in preaching the importance of the history of science in shaping an expanded humanism. The reissue of his book, *The History of Science and the New Humanism*¹¹⁵ gives another opportunity to consider the actual uses of the history of science. There is a fair amount of talk currently about the sciences as members of the humanities; the meaning of this seems to be that their educational effect is comparable to that of the traditional humanities. As matters now stand, the chief func-

¹¹⁵ New York: George Braziller, 1956. The volume consists of two sets of lectures, delivered originally in 1930 and 1935, plus an essay first published in *Isis* in 1920. As Sarton points out, what he says here is a continuation of views first stated as 1912, immediately after he received his doctorate.

tion of the history of science is to give the non-scientist at least the illusion of understanding science. There is, and will continue to be, a serious question as to whether it is an adequate *substitute* (as opposed to supplement) for a stubborn effort to study science itself. But the other side of the coin is the question whether it is being used—or even can be used—as a contribution toward the humanizing of those embarking on a scientific career.

The question of the necessity for any additional humanizing influence beyond technical studies is a touchy one, especially in view of the attempts to identify the sciences with the humanities just mentioned. There has been a steady growth in requirements of non-science courses for science students, which would seem to attest to less than perfect confidence in Advanced Genetics or Selected Topics in Modern Physics as true humanizing forces. The problem has been candidly set forth by T. North Whitehead in an article entitled "Humanism in a Scientific Age," which appeared recently.¹¹⁶ He says that while he knows many humanist scientists, in no case has he found that this condition is a result of their *scientific* training. Sarton's older judgment is still valid.

The truth is, a man of science is not necessarily wise; his mind may be very acute and yet very narrow; he may be able to penetrate mysteries veiled to all other men, and be in that respect of almost uncanny intelligence, and yet be very dull and dense in every other. Finally it must be confessed that many men of science show a lack of education which cannot but irritate the people upon whom they are looking down and who are peradventure far more civilized than they are.¹¹⁷

Sarton's recommendation, and it seems to be Whitehead's also, is an increased study of the history of science. Yet given the motivations which, Whitehead admits, already interfere with a budding chemist's or engineer's appreciation of the liberal arts, we do not yet have sufficient data to tell whether enforced exposure in this area will produce the desired result. Sarton has been a persuasive

¹¹⁶ *American Scientist*, Vol. XLVI, 3 (Sept., 1958).

¹¹⁷ P. 51. The description should not be confined to scientists, of course. There are no grounds for smugness on the side of the traditional humanities.

advocate of his lifelong dream, but the best compliment one might pay it would be to treat it as a hypothesis for serious and thorough testing, to be rejected if it fails. Perhaps some day this will be done; until then we must be on guard against wishful thinking and sentimentalism.

Yale University.

ETHICS, METAPHYSICS AND SOCIOLOGY

H. J. McCLOSKEY

I

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DIVERSITY in moral codes, in moral philosophies and in moral behavior. In philosophy, in sociology and in the social sciences generally, ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism have won considerable support. This poses the problem of the possibility of a valid rational objective ethic, i.e., of whether ethics is outside the sphere of reason. If a rational ethic is possible, then we are faced with the problem of explaining and justifying it. And if the social sciences are not to be construed as lending substantial support to cultural relativism, there is the problem of accounting for the apparent relevance of the social sciences to morality, and, more positively, of relating the latter more effectively to the former. Again, the diversity in moral philosophies, in "styles of reasoning" in ethics, raises a number of problems. How, for instance, in the light of it can we speak of "the unity of ethics"? And, related to this problem, how can we account for and explain the impulses that have led to these different approaches, and how should we elucidate the metaphysical presuppositions of these different types of theories? It is to these various questions that the writers to be considered here have directed their attention.¹

The three works to be examined here are concerned in their various ways with the rationality of ethics. Baier is concerned almost exclusively with bringing out the rationality of ethics, and in the process develops a new/old ethical theory. Ginsberg's concern with "the rational ethic" is rather subsidiary to his main themes, namely the unsoundness of cultural relativism and the truth concerning the relevance of the findings of sociology and

¹ Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. Morris Ginsberg, *Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Vol. 1, *On the Diversity of Morals*. New York: Macmillan, 1957. D. M. Mackinnon: *A Study in Ethical Theory*. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1957. (Distributed by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1958).

other social sciences to ethics. Mackinnon is largely concerned with the meta-ethical problem of the "different styles of reasoning" in ethics, and hence with the problem of the inter-relation of ethics and metaphysics on various levels, logical, historical and psychological.

Baier, although writing in the analyst idiom and directing himself against the recent analyst theories of Stevenson, Hare and Nowell-Smith, as much as against the older theories of Plato, Aristotle, the natural law theorists, Hume, Kant, Moore and Ross, argues in an *a priorist* manner to an egoistic, Hobbesian, conformist ethic, holding that only such an account explains the rationality of moral discourse. His *The Moral Point of View* is an important addition to the ethical writings which have come from the logical analysis "school" of philosophy, even though in its constructive aspects it is largely an unsuccessful attempt to resurrect Hobbes, (the key chapters, 8 and 12, are the least closely argued and the least plausible of the whole book). The negative, critical sections, on the other hand, are acute and constitute a valuable, compact and penetrating statement of the difficulties of both contemporary and traditional theories.

The Diversity of Morals is a collection of essays previously published by Ginsberg during a period of some twenty-three years; yet the result is a well-unified book, and one that must rank as one of the more useful, if not specifically original contributions to the books in ethics in recent years. Ginsberg defends a rational ethic of ideals related to human needs, but his main purpose is to defend the distinction between fact and values as a genuine distinction against the arguments of cultural relativists, and then, on the basis of this, to relate ethics to practical situations, to sociology, and to allied social sciences, showing that these social sciences do not displace ethics but presuppose it. In Part 2 there is interesting incidental discussion of philosophical issues but Ginsberg's main themes there relate to the sphere and methods appropriate to sociology.

Mackinnon's *A Study in Ethical Theory* is neither an attempt to develop an ethical theory nor to expose the defects of particular theories of the past or present day; it is not concerned with the problem of ethical epistemology which is Baier's main concern,

nor with the relevance to ethics of the social sciences, which is Ginsberg's primary preoccupation. Rather, Mackinnon is concerned with thinking in ethics, that is, "the different styles of reasoning," the different levels of thinking such as the practical level of personal perplexity, the higher level of logical analysis and clarification, and the third, more general level of the metaphysical presuppositions of different types of ethics, at the same time noting their interrelations. Mackinnon gives a fairly accurate appraisal of the book when he observes in the Preface:

This book is sadly inconclusive. It is a study in ethical theory as its title suggests; it is not an "ethics," but an attempt to study different styles of argument concerning the foundations of morality, by methods sometimes analytic and sometimes historical. It is informed by a desire to bring out some of the ways in which the problem (or problems) of the possibility of metaphysics impinges on moral reflection, the way we think we should live, choose, act. This impact is much more complex and awkward a thing than is sometimes allowed; and it is reciprocal. If the book has any value, it may be in the way it enables readers to see in a different context, and from an altered perspective, much with which they will be already familiar in books of greater scholarship and analytic power.

II

The problems then of the three works to be examined here relate to the rationality of ethics, ethics and the social sciences, ethics and metaphysics. We may now consider how successfully these problems are handled, and how suggestive of better answers are those discussions which are themselves not satisfactory.

Baier starts from the unsatisfactoriness of traditional and contemporary theories arguing that they fail to take note of the main logical features of moral judgments and to answer the important questions pressed by moral skeptics. The main logical features of moral judgments which he notes are: (a) Moral judgments may be mutually contradictory. (b) Moral judgments are capable of guiding a moral agent in search of the morally right thing to do. (c) There must be good reasons why any and every moral agent should do the morally right thing rather than the opposite. (d) We often know whether a course of action is right or wrong

even though we cannot perceive it by means of any one of our senses. Baier does not argue for these being logical features of moral judgments, although elsewhere he does show how theories and wrong analyses have led to the denial of various of these apparently obvious features of moral judgments. All but (c) would seem without question to be features of moral judgments, and this depends on how it is interpreted. Clearly these features are difficult to explain in terms of most traditional and contemporary theories; it is his purported proof that no important theory accounts for these features of moral judgments that creates for Baier the problem of developing a new account of moral judgments which does justice to these facts.

In brief, Baier's view is that moral behavior is to be explained as consisting in acting on moral reasons. Moral reasons are explained as being determined by the moral consideration-making beliefs of our community; and the moral consideration-making beliefs are explained as those beliefs which occur in moral deliberation and which make it moral. Moral deliberation is characterized as deliberation from the moral point of view, which in turn is characterized in terms of four criteria—acting on principles, universally applying, universally teachable, and being in the interest of everyone. Although in a confused discussion these criteria seem to be advanced as a test of the truth of moral principles as well as as a set of criteria of the moral point of view, independent argument is later offered concerning the test of truth of moral principles. The test seems to be that these principles are true when they serve the end for which we engage in reasoning, namely to maximize satisfactions and to minimize frustrations. Baier explains that moral reasons are only one type among other reasons (individual, social and moral) for practical conduct. How we determine the superiority of reasons—e.g., moral by contrast with social and individual—is largely explained in terms of its being the very point of morality to provide reasons which override considerations of self-interest where it would be harmful overall for each to seek his self-interest. Thus, in terms of such an account of morality, Baier purports to show how it is that we *know* what is right and wrong, and also *why we ought to be moral*—because it would be madness, literally madness, not to follow the most superior of

reasons. He explains *why people are moral* in terms of social conditioning to rational living, and of its paying, and in terms of reason, by definition, being that which moves us. In these ways he purports to answer the three questions which he sets out at the outset as the three crucial questions of ethics.

Baier claims that this theory is equally successful in accounting for the logical features of moral judgments he had noted. The truth and falsity of moral utterances, and hence the possibility of their being *mutually contradictory* is explained in terms of moral judgments being value judgments, and value judgments being simply a type of comparison and hence verifiable as are other comparisons, that is, in terms of reference to criteria. Value judgments are said to differ only in usually raising the problem of validation as well as of verification. Validation relates to the justification of criteria. With moral judgments the criteria are moral reasons, and these are validated by reference to the moral point of view and the general account of the justification of moral consideration-making beliefs. Obviously Baier's theory also allows him to offer an answer to how it is that moral judgments may *guide* a moral agent, and to explain how it is that there are always *reasons* for the moral agent's doing the morally right thing. Further his theory purports to show how *knowledge* in moral matters may be attained, even though not through the senses. It also permits Baier to explain how it is that we are moral, without resorting to a theory of reason as a faculty or power. However, in view of the considerable claims made on its behalf, of doing what the traditional theories have so "scandalously" failed to do such a theory needs much to be said of it both by way of explanation and justification. Baier attempts to give the latter by developing further the shortcomings of traditional theories in the face of the questions and challenges of moral skeptics. The three questions which he takes as central here are: (i) Why should we do what is right? (ii) Why do we do what is right? (iii) How do we know what is right? Baier argues that the traditional theories fail to answer these questions satisfactorily. Since the third question, the epistemological question, is logically prior to the other two, Baier proceeds to concentrate on it for he

contends that it is in explaining moral knowledge that traditional theories have failed most completely.

In developing his epistemological criticisms, Baier groups ethical theories under four general headings, with subdivisions being drawn within each group, so that practically all the significant theories of ethics are examined and rejected for their inability to explain how we may know what is right or wrong.

(A) In criticizing what he calls *law theories* Baier means to reject theories such as Kant's, and the Thomist natural law theories, as well as cruder theistic theories. The criticism is that laws or commands require a law-giver who may or may not be known. If he may be known, then his commands may be fallible; hence we could never know whether his commands were correct. If on the other hand, morality is explained as the command of a perfect being, we can never tell whether any laws really emanate from this being. In any case it is absurd to suggest that what is right or wrong has been made so by someone's law. Not even God can say: "I shall abolish the moral law against killing." Baier in this acute and ever-timely argument brings out very clearly the autonomy of ethics in respect to religion, showing that allusion to God is no help in providing a solid foundation for ethics nor for evading the traditional difficulties of ethical knowledge. This criticism does not invalidate natural law ethics, but more obvious epistemological objections appear to do so.

(B) In treating of *moral fact theories*, Baier means to consider a whole range of theories including utilitarianism, ideal and "non-ideal," as well as theories like that of Sir David Ross in terms of *prima facie* duties. Against the naturalistic fact theories, Baier alludes to the criticisms of Moore and Ross—criticisms which are not epistemological objections. With non-naturalistic theories, he rejects the various accounts offered of our ways of attaining knowledge of moral facts—e.g., by a moral sense, by intuition, by reason. Baier simply denies that there is such a sense as the moral sense. He contends that intuition could not in itself be a valid way of knowing as it would first have to have its findings verified by ordinary methods. The claims of reason are rejected on the grounds that if by reason is meant calculative reason, then it can only judge

about means, and if categorical reason is meant, then reason would only discern empty imperatives such as Kant's categorical imperative. The case against knowledge by intuition given here by Baier is absurdly weak, and amounts to the dogmatic assertion of the empiricist postulate. In our consideration of Ginsberg's theory, it will become apparent just how inadequate such an objection to knowledge by intuition is.

(C) In criticizing *the response theories* (i.e., theories that moral expressions express the response of the speaker, his feelings, attitudes, etc.) Baier sets out a dilemma. (a) The response would have to be a characteristically moral one. This would necessitate a method of determining those feelings which are characteristically moral. Or (b), we should have to ask: "Whose feelings, responses, or attitudes should count when there are differences among people?" Since we can and must distinguish moral approval from non-moral approval, and hence have some means of drawing this distinction, reference to approval does not help. Many other objections to the response theory are noted, e.g., feelings may be liked or disliked, but my own moral attitudes cannot be liked or disliked by me. Since the response theory has very frequently been shown to be unsound in recent ethical writings, these additional objections need not be noted here.

(D) *The emotive theory* represents a denial of the epistemological problem. Baier argues against it by insisting that there is an epistemological problem. Two judgments may be contradictory, hence they imply a procedure for settling disputes. The version of the emotive theory called by Baier, the impact theory, is rejected as failing to distinguish between what a remark means and the influence it tends to have. On the other hand, what he calls the imperatival version regards moral expressions as commanding, requesting or telling someone to act in a certain way, and is rejected because it is faced by the problem of whether to allow the possibility of moral reasons. If the existence of moral reasons is disallowed the theory becomes the impact theory, whilst if their existence is allowed, the old epistemological question arises. An additional objection is that commands are not essentially intended

for answering questions. "What shall I do?" is a request for knowledge or authority, not an attempt to elicit a command.

Clearly these criticisms arising out of the epistemological problem relate to most important ethical theories, and with the exceptions indicated, and certain qualifications of detail in other cases, are seriously damaging criticisms.

Baier develops two other lines of criticism at some length, and with a considerable measure of success except in respect of Plato. He criticizes the theories of Plato, Hume and Stevenson, and kindred theories, for the accounts they contain concerning *what makes something a reason*. And he criticizes these same theories and others for their accounts of the psychology of moral behavior, arguing that faulty psychological theories are developed in answer to the question, "How is it that we are moral?" The discussion of Kant occurring in this latter context is quite valuable. These criticisms are less damaging than the epistemological criticisms because many theories—e.g., those of Moore and Ross—are not obviously exposed to them, and because various of the theories against which these criticisms are directed seem to admit of restatement so as to circumvent them.

There is much else of a critical nature of real value in Baier's examination of other theories, e.g., his refutation of the view that value judgments are commendations, his detailed examination of Kant's distinction of categorical and hypothetical imperatives, his discussion of Kant's universalization test, the treatment of theories about the naturalness of morality. However these discussions bear less directly on Baier's working out of his own theory.

Baier approaches the more constructive development of his theory by stating that the crucial question—"What ought I to do?"—is asked before acting and is asked to obtain guidance as to what is the morally right thing to do. The crucial problem, he tells us, is to explain the double nature of moral judgments. They are designed to guide (hence the plausibility of the emotive theory) but they are also meant to tell us something (hence the attractiveness of the various traditional theories).

The argument commences with an analysis of value judgments. This has a twofold purpose: to bring out that moral as well as value judgments in general may be true or false (in the way that

comparisons and rankings may be true or false), and to consider how their verification would proceed. His argument is that ordinary comparisons and rankings are empirically verifiable, and that their verification involves reference to criteria (comparisons) and standards (rankings), e.g., taller than, tall; hotter than, hot. Value judgments differ from other comparisons and rankings in that the use of different criteria (and standards) in the latter is of no great consequence if understood, whereas in the former it is of very great consequence. This leads to the introduction of the distinction between verification and validation. Verification proceeds by *reference* to the criteria. Validation is *of* the criteria. Value judgments, Baier notes, usually although not always, involve both.

Validation of criteria proceeds in various ways. With some things, e.g. cars, it may proceed by reference to the purpose. With moral validation the explanation, Baier suggests, is to be given in terms of moral reasons, and in the manner of justifying them. This leads Baier to consider the nature of moral reasons, they being considered firstly in the general context of reasons which may be offered in answer to the question, "What shall I do?", this question being equated firstly with the distinct question, "What is the best thing to do?", and this in turn with the distinct question, "What is the course supported by the best reasons?"

Baier, having rejected what he takes to be the answers of Plato, Hume and Stevenson to the question, "What makes something a reason for or against entering on a certain line of action?", argues that reasons are to be explained in terms of what he calls "consideration-making beliefs." He explains his view by reference to the example of selling a car at an excessive profit and contrary to the law. The minor premiss in the syllogism is said to be the reason, and like other minor premisses, only becomes relevant and appropriate by reference to the major premiss to which it relates. Hence moral rules are explained in terms of these consideration-making beliefs, our moral convictions, which figure as major premisses in our practical syllogisms; and the reasons in reply to practical questions in general are explained in terms of minor premisses which relate to rule-like major premisses of consideration-making beliefs in general. It might be urged that Baier

is somewhat arbitrarily restricting the use of the expression "reason." It is true that more usually we give as reasons what Baier calls the minor premisses of these practical syllogisms, but we need not restrict ourselves to the minor premiss. It is equally possible to give a reason by pointing to the consideration-making belief, the major premiss, and the reasons for its being thought to be true. However Baier argues that to give a reason is to bring an act under a consideration-making belief, and that to give a moral reason is to bring an act under a moral consideration-making belief. This means that to complete his account, Baier has to indicate how to distinguish moral from other consideration-making beliefs, and also how the truth or falsity of these consideration-making beliefs may be determined. Further he needs to explain the superiority of moral reasons over other kinds of reasons, namely individual and social reasons.

Baier argues that moral reasons are those which relate to moral consideration-making beliefs. These in turn are explained as those which occur in moral deliberation and the occurrence of which makes the deliberation moral. Baier approaches the problem of characterizing the moral by considering the possibility of moral judgments being true or false, and urging this as a ground, among other grounds, for distinguishing moral principles from law and custom. He cites the example, "Killing is wrong," suggesting that it amounts to saying that "Killing constitutes the contravention of a certain sort of rule or commandment 'Don't kill,' 'Thou shalt not kill.' " Hence, "Killing is wrong" may be true or false for it may or may not be the contravention of such a rule. This most unpalatable line of argument leads Baier to ask: "What are the tests this rule must pass, if it is to be true that killing is wrong?" In a very confused discussion it seems to emerge that Baier thinks that we can approach the two distinct questions, "What is a moral rule?", and "What is a true moral rule?" from the one standpoint of determining what is the point of view of morality, the criteria of the latter seemingly being regarded as criteria of both a moral rule and a true moral rule. Baier's confusion seems to have resulted from his wanting the criteria of the moral point of view to constitute a test of what is a moral rule, and hence *ipso facto* of what is *capable of* being either true or false. However he seems

to muddle his way into proposing the same test for both, although later he offers an independent test of the truth of a moral rule and writes as if this confusion has not occurred in his discussion of the moral point of view. The confusion is therefore significant only in that it obscures Baier's exposition of his theory.

The characterizing of the moral point of view is a key step in the exposition and defense of Baier's theory. It is by reference to it that Baier seeks to explain what is a moral reason, moral reasons being the criteria by reference to which moral judgments are verified, and which themselves must be validated by reference to moral consideration-making beliefs, which in turn are those characterized by the moral point of view.

Baier approaches the problem of what is a moral rule by considering how moral rules differ from custom, law and taboo, arguing:

My main contention is that we could not properly speak of a *morality*, as opposed to a system of conventions, customs, or laws, until the question of the correctness or incorrectness, truth or falsity, of the rules prevalent in a community is asked, until, in other words, the prevalent rules are subjected to certain tests.²

This leads to the question, "What is the test a moral conviction must pass in order to be called true?" It is this question which leads to allusion to the moral point of view, Baier replying to his question that "our moral convictions are true if they can be seen to be required or acceptable from the moral point of view."

Baier dismisses the claims of self-interest to co-incide with or be the moral point of view and goes on to list three formal and one material criterion of the moral point of view. He is purporting in this discussion to be offering a conceptual analysis, but at no stage are even the beginnings of an argument offered for these criteria as criteria which characterize the concept of morality. They seem to be regarded as too obvious to need any sort of defense. There are good reasons for rejecting all four, and hence for rejecting Baier's whole account of the verification of moral judgments. The criteria are explained as follows:

1. Adopting the moral point of view is said to involve *acting*

² *Ibid.*, p. 174.

on principles (where the contrasts appear to be with arbitrary or capricious action and with acting with an aim rather than on principles). Moral rules are said to be absolutely inflexible and to admit of no exceptions. (Baier points out that all this was seen by Kant but that Kant failed to see that whilst there could be no exceptions to the rule, exceptions could be and are written into the rules, as for instance, with justifiable homicide). 2. Moral principles are not merely principles on which a person must always act without making exceptions; they are also principles *meant for everybody*. 3. The teaching of morality must be completely universal and open. An esoteric code, a set of precepts known only to the initiated, is said not to be a morality. Three subsidiary criteria are derived from this. (i) Moral rules must not be self-frustrating. (ii) They must not be self-defeating, i.e., morally impossible. (iii) They must admit of being taught as moral rules of a group must be taught. (This is thought to rule out the rule: "Always assert what you think not to be the case.") 4. The material criterion is that a moral rule must be in the interest of everyone alike from the "God's eye view" conceived of by Hobbes. This is described as the principle of reversibility, as it implies that conduct must be acceptable to a person whether he is at the giving or receiving end of it. Baier argues that this principle implies positive injunctions as well as entailing certain prohibitions. It is distinguished from the universalizability test summed up in the formula: "Suppose everyone did the same." The latter is explained as being a useful practical guide if it is qualified in the ways indicated by Baier.

Although the context suggests that Baier in his very confused discussion comes to construe these criteria as tests of the truth of moral rules as well as of what is a moral rule, their soundness as tests needs no discussion since they are obviously unsound, and Baier clearly shows in a later chapter that he means to offer a distinct test of the truth of moral rules.

A large number of serious objections may be urged against these criteria as criteria of the moral point of view, and this means that Baier's theory breaks down at a crucial point.

An absurd implication of the first criterion—that exceptions are built into the rules, and that moral rules never admit exceptions

to them—is that we should seldom know the principle on which we are acting. This is not the case. Much of our moral perplexity concerns whether to break one rule rather than another. Telling against the same criterion is the fact that our moral rules—consider our sexual code—would still be moral rules even if Kings and prophets were exempted from observing them, or if they lapsed every February 29th, or on special occasions. This brings out the vague sense of principle involved here. Again, it is not obviously true that morality involves acting on principles. People may have a morality of a single principle, i.e., of an aim in Baier's language, and still properly be said to have a morality. The aim or principle of self-perfection is still a moral principle even when the only moral principle of a person.

The second criterion is equally unsatisfactory. A moral principle is no less a moral principle for being meant only for white people, or freemen, or males. A people which restricts morality to freemen and excludes slaves, or which engages in any modern counterpart to this sort of discrimination, would be said to have a low level morality, but as Ginsberg points out, this judgment is itself a moral judgment and does not show that such a morality is not a real morality. What is needed here is an argument of the type urged by Socrates against Polemarchus' account of justice as doing good to friends and evil to enemies. However it is arguable how sound that argument really is, and how far it can be extended against moralities which restrict the scope of their moral rules. It is relevant that Ginsberg observes what a shockingly novel moral view it was when it was first suggested that moral rules applied to slaves as well as to freemen, to one's enemies as well as to one's friends. The limited universality compatible with a rule thought to be a genuine moral rule is best exemplified in the extension over the ages of the range of people thought to be covered by the injunction "Love thy neighbor." Ginsberg's empirical investigations, which obviously bear on the conceptual issue, lead him to conclude:

Formally all the ethico-religious systems are universalist in scope, and their insistence on sincerity and the inward nature of virtue implies that for them goodness consists in doing what is right because it is believed to be right. But the formal resemblance is deceptive. The universalism is never thorough-going and is variously limited. Doing

right because it is believed to be right may mean in one case because it is the will of God and that will may well be considered inscrutable; or it may mean . . . not so much because they are worthy of it, but because they are the objects of divine love and ennobled by the Incarnation; or again for prudential reasons because it would lead to beatitude in this or another world.³

This criterion may also be rejected on the grounds that it is simply false that moral rules are meant for everyone equally. It is a plain fact of experience that there are different rules governing different people—property-owners and the property-less, the married and the single, creditors and debtors, etc. Baier attempts to take note of some of these facts in terms of his quite proper distinction between absolute morality and true moralities. However, unless the absolute morality is reduced to the one solitary tautology, "Seek the good and avoid the evil," there will be different principles for different people, as well as variations in the range of principles corresponding to the differing levels of moralities.

The criterion of universal teachability and its derivatives, seems no better than the others. A self-frustrating rule might well be a moral rule, e.g., suicide, or suicide in defeat; and a moral rule can be a rule of a clique as with the demanding moralities of religious orders, or of "higher class" schools or universities. In these cases the rules are often thought to be binding only on the members of the group and not on all members of the community. Again, a code of limited lying, which would be self-defeating if universally taught, might be held as a code by a group within a community. To see this we need only to consider the ethical codes of advertisers and propagandists—and it is important to stress that advertisers and propagandists have moral codes which govern them in their professional activities.

The material criterion, that a rule must be in the interest of everyone—from a "God's eye view"—is sound only if made circular. Many genuine moral principles are contrary to the interest of everyone, but they are moral principles nonetheless. Consider the principles of the Sermon on the Mount, or the principle of punishment viewed purely as retribution.

Baier is therefore wrong in his characterizing of morality, and

³ *The Diversity of Morals*, p. 106.

with this his whole account breaks down, for unless he can explain what a moral rule is, he cannot explain how it may be shown to be true or false, why it pays to be moral, why we ought to be moral, nor how it is that moral judgments are to be verified.

However the problem of characterizing moral rules remains and is itself an important one, and one to which we do not find the answer in the writings of the sociologists. Ginsberg brings out that the usual sociologist's definition of morality is somewhat arbitrary. In fact it is much more arbitrary than Ginsberg suggests, including as it does, customs, taboos etc., and excluding ideals. Its unsatisfactoriness becomes apparent if we consider the sorts of conclusions that would be reached about our present day morality by a sociologist using Tyler's definition of morality as "a man's conformity to the customs of the society he belongs to." Baier is right in stressing that there may be pre-moral societies just as there are pre-political societies. He is right in insisting that law *qua* law, custom *qua* custom, taboo *qua* taboo and etiquette *qua* etiquette are not morality. However customs, taboos, etc., may figure as parts of moralities; hence morality, taboo and custom are not so sharply cut off as Baier suggests. This is evident if we consider many of the rules of our moral code, e.g., our incest rules. A great deal of reform of moral codes proceeds by rejecting rules as being *mere* conventions, prejudices, or taboos; and many of our moral rules seem ripe for such rejection today. However, until they are rejected and acknowledged as being *merely* taboos, prejudices or conventions, they seem to remain genuine, although false moral rules. How is this possible? Baier would seem to have part of the answer when he insists that moral rules are in the sphere of truth and falsity. Just so long as a rule is used or thought of in such a way as to permit it to be taken out of the sphere of truth and falsity, as when it is declared to be a mere taboo or convention, it ceases to be a moral rule. But many rules are conceived of as being within the sphere of truth and falsity, without being moral rules. What then characterizes a moral rule? Here it would seem that we are forced to describe them in a partly circular way, in terms of the moral predicates they contain, i.e., by reference to the predicates good, right and moral obligation, and hence to suggest an entirely differ-

ent moral theory, e.g., of the kind developed by Sir David Ross, with its own problems of the ontological implications of these predicates. That is why the breakdown of Baier's attempt to characterize the moral point of view in non-moral terms is so damaging to his whole argument.

Enough then has already been said to destroy Baier's theory. However a further important step in its development needs to be examined, namely, the ultimate justification given of moral consideration-making beliefs. Here again we find that Baier's theory breaks down for lack of adequate proof and because of strong opposing considerations.

Baier outlines his justification of moral principles in the context of an explanation of all consideration-making beliefs. He starts from the non-moral rule of reason, private enjoyment, and from this derives the general formula:

The problem of the truth or falsity of consideration-making beliefs is reduced to the question whether it is better that they, rather than their contraries and contradictories, should be used as rules of reason, that is, as major premisses in practical arguments. How can we tell? ⁴

Baier rightly argues that this question cannot be settled simply by looking at the linguistic proprieties, but as an alternative, he seems simply to offer a circular—or question-begging—argument:

What, then, is relevant? Following reasons is following those hints which are most likely to make the course of action the best in the circumstances. The criteria of "the best course of action" are linked with what we mean by "the good life". . . . Our very purpose in "playing the reasoning game" is to maximise the satisfactions and minimise the frustrations. Deliberately to frustrate ourselves and to minimise satisfaction would certainly be to go counter to the very purpose for which we deliberate and weigh the pros and cons. . . . Insofar as we enter on *that* "game" at all we are therefore . . . bound to agree that the consideration-making belief which is prevalent in our society is better than its contrary ⁵ . . .

To sum up. People who replace our most fundamental consideration-making belief by its contrary or contradictory will not do as well as those who adhere to it. *Those who adopt its contrary must even be said to be mad.* This seems to me to be the best possible argument for the preferability of our fundamental consideration-making belief

⁴ *The Moral Point of View*, p. 300.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

to its contrary and contradictory. And this amounts to a proof of its truth.⁶

The outline of the theory is completed when it is shown how the different types of reasons are to be weighed against each other. Baier here seems to argue empirically, from how we think we ought to weigh the different types of reasons against each other, and more significantly, by reference to an argument of a more *a priori* character which runs:

The very *raison d'être* of a morality is to yield reasons which over-rule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone's following self-interest would be harmful to everyone. Hence moral rules are superior to all others.⁷

There are a lot of objections which must be urged here.

1. Even if the theory were supported by good reasons—and this I shall be concerned to deny—it would still be unsatisfactory because seriously incomplete. Baier's account simply does not deal with the problem of explaining how the more usual forms of moral perplexity are to be resolved. This means that the theory is unsatisfactory in the respect on which Baier bases his boldest claims, namely in respect of its success in meeting the epistemological problem. To explain: Baier fails to indicate how a person determines his duty in a society in which there are rival moralities, and in a community in which there is general uncertainty about certain rules. Consider how, on Baier's theory, a perplexed person living in a mixed Protestant, Catholic community such as the United States would determine the rights and wrongs of divorce, birth control, voluntary euthanasia and of certain forms of indirect lying. Similarly the theory seems to offer no guidance to an individual who feels that the moral rules of his community are defective and in need of reform. Should he obey them without comment, or "obey punctually and censure freely" or should he disregard the community's rules entirely and live on the basis of those he thinks to be best? Baier sets out certain rules in his account of the moral point of view, and in his account of the method of determining the truth of moral principles which bear on

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

these problems, but they are not adequate, and the practical impact of his theory would seem more usually to suggest moral conformism for the want of adequate grounds to justify anything else. This incompleteness in the resolution of the epistemological problem is clearly a serious defect, for it is not simply that the theory does not resolve moral perplexity but that it seems not even to be able to suggest how much everyday moral perplexity is to be resolved.

2. In spite of the repeated promises throughout the book that chapter 12 will provide the answers, very little is said in chapter 12 about moral rules. As a result we are left puzzled as to exactly how the detailed determinations of particular moral rules would proceed. Baier tells us that moral rules do not admit of exceptions and that the exceptions are built into the rules. How then may we determine the relevant rule about killing or truth-telling? Clearly, until this area of the theory is filled in, it cannot be advanced as a sound account of morality.

3. The theory fails to offer anything approaching a serious account of moral obligation. At best it may be viewed as an attempt to explain and justify *the institution of morality*, but it never really approaches an explanation of *personal moral obligation*. It simply does not explain why we as individuals ought to be moral on all occasions. Baier tries by means of an ingenious argument to suggest that it would be madness not to be moral when we understand the reasons for the moral course of action. But this just is not the case in terms of his own argument, nor is it in fact the case. His theory is just as exposed as is Hobbes' political theory to the parallel objection that it entails that if we can act immorally, undetected and unpunished and without weakening the institution, then it would be irrational not to be immoral. That is to say, Baier gives no reason for adopting this "God's eye view" when the interest of everyone conflicts with our interest, and when the institution of morality is not endangered by our preferring our own interest. It is significant here that Baier had to characterize this perspective as "God's eye view." It is a perspective which would constitute a sound reason for God's preferring the moral course to be adopted on all occasions by men,

but hardly for ordinary mortals. In terms of Baier's analysis, it would be sheer madness for ordinary mortals to adopt such a view in the conditions indicated. This means that there is no analysis of moral obligation. Instead there is simply an unsuccessful attempt to assimilate the moral "ought" to the prudential "ought."

4. Baier offers no real argument in support of his contentions that we deliberate in order to maximize satisfactions and that the *raison d'être* of morality is as he suggests. On the other hand, there are good grounds for denying Baier's conclusions. What has probably led Baier to suppose that he has argued the issue of the *raison d'être* of morality is his allusion to Hobbes' account of the state of nature. This is not enough, for Hobbes' argument at best simply shows that it is prudent to have a morality, not that morality is nothing but a prudential insurance institution. Unless "reason" is defined as that which has as its end the maximizing of our satisfactions, and unless "satisfactions" here is used very widely, it is false to say that we reason in order to maximize our satisfactions. Many people are concerned to reason in order to discover their moral obligations, which they are prepared to fulfil even at the expense of their satisfactions, e.g., at the cost of their lives. Baier is trying to legislate out of order any question about the rightness of frustrating ourselves. Yet in any straightforward sense of "self-frustration" we may ask whether it is justified or not and this on occasions when it is not in the interest of everyone. This suggests that the question of the goodness or badness of maximizing our satisfactions may arise and hence the question of justifying doing so or abstaining from doing so. This means that the theory presupposes a moral judgment or that it is incomplete in yet another respect.

5. Baier interprets his theory as implying that morality is essentially social. He argues to this conclusion in part because he thinks that consideration-making beliefs are essentially a social phenomenon, and partly because he thinks of obligations as being three termed relations, the three terms being the partner, the ground and the content. In addition he uses the Hobbesian argument that morality is a social institution which we all see must be adopted for the better satisfaction of our needs. Baier re-inforces

his contention by examining the arguments of those who argue that we have duties to ourselves. If space permitted I should wish to deny this whole contention and suggest that individually these arguments are either essentially unsound in themselves (e.g., that duties have three dimensions) or that they are inadequate to sustain the conclusions drawn from them (e.g., the Hobbesian argument, even if its general point were true, that morality is an essential condition for contented life, would not establish that it was nothing but that). An attack along these lines directed at showing that morality is not essentially social, if successful, could be damaging to Baier's theory, but as more direct criticisms have already been developed this criticism can simply be noted.

To sum up: Baier's theory fails in respect of the three key questions of ethics, as these questions are discerned by him, namely, "How do we know?", "Why do we act morally?", and "Why ought we to act morally?" It is little more successful in explaining the main logical features of moral judgments as these are discerned by him. And the ways in which his theory breaks down suggest an approach to ethics in terms of moral predicates being treated as *sui generis*. Ginsberg's theory, of ideals related to, but distinct from needs, which has certain obvious affinities with that of Baier, would seem therefore to rest upon a clearer grasp of the nature of morality.

III

Ginsberg in *The Diversity of Morals* is concerned to stress the distinction between fact and value—that facts and values are distinct and such that the latter cannot be reduced to some form of the former—because he sees how often social scientists, e.g., Durkheim, Freud, have failed to acknowledge the distinction, with resulting errors and confusions. However he stresses this distinction also because he wishes to argue for the very real importance of a knowledge of the facts in reaching sound value judgments. It is because he thinks that the factual discoveries of the social sciences are so relevant to ethics, as well as because he thinks that ethical questions are distinct from factual questions and conse-

quently need to be seen to be such in the social sciences, that he stresses this distinction, documenting his case at every point with evidence of the confusion in the writings of notable sociologists.

The distinction between fact and value is largely insisted upon by showing how attempts to proceed without it result in important questions being left unanswered, and also by examining the grounds upon which it has been disregarded or denied. This latter examination introduces one of Ginsberg's main themes, namely the lack of an adequate basis for ethical relativism.

Ginsberg notes that ethical relativism may be defended either by means of a logical analysis of moral expressions, or by reference to the variations in moral beliefs between different cultures. His reply to those who argue to an ethical relativist position from a logical analysis of ethical terms is too sketchy to be effective. (However Baier in *The Moral Point of View* shows that a refutation is possible in terms of a more subtle analysis.) Ginsberg is much more convincing in his contention that a careful examination of the nature of the varieties of moral beliefs brings out that "there is no necessary connection between the diversity of morals and the relativity of ethics."

Ginsberg attacks ethical relativism both because it is not justified by the facts upon which it is based, and because it is a dangerous theory in that it takes ethics outside the sphere of reason, and as a consequence is congenial to totalitarianism. Relativists (e.g., Stevenson) have of course attempted to meet this criticism by arguing that in terms of their theories genuine reasoning about our obligations is possible; but they succeed only up to a point and in a limited area, and not with respect to ultimates. Ethical relativism is therefore both a potentially dangerous theory, removing morality from the sphere of reason, and a theory which is not sustained by the considerations from which it usually proceeds—hence Ginsberg's concern to expose the inadequacy of its grounds.

Ginsberg's most impressive discussion occurs in the chapter, *On the Diversity of Morals*. At the outset of his discussion he notes the very great difficulty to be overcome in getting the facts in this area. The usual anthropologist's definition of morality, as we have seen, is by no means satisfactory. Further, variations within

group moralities confuse issues. However, having noted these points, Ginsberg does not seek the easy way out taken by philosophers such as Maritain (*The Rights of Man, Man and the State*) of suggesting that there is really fundamental agreement. Rather he argues that

Despite a certain similarity in what might be called elementary rights and obligations moral codes differ very widely in the clarity with which the rights and obligations are conceived, the sanctions by which they are upheld and the area of conduct which they cover.*

Ginsberg notes six main types of variations in moral rules (p. 101), but argues that three important types lend no support to the relativist view, the latter types being "the variations arising from differences of opinion or knowledge regarding the non-moral qualities of acts or their consequences, those due to the different moral import of the 'same' acts in different social situations and institutional contexts, and those arising from the possibility of alternative ways of satisfying primary needs." However Ginsberg concedes that the other three types of variations are indicative of genuine moral disagreements: "variations in the range of persons to whom moral codes are held to be applicable" (Ginsberg denies that all moral variations can be reduced to this one type), "variations due to difference in emphasis or balance of the different elements in the moral life, and variations due to differences of moral insight and general level of development, moral and intellectual."

Ginsberg seeks to account for such variations by arguing that the assumption that universally valid moral principles are discoverable would lead one to expect such differences. Agreement between groups of the significantly different levels of development investigated by anthropologists would be surprising, and in terms of Ginsberg's own ethical theory, virtually impossible. Thus the mere fact of the great differences in the levels of mental development explains much. Further, lack of the sort of factual knowledge provided now in some measure by the social sciences, also explains much. Consider how lack of factual knowledge led to discrimination and inequality based on race and sex. Further,

* *The Diversity of Morality*, p. 111.

since values seem to be related to needs and these are probably the same for all men, we should expect some sort of fundamental agreement, but considerable variations at all other levels at least in part due to differing stages in the development of awareness of needs. Again we should expect people—particularly, but not only those with undeveloped critical faculties—to come to think of rules originally imposed to serve some recognized purpose as somehow justified in their own right and hence to cling to them long after they have ceased to fulfil their original purpose, or long after it is shown that they never really were justified by reference to their alleged purpose.

There is much more to Ginsberg's argument, but enough has already been said to show that he does dispose of the *usual case* for cultural relativism, although not of cultural relativism. He does not show that cultural relativism is false—he is not in this context seeking to do so—but he does succeed in showing that the facts from which it is so often advanced as the true account of morality are more obviously compatible, or at least as compatible, with an objectivist theory of ethics. Hence the usual premisses for cultural relativism do not sustain the conclusion drawn from them. However it is important that the truth or falsity of cultural relativism be considered. Here Ginsberg's defense of his own rational ethic is vital, for in the last analysis his case against cultural relativism rests upon a claim to direct insights of moral value. This would seem to me to be the ultimate answer that must be urged, and one which Ginsberg has shown not to be offensive as is commonly claimed. However before considering his defense of his rational ethic, the remainder of his discussion of cultural relativism must be noted and the use made of his conclusions be considered.

As an *ad hominem* argument against cultural relativists, Ginsberg points to the practical unavoidability of moral judgments, in particular, to the fact that they are not avoided by cultural relativists. He cites here their judgments concerning levels of morality, showing these to be themselves moral judgments. Again Ginsberg considers the attempt by Russell—and by many others since echoing Russell—to give cultural relativism stronger support by urging that objectivism is untenable since moral judgments can never in fact be verified and consequently can never be true or

false. Ginsberg's reply here is important. Russell's argument is rejected as not being backed up with an inquiry into the nature and extent of the observable differences of moral opinion, and on the ground that Russell fails to consider the possibility of applying to moral judgments the same sort of criteria as are applied in dealing with judgments of sense perception, namely consistency, freedom from contradiction and possible systematization. This latter point is effectively used in his development of "the rational ethic."

Having shown that the distinction between fact and value is not to be disposed of as easily as so many cultural relativists suppose, Ginsberg goes on to consider just how they are inter-related. He never underestimates the relevance to morals of non-moral knowledge, but argues constantly, as in the Introduction:

Ignorance or distortion of the relevant facts results in false value judgments, while, conversely, ingrained and uncritically accepted value judgments may, lead to distortion of the facts.

Thus whilst many of the essays are devoted to insisting on the distinction of fact and value, other essays are devoted to tracing out how particular sciences may aid ethics, and how they bear on moral questions. "Psycho-Analysis and Ethics," one of the more valuable essays in the book, sets out to demonstrate how psycho-analysis fails to deal adequately with the nature of moral obligation, and then to show just what positive value for ethics the findings of psycho-analysis may have, indicating the large number of ways psycho-analysis can play an important part in working out a rational ethic. Similarly in another important essay, "Durkheim's Ethical Theory," he seeks to make much the same sort of point. He agrees with Durkheim that social psychology and sociology have a lot to offer; we are unduly ignorant about the ends served by the institutions of our society, institutions such as property, the family, and criminal law. But he insists that after the empirical the value problem remains—"What ends ought these institutions to serve?"—although he does stress that we are better able to answer this value question intelligently as a result of our empirical enquiry. Further he notes that Durkheim neither gives an adequate account of value, nor succeeds in doing without it.

In this way Ginsberg gives a general account of the great relevance of factual studies to morals. He notes that moral

judgments always have large factual components such that a full treatment of morality involves both reflection on moral principles and a knowledge of the relevant psychological and sociological facts. The discussions in chapters 1, 2, and 3 ("Moral Bewilderment," "The Moral Basis of Political Conflicts," "Ethical Relativity and Political Theory") bear on the detailed working out of this interrelation of fact and value, in certain areas and in respect to certain problems.

Ginsberg approaches the problem of "the rational ethic" by arguing that ideals are central to morality. Hence he rejects naturalism as identifying morality with the satisfaction of needs. Ideals are distinguished from needs, but otherwise the concept of an ideal is at the outset vaguely equated with moral principles as well as with ideals in the strict sense.

Ginsberg makes what appear to be a lot of contradictory statements about how we determine the truth of moral principles. He appears to oscillate between suggesting that we cannot attain knowledge—that in the last analysis we must simply assume our principles—and claiming on the other hand that we have moral insights, i.e. some sort of direct awareness of moral principles, although it is important to notice that Ginsberg is always careful not to give the impression of adopting an intuitionist position such as Ross's. To do the latter would be, to his mind, to take too easy a way out of a genuine difficulty. Quite often he talks as if truth is to be obtained by applying the coherence-consistency test to eliminate "encrustations" in current morality. The truth of the matter seems to be that, like Ross in *The Foundations of Ethics*, he thinks that the first job is to sift the true from the false by the tests of consistency and coherence, and that in the last analysis, we come to the truth—when we do attain it—by direct apprehension. But there the agreement with Ross ends. The last stage comes much sooner and is more confidently anticipated by Ross than by Ginsberg who would suggest that Ross has not probed deeply enough nor with sufficient sociological knowledge. Ginsberg's position is that ideals are basic, that they are geared to our needs, and that both our needs and our ideals gradually emerge more clearly with experience by individuals and over the ages; hence it is misleading to suggest that the basic principles of

morality can be apprehended clearly in their purity for all ages and all times. It is not a theory of emergent morality but akin to one. Clearly it is a theory which allows us to explain much of the diversity of moral beliefs in terms of differing experiences and differing insights into these experiences.

Ginsberg's defense of his position proceeds in part from a consideration of how it is that those philosophers who start from needs or desires are forced to move to what he calls ideals, that is, to what ought to be, e.g., Hobbes, Bentham and Green; whilst those who try to leave needs out of the picture tend to bring them in by the back door, e.g. Kant. Ginsberg argues also from the fact that commonsense morality does expect an explanation of the rationale of morality. It does expect questions such as "What good does the rule do?", "Whose well-being does it serve?" to be answered. Further in all moral experience "there is an implicit reference to a certain duality in human nature. Moral experience moves between the poles of repression and fulfillment, the negation of self and the realization of self, the need for freedom and the need for control." Behind these oppositions, he suggests, is the sense of a contrast or conflict between the "lower" and "higher" parts of human nature. This Ginsberg takes to bring out that the notion of an "ideal" is central in moral experience, for "in the notion of an ideal there is a fusion of the conception of something that 'would' satisfy us if attained and the conception of something that 'should' or ought to satisfy us." This is an interesting suggestion, but one which needs further development before it can be the basis of a serious ethic.

Ginsberg, as we have seen, explains that ideals are distinct from needs but related to them. He explains this relationship ostensibly by pointing to the basic human needs and indicating the sorts of ideals that emerge from them. Three general types of basic human needs are distinguished: the needs of the body, for food, drink, exercise, rest and sleep; the needs of the mind, to understand, construct and appreciate; and the social needs, which are explained as being wider and more general than instincts. Clearly the ideals of bodily and mental health, or of the pursuit of truth are related to these needs but nonetheless distinct from them. This observation leads to the general contention:

It will be seen that these ideals though rooted in human needs imply obligations and make demands which control and transform them. These demands are not arbitrary but are inherent in the structure of the needs and ideals and are, so to say, necessitated by the structure. Each ideal generates its own norms and they appeal and constrain in varying degrees. The balance or grading of the ideals depends on what may be called the general way or form of life which prevails in a society. This is in fact never unitary or self-consistent, and there are always different ways or forms of life within a general framework, difficult to define. . . . The general form of life and the particular ideals grow up together and influence each other without being, it seems, ever in harmony.*

Can ideals be subjected to rational tests? We have already noted Ginsberg's answer: ultimately we rely on fallible insights, and before accepting apparent insights we subject them to various tests. Rational reflection can seek to clarify the ideals, to discover their inner structure, and to eliminate vagueness. It can help to free them from the accretions that have gathered around them in the course of their development. It can consider the compatibility or incompatibility of the various ideals. And it can consider how the nature of the available means reacts on the ideals themselves. In these and like ways ideals may be rationally sifted. Ginsberg illustrates his points by reference to examples such as freedom, asceticism etc.

There are many objections which may be urged against Ginsberg's contentions, but they will simply be noted and not pressed as Ginsberg is not purporting to present a completed theory.

There are serious gaps in Ginsberg's explanation of his theory of the rational ethic as centered in ideals. The concept of an ideal is very vague. At first, when introducing it, Ginsberg seems to be using it very widely to include obligations and goods as well as ideals in the more usual sense. Later he seems to tighten up the notion and in so far as he does this, he exposes his theory to a new criticism. Ideals in any narrow sense are not the whole of morality.

Further the account of how these ideals are related to needs is left seriously incomplete. How, in detail, is justice related to

* *Ibid.*, p. 136.

needs? Ginsberg is simply mapping a theory, not claiming to set it out in detail, so this is scarcely a criticism of his claims but rather an attempt to suggest where the theory will be found to be defective once an attempt is made to work it out in detail. The point is that many obligations and goods seem not to be obviously grounded in needs. Many aspects of the duties of justice are formed by the nature of our needs; but the "ideal" and many of its aspects seem not to be grounded in needs in any more important sense than that we have a need for the society of others, and justice is the "ideal" governing our relations with others. So too with personal integrity, benevolence, mercy and forgiveness, and retribution.

Again, it may be urged that closer examination would suggest not that morality is grounded in some way in our needs, but rather that our needs simply serve as clues to our obligations. Clearly needs are not irrelevant to morality. They are part of the data in the sort of way that what we can do is part of the data of morality. However, unless some sort of argument avoiding the difficulties encountered by the traditional arguments for natural law is associated with Ginsberg's theory, it is difficult to see how it can be contended that needs are more than the data, clues or guides to our ideals.

Finally it might be asked: "Does Ginsberg escape Baier's sort of epistemological objections?" The answer is a firm "yes." He escapes it simply by showing how unrealistic the contention is that intuitions must admit of checking by empirical means to be validated as a way of knowing.

To sum up: Ginsberg restates more clearly than most the case against cultural relativism. He moves from this to the more constructive tasks of attempting to develop a rational ethic, and of relating ethics to the facts revealed by the social scientists. And he reaffirms in a striking way the need to keep value questions separate from questions of fact, without however necessarily condemning the trend today among many sociologists of openly evaluating. In addition to all this, he contributes much which to a philosopher who is not trained in sociology appears as useful in the sphere of sociology as are his contributions in the sphere of philosophy. Ginsberg has therefore done well a number of jobs

which have been done before but which needed doing again, and in a context in which they would be readily accessible. The collecting together of the already published papers has achieved this.

IV

Mackinnon's *A Study in Ethical Theory* is concerned for the most part with the relevance of metaphysics to ethics, and the interrelation of the two. He seems to be concerned with the problem of what metaphysic is presupposed by any particular "style of reasoning in ethics." However, for the most part it seems that Mackinnon fails to distinguish clearly the logical issues—how ethics and metaphysics are interrelated, and how particular ethical and metaphysical theories are interrelated—from the sociological, psychological and historical questions such as how theories of ethics have in fact been related to metaphysical theories and how they have been thought by their exponents to be related. He notes the differences between the various types of approach and records that he intends to concern himself with the different types of approach; but in the actual discussion these become seriously confused with one another.

The ethics-metaphysics problem is simply the most pervasive of the many problems treated by Mackinnon. He sometimes speaks of the main theme of the book as relating to the dialectical opposition of ethics of consequences and ethics of motive, and has interesting contributions to make in that area. And there are many other problems of real interest and importance in the spheres of meta-ethics and meta-meta-ethics, which are touched on and which involve discussion of utilitarianism and Pritchard's criticism of it, Kant and the problem of freedom, Butler's ethics, Hegel and St. Paul. In all these discussions Mackinnon raises interesting problems, often in an illuminating way and in a way provocative of thought; but in spite of this, the book is disappointing. This is partly because of its defects—it is unduly discursive and unnecessarily obscure—but partly, I should suggest, because the philosophical issues which are Mackinnon's main concern cannot be treated effectively from the detached standpoint Mackinnon

seeks to adopt, but rather must be treated by entering into the activity of ethical thinking. Baier and Ginsberg suggest answers—different answers—to the metaphysical problem of the pre-suppositions of ethics and to the other problems that concern Mackinnon. And unlike Mackinnon, who attempts to view the different answers from a point of detachment, they offer reasons and grounds for the answers they suggest. And that would seem to me to be the proper philosophical approach.

Mackinnon's approach is of course not without value. It is of value to see theories in the perspective of ethics as a whole. But it is nonetheless a less effective approach and one fraught with dangers as is evident in the very curious discussion of utilitarianism where Mackinnon, following the spirit or inspiration, but certainly not the logic, of utilitarianism comes to suggest that utilitarianism is antimetaphysical and hostile to religion. This of course is not a logical deduction at all—and it is rather unfair on any count to utilitarians such as Rashdall. Clearly utilitarianism in most of its traditional versions carried metaphysical commitments, even though its exponents were impatient with metaphysical obscurantists. These metaphysical commitments are best to be discovered by taking a particular utilitarian theory and seeing just what it implies, rather than by looking at some vague concept of "the inspiration of utilitarianism." That is why Mackinnon's discussion of Kant, and the consequent discussion of freedom, are of much greater value. They involve following a theory through. The same seems to apply with the problem of the unity of ethics. It would seem that this higher order question is also best treated by engaging in the lower order activity of ethical theorizing.

The subject of ethics and metaphysics is too immense to discuss here, but enough has already been said in the discussions of the theories of Baier and Ginsberg to suggest that ethics does have very definite ontological commitments and that it is the pressing task for moral philosophers to see just what these commitments are, now that analysts such as Hare and Nowell-Smith have exposed the difficulties of the more important traditional answers.

University of Melbourne.

EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AND METAPHYSICS

GEORGE A. SCHRADER

EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS represents one of the most natural marriages of theory to practice that one could possibly find. It seeks, in the first place, to make psychoanalytic theory philosophically respectable by providing it with a sound metaphysical foundation and, in the second place, to test *empirically* the speculative theories of existentialist philosophers. Metaphysics stands to gain on both counts. Whether or not one is willing to accept without qualification the categories and doctrines of existentialist metaphysics, one cannot help feeling, on reading the case analyses of the existentialist psychotherapists, that he has encountered a new and highly interesting world—a world at once more complex and more profound than he would ever have dreamed of from reading Freud and his disciples. I say this not to belittle Freud, for whom I have the greatest admiration, but to stress the *philosophical maturity* of this new way in psychoanalysis. Several new dimensions in the analysis of human personality have been added, and the resulting picture of man is sufficiently inclusive that if anything important has been left out, its absence is by no means conspicuous. It is empiricism with a difference, and the difference is salutary.

Having indicated my own enthusiasm for the project, I must hasten to add that it is precisely the explicit philosophical concern of existential psychoanalysis which constitutes its greatest vulnerability. No matter how strong one's interest in metaphysics may be and, hence, his initial sympathy with the metaphysical component in existential psychoanalysis, if one is critical and honest he cannot long avoid the question: what will be the results for psychoanalysis as a science? Two considerations are bound to give the philosopher pause: (1) Modern experimental science deliberately and willfully cut itself free from metaphysical speculation; up to the point where it failed to take this step, its progress was minimal. There are, I think, obvious dangers involved in

empirical science either becoming too explicitly metaphysical or attempting to adapt itself to an antecedently available metaphysical system. I do not mean to suggest that metaphysics has not or cannot contribute to natural science, but only to underscore the fact that natural science has attained at least a relative autonomy. The physicist develops his own metaphysics to serve his own purposes and there is good reason to believe that he is well advised in doing so.

The second consideration which occasions at least mild skepticism is the fact that Freud, the founder and chief architect of psychoanalytic theory, thought it necessary to restrain his own natural impulse to philosophical speculation in order to develop a scientific theory. The question may be raised, of course, whether this attempt at restraint was either desirable or successful. It might be argued that the success of Freud's venture depended upon the employment rather than the inhibition of his speculative faculties. But this line of argument is, I think, fundamentally mistaken—and I can appeal to the existentialist psychoanalysts for support on this point. They are critical of Freud because they regard him as having pursued too naturalistic and too restricted a course in his interpretation of human behavior. They point to the lack of elegance, completeness, and even consistency in his view of man, and propose to remedy these defects. But if one looks at their own results, which I hope to do in detail presently, it is by no means clear that Freud was mistaken. Freud's theory is surely inadequate if judged by a metaphysician's yardstick and, doubtless, less than perfect if judged as a psychoanalytic theory. It would have been nothing less than incredible if Freud had brought psychoanalytic theory to birth in flawless perfection. But, and here lies the important philosophical question, do Freud's inadequacies as a metaphysician and as a psychoanalytic theorist come to the same thing? Was Freud, in other words, essentially just a metaphysician who happened to be singularly devoted to the empirical study of man, or was Freud the founder of a new science? When all the shooting is over, this is apt to be the critical question facing therapists and philosophers alike. Metaphysically inclined philosophers are apt to judge Freud in terms of the former characterization, and practicing psychoanalysts in terms of the latter.

Actually Freud was both metaphysician and scientist, so the two viewpoints need not exclude one another. The question is whether he is to be judged *primarily* in terms of standard metaphysical criteria or in terms of more restricted principles appropriate to the science he attempted to found. We must, I think, be duly cautious in rejecting the latter alternative. Perhaps Freud succeeded because of rather than in spite of his attempt to avoid philosophical speculation. And, if this is true, there may be serious hazards in saddling psychoanalysis today with an existentialist or, for that matter, any other metaphysics. It is fairly clear that any metaphysician today who hopes seriously to influence or to alter the course of physics must become a physicist—which is only to say that physics insists on producing its own metaphysics and on its own terms. Could the situation be at all the same in psychoanalysis? If so, existential psychoanalysis may be forced to reexamine some of its basic premises.

As Dr. Rollo May characterizes existential psychoanalysis in his two introductory chapters,¹ it has two chief components: phenomenological method and existentialist metaphysics. Dr. May considers the explicit concern with ontological questions to be one of the most important features of this movement. But it is equally clear that Dr. May understands ontology in existentialist terms. Although he summarizes the views of the contributors to the volume in such a way as to recommend them to the reader, he seems to be far more indebted to Professor Tillich (his former teacher) than to his collaborators for both his own ontological convictions and his understanding of existentialism. Apparently Dr. May is unaware of the fact that there is no commonly accepted ontology among existentialist philosophers or even agreement as to whether or not ontology is possible. Moreover, in spite of strong affinities with existentialism, Professor Tillich draws upon many other strands in the history of philosophy and theology and combines them in his own unique system. Whatever similarity there may be between Tillich's ontology and existentialism, there are

¹ Rollo May, Ernest Angel, Henri F. Ellenberger, editors, *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*. New York: Basic Books, 1958.

also sharp differences. But, to complicate the matter still further, there are fundamental differences among the existentialist writers themselves. Dr. May seems to adopt a more or less eclectic attitude, singling out those features in existentialist philosophy from Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Tillich which he finds congenial, without attempting to incorporate them into a system. We need not regard this as a serious shortcoming, since he is professing only to introduce the thought of representative European thinkers to an American audience. But unlike Dr. May's, the philosophical allegiance of the other contributors to the volume is firm and clear. They regard themselves as building on the foundation of Heidegger's metaphysics. Thus, if we may except Dr. May's more open position, it is with a psychoanalytic theory based on Heidegger's conception of man and his world that we are confronted.

Far and away the clearest and most articulate statement of existential psychoanalysis both in theory and practice is offered by Ludwig Binswanger, who has contributed three of the ten chapters of the volume. One of the founders and the most systematic proponent of the movement, Binswanger is a staunch disciple of Heidegger.

By "existential analysis," we understand an anthropological type of scientific investigation—that is, one which is aimed at the essence of being human. Its name as well as its philosophical foundation are derived from Heidegger's analysis of Being, "Dasein Analytics." It is his—not yet properly recognized—merit to have uncovered a fundamental structure of existence and to have described it in its essential parts, that is, the structure of being-in-the-world. (p. 191).

In his analysis of "being-in-the-world," Binswanger adds, Heidegger has examined the condition of the possibility for human existence.

From the discovery and presentation of this essential condition, existential analysis received its decisive stimulation, its philosophical foundation and justification, as well as its methodological directives. (p. 191.)

Existentialist psychoanalysis is not, however, to be regarded either as an ontology or a philosophy and, for this reason, not even as a philosophical anthropology. It can only be properly designated

as a "phenomenological anthropology." In making this disclaimer Binswanger explains that existential analysis "does not propose an ontological thesis about an essential condition determining existence (which it apparently derives from Heidegger's analysis), but makes *ontic statements*—that is, statements of factual findings about actually appearing forms and configurations of existence" (p. 192). Existential analysis is, he claims, "an empirical science, with its own method and particular ideal of exactness." It is empirical in the sense that it employs a phenomenological method of letting things "speak for themselves" and of expressing things as they are.

Binswanger is curiously naive in his view of the relation between his pure empirical method and his allegiance to Heidegger's ontology. A pure phenomenological method which begins with an a priori ontology is suspect from the outset. It is evident that the acceptance of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalyse* involves major commitments with respect to choice of categories and overall perspective. The result is that Binswanger's phenomenological anthropology is by no means presuppositionless. It can defend itself as a phenomenological method only by an appeal to Heidegger who proposed to offer a phenomenological ontology of human existence. The ontic statements to be furnished by existential analysis are based upon Heidegger's ontological theses. If Heidegger's method is truly phenomenological then Binswanger can legitimately claim that his own empirical procedure, which takes its starting point from Heidegger, is but an extension to the ontic level of Heidegger's ontological *description* of human existence. Although there is nothing illegitimate about this procedure, it does raise the question whether existential analysis is or can be "an empirical science with its own method and particular ideal of exactness." In setting for itself the limited task of supplying illustration on the ontic level of ontological theses which it has not established and presumably is not in a position to evaluate (since this would be an explicit ontological undertaking), existential analysis has surrendered a considerable measure of its autonomy. It adopts the "basic forms and configurations of existence" from Heidegger and seeks only to determine how these forms appear in particular instances. The ideal of *exactness* may be

defined by existential analysis but it does not define either the ultimate ideal or the criteria of explanation. Lacking this basic condition of autonomy, can existential analysis properly be regarded as an *empirical science*? Would it not be more proper to regard it as the empirical application of an ontological theory? And in so far as it is only or even primarily the latter, has it not made itself too much the handmaiden of ontology? Laudable as the concern to enlarge the scope of psychoanalysis may be, is it not to be expected that it will eventually insist upon formulating its own categories of interpretation and in developing its own metaphysics from clinical materials? If the existential analyst cannot himself be an ontologist, is he not faced with the alternative either (a) of making a dogmatic beginning by accepting uncritically a particular metaphysical system such as Heidegger's or (b) of formulating his own more limited metaphysics in the light of the widest possible acquaintance with metaphysical theories of nature, man, and history?

I do not mean to suggest that Binswanger is a slavish follower of Heidegger or that he does not have a critical understanding of Heidegger. He has, as a matter of fact, a remarkably good grasp of the subtleties of Heidegger's philosophy. His discussion of existential analysis provides one of the clearest and most intelligible accounts of Heidegger's Daseinanalysis to be found in print. Moreover, Binswanger has not been timid about modifying Heidegger's views where he has found it to be necessary. His specification of "being-beyond-the-world" as an existential characteristic of man represents a fundamental innovation within the Heideggerian scheme. In love, Binswanger recognizes a mode of positive transcendence which is not to be found in Heidegger. Though projected into the world, man "has the possibility of transcending this being of his, namely, of climbing above it in care and of swinging beyond it in love" (p. 198). In the famous case of Ellen West, which serves as a prototype of existential analysis, Binswanger makes good use of this category in examining the possibility of human love. The tragedy of Ellen West is, at least in part, a failure of loving and being loved. As a basic existential possibility for man, love offers hope of a positive resolution of ultimate human problems. Although he has a deep sense of the tragic

possibilities of human life, Binswanger is by no means as pessimistic or as fatalistic as Heidegger. Binswanger has not surrendered his autonomy *in practice* and there is good reason to believe that as he and others pursue their research further they will become increasingly autonomous in the formulation of a psychoanalytic theory of man.

The case of Ellen West, extensively analysed by Binswanger in this volume, is especially interesting because it represents an instance of tragic human failure. In this respect it is altogether unlike the usual case presented by writers on psychoanalysis. For understandable reasons, the psychoanalyst tends to select cases which will illustrate the success of psychoanalytic techniques. It is not, I suspect, that he thereby seeks to conceal his failures as a therapist, of which there doubtless must be many on record, but rather that, on his view, the failure is not theoretically significant. From an orthodox psychoanalytic point of view, such a failure must have resulted either from resistance on the part of the patient or bungling on the part of the therapist. The analyst assumes that in those cases which are *properly treatable* by psychoanalytic techniques (and he does not assume that all psychic illnesses are so treatable), the result should always be favorable—provided that both patient and therapist play their roles adequately. There is, then, no point in presenting cases of failure save only to show how they might have succeeded if conditions had been different—conditions which were within the control of patient and therapist. Existential analysis, on the other hand, regards the failure as significant not merely because it may be instructive for an improvement in analytic technique, but as a disclosure of the human condition in its tragic aspect. In revealing how it is possible for man to fail tragically it provides us with a deeper understanding of what man is. Since man is, for existential analysis, a being who transcends nature and must determine *whether* he is to be a self as well as *how* he is to be a self, tragic failure is a supreme possibility. No psychotherapeutic *technique* can hope to obviate this possibility, since tragedy derives from an ontological characteristic of man. If man were simply a highly complex natural being it might be possible progressively to eliminate the more serious human failures and thus prevent such an occurrence as

the suicide of Ellen West. But if man is a radically free being who transcends himself and the world, no therapeutic technique however perfected can hope to overcome human tragedy.

Dr. May contrasts existential analysis with orthodox analysis in terms of the emphasis which the latter places on technique. It has, so Dr. May argues, a *naturalistic* conception of man which attempts to explain and modify human behavior through understanding the basic mechanisms operative in the life-history of the person. It embraces a genetic-causal account of psychic development and depends for its own technique upon the possibility of adjusting and modifying these causal processes. Classical psychoanalysis is an applied science which seeks not only to understand men but to heal them. Freud, after all, was a physician, as are the greater part of contemporary analysts. They consider psychoanalysis to be a legitimate extension of the science of medicine. Existential analysis, on the other hand, seeks first and foremost to understand the individual in the full context of his conscious life. In adopting a phenomenological empiricism it sets aside the genetic-causal view of orthodox analysis in favor of an exploration of the world-design of the individual. The individual is considered in Heideggerian terms as a "being-in-the-world" whose world orientation provides the key to the detailed aspects of his behavior. In contrast with Freud, who sometimes tends toward an epiphenomenal view of conscious processes and a reductionist view of general ideas, existential analysis regards the patient's world-design as the basic explanatory factor. It is the metaphysics of the patient which is appealed to in understanding his physical behavior and psychic processes rather than the reverse. This means, in effect, that the orthodox and the existential analysts embrace radically different conceptions of how human behavior is to be explained. In spite of his gradual rejection of mathematical physics as represented by Helmholtz, for whom he always had such high regard, the model of causal explanation in the natural sciences never lost its hold on Freud. Although he adopted more and more a biological approach to human behavior, physical models continued to play an important role in his theory. A notable example of this is Freud's view, prominent in one of his later writings, of the conservation of psychic energy. It is fair to

say, I think, that Freud sought to accommodate biological phenomena to physical and even mechanistic modes of explanation. But even if the physicalistic and mechanistic elements in Freud's theory are ignored, the fact remains that he attempted to offer a causal explanation of human behavior. Earlier events are regarded as determining later events in uniform ways. The therapist himself does not stand *outside* this causal process but rather *makes use of it in his therapy*. Transference, for example, must be understood in causal terms as must all relations of the patient to the outside world.

Dr. May and the other advocates of existential analysis regard their departure from Freud's causal mode of explanation as constituting one of the chief merits of their school. The orthodox analyst is, Dr. May charges, too much concerned with therapeutic technique as opposed to phenomenological understanding of the patient (p. 10). We tend, Dr. May alleges, "to be a nation of practioneers" and to forget that "technique emphasized by itself in the long run defeats even technique." Existential analysis "does not purport to found a new school as over against other schools or to give a new technique of therapy as over against other techniques. It seeks, rather, to analyze the structure of human existence—an enterprise which, if successful, should yield an understanding of the reality underlying all situations of human beings in crises" (p. 7). Instead of seeking "to explain this life history [of the patient] and its pathologic idiosyncrasies according to the teachings of any school of psychotherapy, or by means of its preferred categories . . . it *understands* this life-history as modifications of the total structure of the patient's being-in-the world . . ." (p. 5, quoted from Binswanger). Genetic-causal explanation in terms of the "preferred categories" of a particular school of psychotherapy is, then, to be rejected in favor of a phenomenological understanding in the light of the patient's world-design. The intent is, however, "to be more rather than less empirical" (p. 8). To be more empirical means to let the patient reveal his own world-design and, hence, to furnish both the materials and the principle for the interpretation of his situation. In the rejection of "preferred categories" the leap is made all the way from Freud to Heidegger, from psychoanalysis as a

special science to pure ontology. It may prove instructive to consider how this new method operates when applied to a clinical case.

Part III of the volume is devoted to the presentation and analysis of three cases. Two of these cases, "Ellen West" and "The Attempted Murder of a Prostitute," are treated extensively. The third, the "Case of Ilse," though treated much more briefly, provides a particularly clear statement of Binswanger's method and basic theses. Because of its relative simplicity the latter case exhibits most strikingly the difference between orthodox and existential analysis in their handling of a clinical problem. These cases are far too complex to be considered in any detail. We must confine ourselves to certain features of the analysis which represent the basic innovations in approach.

A prominent feature of the case of Ilse is the devotion of the patient, a woman, to her father. A notable incident in her life history was her attempt to demonstrate her love to her father by putting her arm into a burning stove and then holding it out to him with the words: "Look, this is to show you how much I love you!" (p. 215). She sought thereby to change her father's attitude toward herself and, particularly, toward her mother to whom he had been harsh and tyrannical. Unfortunately her father remained unmoved by this act and, instead of accomplishing her purpose, Ilse found the situation unimproved. Subsequently she became acutely troubled about all of her relations to people. "The theme around which this biography revolves is *father*" (p. 216). But in Binswanger's analysis there is no suggestion of an "Oedipus complex" or the now classical treatment of the father-daughter relation. Binswanger takes the problem as revealed and interpreted by the patient to be that of love. Ilse loved her father and through a dramatic sacrificial act sought both to demonstrate her love to him and to move him to a reciprocal expression of love. "The 'sacrifice of love' is designed to overcome the father's brutal tyranny. Through the sacrifice of love Ilse takes the brutality upon herself. It is she who submits to suffering from some brutal pain so that mother does not have to suffer any more. The father is 'spared' throughout" (p. 217).

It is important to note here that the theme of love and sacrifice

as the fundamental thread for interpretation is supplied by the patient herself. She is quoted as saying: "I wanted to demonstrate to my father that love is something that overcomes itself, not by words but by deeds. This should have had an effect on him like a lightning bolt, like a revelation, and should have made him stop living as an egotist" (p. 216). She comments on her later compulsive behavior toward others by stating that "I must love all men so much because I loved my father so much." Binswanger regards Ilse's sacrifice as essentially a self-chosen decision designed "to bring about a resolution of the discordant forces" (p. 217). But in her subsequent action Ilse succumbs to "the leitmotif of its history" and free decision is replaced by obsessive necessity. This necessity is indicated by Ilse's use of the term *must* in referring to her need to love all men. "The lack of insight into the *must* of this loving and attracting-of-attention we call insanity. The cure for such insanity consists in the shaking off of the *must* and in the restoration of the rule of the self" (p. 217). After thirteen months of institutional care Ilse was cured of her psychosis and lived a perfectly healthy life up to her death at the age of seventy-three. (She was thirty-nine at the beginning of her treatment.)

There is a method in Ilse's insanity. The entire dialectic of her relation to her father is reflected in her relations to her fellow man in general. The actual meaning of her disorder "rests in the pluralization of the father—in the transformation of the singular *thou* and of the dual *we* into the plurality of *you* (plural) and *we*" (p. 222). Her disappointment in the father develops in this fashion into delusions of reference and expresses itself in her anxious concern about all other people in her world. There are actually several facets to her problem, but the fundamental theme or constant in her life history is her struggle for autonomy. The decision to sacrifice for her father was originally her own. But it was followed by the obsessive need to love and be loved by all men. Before she could be freed of this obsession it was necessary for her to understand her relation to her father more clearly. She had to discover, for example, that her sacrificial act was not directed by purely ethical motives but contained a strong admixture of the will-to-power and arrogant self-assertion. We are not told by what steps Ilse eventually arrived at the necessary self-under-

standing for her to resolve her problem and find healthy avenues in which to achieve "salvation" and "purification." But it was evidently in terms of the themes which she initially presented and her own life-history as illumined by these themes that she reached this understanding. The analyst presumably served primarily as a mirror enabling her to see and understand herself. Any resolution of her disorder depended, in the last analysis, upon how she *chose* to develop these themes further. Happily she chose a constructive and healthy course.

The case of Ellen West, which is treated in far greater detail, is far more complex than that of Ilse and, as we have previously noted, ends tragically. Since understanding is no substitute for resolute decision and, further, since understanding may follow upon decision and thus require it, the therapist does not hold a magic key to unlock a golden future for the patient. The patient holds the key to his future. There is no reduction of either patient or therapist for the existential analyst. Both retain their freedom and independence in the analytic process. The therapist's own understanding of himself as a man is a condition of his being able to understand and respond to the problems of his patient. He is *involved* with the patient in the analysis. This is, of course, not a discovery of existential analysis; Freud had made much of this relationship and, in fact, regarded it as critical for successful therapy. But, as I have suggested earlier, Freud represented it as occurring in a *special* and *restricted* context and, hence, as having a *modus operandi* distinct from ordinary human communication. On this point the existential analysts differ sharply with Freud. The therapist as a person is dealing with the patient as a person in the fullest context of the human situation. The analyst dare not attempt to reduce the patient to an *object* who can be understood in terms of mechanisms and universal causal patterns but must seek always to treat the other as a being with his own freedom and his own world. Communication, of which psychoanalysis itself is such a prominent example, can occur only between *persons*. If there is no genuine communication there can be no disclosure of the patient's world-design and, finally, no opportunity for a free resolution of the problem by the patient. Ellen West pursued her tragic course to its bitter end in spite of extensive treatment by

three eminent analysts of whom Binswanger was the last. There is no suggestion from Binswanger that if she had been handled differently—and he is not averse to pointing out inadequacies in the procedures of earlier analysts—this outcome might have been avoided. Neither Binswanger nor any of the other contributors to the volume would consider suggesting that any man can or should hold the fate of another human being even temporarily or provisionally in his hands. The fact that the patient retains his freedom and transcendence makes the therapeutic process considerably more difficult and more contingent with respect to its result. But it frees the therapist of what might be a *dreadful responsibility* were it really possible, and treats human illness as a *sickness of the spirit* rather than a merely natural disorder. The latter point is of crucial importance in that without exception the existential analysts insist upon the dimension of *spirit* as encompassing the life-history of the individual. It is undoubtedly for this reason that they find the existentialist writers so congenial. As Kierkegaard originally maintained and as Binswanger and the other contributors to this volume agree, there can be no *natural cure* to the sickness of the spirit. It may be, indeed, the *sickness unto death*. Binswanger points out in connection with Ilse's sacrifice that if her father had responded differently her problem might have been solved by founding a new life for her. The responsibility of the therapist toward the patient is not unlike that of the father toward his daughter. In both cases it is fundamentally the basic moral responsibility of man to man. This puts the situation of the physician in a new light. What he needs is not so much another analyst, himself under analysis, analyzing him as he analyzes his patient, but a *healthy relationship to other persons in his world*. He must understand love, despair, friendship, and the human condition generally in existential terms—which means in the context of his own life-history. The needed objectivity is not to be gained by an infinite regress of transference from analyst to analyst, but by the wisdom and courage with which he chooses to be himself. Existential analysis takes the admonition; "physician heal thyself!" with the fullest seriousness and makes the moral training of the therapist more basic than clinical tutelage. I stress this point for it has a direct bearing on the question I raised earlier,

namely whether psychoanalysis is properly to be regarded as a science. Socrates, who was in effect a practicing metaphysician, regarded himself as a mid-wife and took his personal responsibility with the greatest earnestness. It is evident that the existential analysts look upon the analyst more on the model of Socrates than of Freud. Perhaps they, like Socrates, are practising, even "licensed," metaphysicians.

In keeping with his basic commitment to phenomenological analysis, Binswanger attempts to discern the structure of Ellen West's world-design. This entails the discovery of the way in which her life is organized with respect to the *surrounding world* (Umwelt), *herself* (Eigenwelt), and *being-beyond-the-world* (transcendence). It is Binswanger's firm conviction that the details of her life history cannot be understood or interpreted until these organizing principles are uncovered. One of the symptoms of Ellen West's disorder was obsessive eating. She would alternate between the most ascetic fasting and the most unbridled indulgence of her craving for food. To the end she never managed to bring these conflicting compulsions into balance or harmony. Binswanger interprets this conflict in terms of the contrast between her ideal-world and her physical world. Her conception of the physical world, including her body, was that of a void, an empty hole which, on occasion, she *despairingly* attempted to fill through eating. The eating could not fill the void since food could not attain the ideal meaning which her compulsion required. Moreover, in feeding the body she only augmented her guilt. "Basically, Ellen West nourishes by her eating only 'her bad points and her vices, her turmoil and hatred, her passions and her bitterness'." On only one occasion do we see her eat something which, in contradistinction to all nourishment, only gives her joy, only gives her new strength, only 'nourishes' her hopes, only serves her love, and only brightens her mind. But this something is no longer a gift of life but the poison of death" (p. 293). Ellen West had "become ripe for her death." It was "the necessary fulfillment of the life-meaning of this existence" (p. 295).

Her suicide was, Binswanger indicates, both an "arbitrary act" and a "necessary event." It was *arbitrary* in that it was an act of freedom that could have been avoided. That is, she was not

compelled by any external or internal force or causal process to take her life. But it was *necessary* in that it provided the inevitable conclusion to themes which she persisted in pursuing. This is as much as to say that the novelist could have written a different play or even changed it at any point and, yet, that having developed the characters and the plot as he did it could have had no other ending. The literary analogy is very strong here. Binswanger interprets the life-history of Ellen West much as the literary critic analyzes a play or a novel. He looks for the *necessity* holding all of the elements together even while he recognizes the contingency of the whole structure and of every detail within it. The end is *necessary* only at the end and as an ending. But then the play is finished and done. There is the important difference, of course, that the life-history of the individual is *reality* whereas the play is *art* and only *appearance*. But if we take the play as reality, and art depends upon the possibility of this illusion for its power, the difference vanishes. It seems to me that one would need to discuss the interpretation of this clinical case much in the way one might discuss with a literary critic an interpretation of *Hamlet* or of *Crime and Punishment*. The most striking difference between the existential analyst and the literary critic is (a) that the analyst confines himself to the life-histories of his patients with whom he can converse and (b) that the analyst is committed to a more explicit and detailed metaphysical theory of human nature. But this difference is not terribly sharp in that the analyst may employ his analytic technique on fictional characters as Jones has done with *Hamlet*, and the literary critic may be, as some are, equally committed to ethical and metaphysical theories. This comparison need not be regarded as unfavorable either to the literary critic or the analyst; both are dealing with individual human beings in all their complexity. But since literary criticism is an art once removed and in no wise to be regarded as a science, the strength of the analogy provides further ground for skepticism about the claims of the existential analysts.

The literary critic is not interested in *controlling* the characters he analyzes. He is satisfied with either a tragic or a comic character as long as the character is authentically portrayed. In so far as his own method involves what might be termed *phenom-*

enological description, he takes what might be regarded as a fundamentally *aesthetic* attitude. We may contrast this attitude with that of the moralist who wishes to judge and influence the course of events, and the scientist who wishes to control them. We need not regard science as utilitarian in the vulgar sense, but it seeks to predict and to be able to test its predictions by experimentation. Experimentation is a mode of control. The Germans have always taken a much broader view of the nature of science, as is witnessed by Hegel's use of the term. Americans, on the other hand, tend to think of science as *experimental science* for which the factor of experimental technique is essential. How we use the term "science" is partly a semantic problem which need not trouble us here. But whether we use the term narrowly or broadly the difference between physics and aesthetics, if both are regarded as *sciences*, cannot be disregarded. In disparaging the stress upon technique in orthodox analysis Dr. May fails to consider what this entails for one's conception of science. It is not simply that, as Dr. May alleges, Americans are concerned with results and are basically pragmatic in orientation, but the fact that modern experimental science involves an *essential* and *necessary* pragmatic component. When we remove this limiting factor from psychoanalysis the result is something very close to aesthetics. Confronted with this state of affairs one can well ask: why should the analyst be consulted at all? Can he do more than any other of my fellow men, namely, suffer the tragedy or enjoy the comedy of my existence, or—more likely—be numbed with its everydayness? What, in other words, has become of the promise of healing? If mental illness is primarily a sickness of the spirit, is it, perhaps, more the love of one's neighbor and the disciplined sympathy of a confessor that is required than a physician? Has psychoanalysis in the process of reaching this, its alleged fruition, revealed itself to be what many have long suspected, namely, a fraud and deception? The existential analysts make the consideration of this question unavoidable. To agree with them is to raise more radical questions than they seem to have entertained. It is not simply Freud but psychoanalysis in general which is in question.

Psychoanalysis is not, I am convinced, a fraud, however much it may have been subject to abuses or fettered with illusion. If it

does not minister to the full dimension of the human spirit, it ministers at least to the psyche. If psychoanalysis is not a fraud, then we must question the proposed innovation which in its effort at improvement has the effect of abolishing the discipline. Have the existential analysts really proposed a revolution within psychoanalysis or rather a way of applying metaphysical conceptions to the study of man? No metaphysician and few philosophers need be persuaded of the importance of the latter. They may, indeed, question whether Heidegger has said the last thing about the *a priori* characteristics of man and his world. But if they are serious, they must applaud the effort to make metaphysics relevant to existence. The question remains, however, whether anything short of an adequate philosophical education for all men can provide the necessary foundation for an understanding of oneself and the world. The teacher of metaphysics is, in a way, a *licensed metaphysician* and a professional. But this gives him no monopoly on metaphysics. Perhaps what we need is fewer rather than more professional metaphysicians. The existential analyst is not so much a licensed metaphysician as a practitioner of applied metaphysics. And here the question whether the enfranchisement of a guild is in order becomes even more pressing. The problem is not only *what* metaphysics is to be applied or put into practice but *why* any professional group should be regarded as having special skills in the matter. Binswanger is obviously well qualified to interpret and apply Heidegger's philosophy. But is this more because he happens to be a psychoanalyst than that he is adept at understanding philosophical ideas and seeing their relevance to human existence? Moreover, if it is *understanding* rather than *technique* or control that is at stake, why go to a practitioner of metaphysics when faced with a psychic disturbance?

Have the existential analysts, perhaps, been carried away with their zeal for philosophy and metaphysics so far as to misunderstand its relation to science? Does metaphysics provide a special foundation for some particular empirical science such as psychoanalysis, or rather a general foundation for all sciences? Is science related to metaphysics and ontology in that it takes the pronouncements of the latter for granted and is content only to make *ontic statements* based upon the application of metaphysical

theories? Or is it rather that metaphysics states the ultimate questions which must be answered by the special sciences even though the latter can never answer them finally and completely. Metaphysics asks: what is man? and thus puts a question which lies at the foundation of biology and psychology. But it is not the case, I submit, that the metaphysician answers the question in *outline* and the biologist or psychologist only in *detail*. The metaphysical question is both the first and last question asked and, similarly, both the first and last question to be answered. Dr. May and his colleagues see it only as the first question and the first answer, forgetting that empirical inquiry both generates new questions and finds new answers. The development of the special sciences entails not the death but the fertilization of metaphysics. The existential analysts are guilty of a fixation with respect to metaphysics—to the detriment of their own discipline. They have not yet learned the lesson that when one begins to be philosophical and metaphysical there is no stopping until one has gone all the way. They provide eloquent argument for the philosophical training of physicians, including and especially analysts, and for a comprehensive understanding of man and the world. But they take their responsibility too lightly in failing to recognize that each man must answer for his own metaphysical views. If Dr. May has found Kierkegaard and Tillich helpful, he must study Plato and Hegel, Kant and Whitehead. Neither eclecticism nor the doctrinaire acceptance of a metaphysical system can provide a satisfactory foundation for psychoanalysis. Hegel surely has as much to contribute to the understanding of the complex dialectical relatedness of the self to itself, to the world, and to other selves as any other philosopher. If philosophy has proved so exciting and so helpful to the psychoanalysts, they should try more of it—much more!

To detail and support this recommendation we might consider the concern of Binswanger and his colleagues to understand the world-design of their patients. They assume, in effect, that each individual has from the beginning of his life-history certain metaphysical principles which determine how he is oriented toward himself, the world about him, and to other men. (Although Binswanger provides for transcendence of the world he makes no

allowance for man's relation to God. The possibility of such a relationship surely has an important bearing not only on the interpretation of death, despair, and freedom, but also of love, hope, and tragedy. Even the existentialist must settle for himself the question whether Kierkegaard or Heidegger is ultimately right about the origin, meaning, and possible outcome of human despair. The fact that these are ultimate issues should indicate that Heidegger's ontology is not founded upon a *pure phenomenological analysis* of human existence. When it is possible for phenomenological analyses to produce such divergent results, one becomes properly suspicious of their claim to be *pure descriptions*. Binswanger places too much confidence in the possibility of phenomenological description both in ontology and analysis. This accounts in large measure for his undue confidence in the adequacy of Heidegger's system.) Following Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world, they assume, further, that each individual has his own world with its unique structure. These differences are clearly and dramatically illustrated in the three cases presented in the volume. But if this is so—and I see no reason for questioning it—why are there not a large number of possible theoretical systems which might in fact be adopted? Might there not be individuals who are fundamentally Platonists or Aristotelians, Scholastics or Cartesians, Kantians or Hegelians, Bergsonians or Whiteheadians, etc.? All that is required so far as Heidegger's ontological categories (existential *a priori* characteristics, to use Heidegger's terminology) are concerned, is that the individual's being-in-the-world involve a determinate ontological orientation toward himself, others, and the surrounding world. If we leave aside Heidegger's own view of the *a priori* structure of Dasein which, in its stress upon *Jemeinigkeit* (my-ownness), suggests that even ontology cannot altogether escape relativity, there is nothing to rule out the possibility of diverse metaphysical world-designs. On the contrary, there is every reason to expect that all plausible metaphysical systems will, in one way or another, be represented in the world orientations of individuals. I say in one way or another for it is at least possible that some metaphysical theories might be represented in disordered personalities and, in fact, be constitutive of the disorder. When Kierkegaard referred

to truth as subjectivity he entertained this possibility, namely that an objectively acceptable theory might not be tenable when subjected to the test of practice. Practice here means not simply *testing hypotheses* in terms of their consequences but the attempt to embody a system in one's existence as its *ratio essendi*. Schizophrenia in some of its forms would not be a *consequence* of adopting a metaphysical scheme as an hypothesis, but the concrete embodiment of such a system. Personality disorder is not a *causal product* of a system but its *exhibition*. The system is, then, the *form* of the disorder, formally constitutive of its subjective untruth. The system itself as lived is *mad, insane!* If every human personality evidences a total metaphysical structure which is determinative of its life history, and if some personalities are disordered and insane, it follows necessarily that some metaphysical theories are, when judged in terms of their personification and embodiment as opposed to their consequences, untenable. Or, looking at it from the other direction, if every metaphysical system can provide a structural form for existence, furnishing it with guiding principles for action, and, further, if some metaphysical theories are false, it is inevitable that, upon being taken up and embraced by the individual, their falsity should evidence itself in the form of personality disorder and, possibly, even madness. If we affirm both of these hypotheticals, existential analysis has offered us a marvelous device for analyzing the structure both of the healthy and the disordered personality and, also, for submitting metaphysical theories to a unique empirical test. This sort of text, be it noted, does not subject metaphysics to the type of quasi-scientific trial of consequences proposed by the pragmatists. It proposes a test appropriate to metaphysics as a discipline and, quite possibly, the only suitable test that can pretend to be empirical.

But as soon as we consider metaphysics within a wider compass we are confronted with a further problem: how can we determine whether or not a theory which informs and structures a human life is true or false? This problem was suppressed by Binswanger, as we have seen, because of his complacent acceptance of the truth of Heidegger's ontology. But even within a Heideggerian context the problem cannot be long avoided. As soon as any distinction is made between the actual world-design

of the patient and a normal world-design which might enable an individual to function in a healthy way, the question is posed. It is one thing to employ Heidegger's *Daseinsanalyse* for a phenomenological description of the patient's world, and another to use it as a criterion of normalcy. If, as one of my friends observed, the world were in itself a disordered affair, schizophrenia might appropriately reflect ultimate bifurcations and, thus, be subjectively true. It is, I take it, a synthetic proposition that the healthy is also that which is subjectively true and a further synthetic proposition that the subjectively true is objectively true. The existential analysts tacitly affirm the first synthetic proposition and, in their appeal to ontology, affirm the truth of the second as well. What, then are the criteria of subjective truth?

At least two possibilities offer themselves for an answer to this question. The analyst might approach his patient with an *a priori* conception of what constitutes a sound world-orientation. His norms would then be derived from metaphysics, ethics, theology, etc., and serve as antecedent criteria for the appraisal of his patient's condition. Or, he might attempt to find normative principles in the life-history of his patient. As a phenomenologist and empiricist it is clear that the existential analysts wish to follow the latter rather than the former procedure. The disorder must reveal itself as what it is in fact, namely a *warping* of a basic order or design. In the case of psychic illness it is always and necessarily the patient who reveals his own symptoms. Perfectly sane and healthy individuals may act in ways that are disturbing to their fellows and disruptive of their social environment. But there is no sufficient ground for supposing that they are *ill* unless they show some awareness of being disturbed. They may, of course, reveal this inner disturbance indirectly by attempting to conceal it or by a withdrawal from communication. But the patient does and must certify his own symptoms. A phenomenological analysis does not presume to classify these symptoms ahead of time on the basis of observation; it looks upon the abnormal as issuing from the patient's own world-orientation. Psychic illness is a kind of human failure, a failure of the individual to realize his own objectives in a unified and harmonious way. In more or less acute

form the person who is psychically ill falls into conflict with himself and this conflict is constitutive of his illness.

In discussing the problem of norms and, in particular, the definition of what constitutes insanity, Binswanger recognizes the danger of confusing cultural or private norms with objective standards of psychic health. This difficulty can be surmounted, he suggests, only if the psychiatrist makes reference to the teleological processes of the natural organism. Sickness is judged medically, he adds, in terms of the impairment of organic functions (p. 229). But there is an important difference between insanity, for example, viewed as a mental disease and regarded as a *life-historical phenomenon*:

The distinction between insanity as a life-historical phenomenon and insanity as mental disease is, as we saw, rooted in the distinction between human existence (Dasein) or being-in-the-world, on the one hand, and nature on the other (p. 232).

Commenting on the importance of this distinction, Binswanger adds:

It is the lack of insight into this distinction [between the natural and the life-historical] which can be blamed for all the embarrassing transgressions of the humanities into clinical psychiatry and of clinical psychiatry into the humanities (p. 233).

Unfortunately this distinction, which is designed to obviate confusion between psychiatry as a positivistic enterprise following the methodology of natural science and the *Geisteswissenschaften*, is of no avail in separating the latter from existential analysis. It seems that Binswanger has not actually eliminated the possibility of such confusion but only shifted it to another level. In being concerned with life-historical phenomena, existential analysis is concerned with the affairs of the spirit. But are there discernible ways in which norms of health and order can be ascertained in the realm of the spirit analogous to those employed by the physician? Is there, in other words, an intrinsic teleology of the spirit in terms of which order and derangement, normalcy and abnormality, healthy functioning and impairment of function can be measured? Since a naturalistically founded teleology has been declared inadequate, and culturally founded norms admitted to be highly

relative, objectivity must depend upon the possibility of an ontological understanding of man.

Spirit is freedom. On this doctrine the existentialists are in complete agreement with Hegel. But they deny that there is a dialectic of freedom or spirit which *necessitates* either personal-historical or cultural development. Kierkegaard sought to outline possible ways of choosing or failing to choose to be a self. There are forms of despairingly willing to be a self, any one of which may be illustrated in a human life. These general types exhibit a logical coherence in terms of which human life may be understood. But the logical order exhibited by a pattern of despair does not determine a *causal order* in the life-history of the individual. A man may always refuse the next step, though he can only do so by altering his objectives. The fact that he has become involved in one moment of despair does not mean that he *must* embody every variety of despair in ever deepening forms. The reason is that he can always make the leap of faith. He sees, perhaps, that if he chooses A, B follows as a logical consequence—provided that his volition remains constant. In this sense there is a dialectic of spirit, a logical typology of basic possibilities. Such possibilities are abstract and have causal power only in so far as they become guiding principles of the will. If we view man as an *object* in the world we inevitably analyze his behavior in terms of *mechanisms* and genetic-causal development. The choice of A is then seen as requiring the choice of B in the way that one natural event follows upon another in conformity with causal law. But this is either to leave freedom out of our account or else to interpret freedom as a form of natural causation. The existentialist objection to Hegel is that in spite of his preoccupation with spirit he naturalized it and accommodated it to an organic teleology. Whereas Hegel was basically Aristotelian in his orientation, the existentialists are Platonic and Kantian. They refuse to see the end as immanent in and providing the telos for life-historical processes from the beginning. The unique capacity of man is that he can choose the type of life he wishes to adopt both in outline and in detail and that he must choose it at every instant. The fact that for the most part people default on this choice does not mean that they enjoy no power of transcendence. In fact, their despair is measured by

the extent to which they have willed to be the sort of being who makes and can make no radical choices.

In so far as existential analysis bases its norms upon existentialist metaphysics it cannot appeal to a teleology of spirit or a natural dialectic of freedom. It must limit itself to consideration of those conditions which define, in the first place, the range of human possibility and, hence, the limits of freedom, and, in the second place, the fundamental dimensions of spirit which determine man's ontological concern. To know man's basic ontological concerns and, further, the ultimate limits of human possibility provides a beginning point for the formulation of objective norms. It will, for example, enable the analyst to determine whether an individual acknowledges or seeks to evade the ultimate necessities and possibilities of his existence. But to know these conditions is not enough in itself. He must have, further, a conception of the self as a unity of the possible and the necessary. To talk or to think of an *authentic self* is to conceive of a self which copes successfully with all of the dimensions of its existence. To describe what a self is ontologically, it is necessary to state in outline what it means for the self to exist authentically or in the mode of truth. The human subject exists not only in and for himself but in the world and with other selves, and, possibly, with God. It has not only itself to contend with but these other beings which define the cardinal points of its world. A man might, for example, be perfectly sane if judged only by himself. His madness may manifest itself only when his relation to the world is taken into account. In that they regard man as fundamentally a being-in-the-world, the existential analysts are in no danger of losing these further dimensions of human existence. The relation of the individual to himself is only one fact in the human condition. As Binswanger has made clear, any one of these dimensions may represent the decisive factor in psychosis.

Existentialist ontologies offer in the first instance only an abstract and formalistic account of man in terms of the ultimate conditions of human existence. But each of them goes further in analyzing these conditions in more concrete terms. Kierkegaard's positive ontology is theistic and Christian, Heidegger's onto-theological, Jaspers' agnostic, and Sartre's atheistic. Before any

application of ontological principles can be attempted it is necessary to supply a determinate ontology which attempts to answer the basic questions. It is necessary, further, to translate the latter into cultural and empirical concepts. Binswanger fails to distinguish adequately between Heidegger's more formal ontology which is non-committal with respect to man's ultimate relation to being, and Heidegger's metaphysics which provides more detailed answers. As Jaspers has pointed out so well and so emphatically, authentic communication takes place at the ontological level between individuals who share a common concern and a common problem. It is the ultimate ontological conditions of existence which make possible communication between the patient with his, perhaps, mad world and the physician with his healthy world-design. If it is the patient who must in the first instance be aware of and reveal his illness, it is he, too, who in the last analysis must determine what for him is a healthy life orientation. Existential analysis proceeds on the Socratic principle that the patient must already know himself in order to discover himself through decisive choice. If the patient defaults on his responsibility no therapeutic technique can aid him. Adopting this position frees the analyst from taking final responsibility for determining what constitutes normalcy for another person. He needs to have this disclosed to him by the patient as much as the patient requires to discover it for himself.

In spite of their laudable effort to analyze human existence in its most comprehensive aspect and to include an explicit account of the ultimate ontological conditions of the human situation, the existential analysts are too incautious in their leap into metaphysics. For one thing they fail to consider the consequences of this move for the autonomy of a scientific discipline. In the second place they tie themselves too closely to and adopt too uncritically a single metaphysical system. The result comes awfully close in practice to an aesthetic portrayal of human life-histories without promise of predictable therapeutic result. Technique can doubtless be overemphasized, but when it is left out of account one wonders what is left of psychoanalysis as a healing art or a science. William Faulkner is a student neither of Freud nor of Heidegger. He doubtless knows little of phenomenological method or of exis-

tentialist metaphysics. Yet his analysis of the human situation compares favorably with the case analyses given in this volume. I should like to conclude with a citation from Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*. It satisfies, I think, many of the requirements laid down by the existential analysts. It would not be difficult to specify the ontological principles constituting the world design of the character Faulkner describes.

Quentin III. Who loved not his sister's body but some concept of Compson honor precariously and (he knew well) only temporarily supported by the minute fragile membrane of her maidenhead as a miniature replica of all the whole vast globy earth may be poised on the nose of a trained seal. Who loved not the idea of the incest which he would not commit, but some presbyterian concept of its eternal punishment: he, not God, could by that means cast himself and his sister both into hell, where he could guard her forever and keep her forevermore intact amid the eternal fires. But who loved death above all, who loved only death, loved and lived in a deliberate and almost perverted anticipation of death as a lover loves and deliberately refrains from the waiting willing friendly tender incredible body of his beloved, until he can no longer bear not the refraining but the restraint and so flings, hurls himself, relinquishing, drowning. Committed suicide in Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1910, two months after his sister's wedding . . .²

Yale University.

² Signet Books, p. 9.

ANAMNESIS IN PLATO'S *MENO* AND *PHAEDO*

R. E. ALLEN

1. Socrates in the *Meno* states what was in all likelihood a Sophist's paradox, that no one ever seeks to learn anything.¹ For either he knows what it is he is to inquire about, in which case he need not stir, or he does not, and therefore has no notion of what it is he is seeking. Socrates points out that the antithesis is false, and that a middle way must be found; for men have neither the wisdom of the gods nor the ignorance of brutes. He overcomes the difficulty by appealing to the doctrines of "wise men and women who told of things divine," including Pindar and ancient priests and sages: (81b-c)

They say that the soul of man is immortal and never perishes, though at one time it makes an end, called dying, and at another is born again. We must, therefore, pass our whole lives in utmost holiness . . . Since the soul is immortal, and has been born many times, she has beheld all things in this world and the next, and there is nothing she has not learnt; so it is not surprising that she can remember what she once knew about virtue and other things. For since all nature is akin, and the soul has learnt all things, there is nothing to prevent her, by recollecting one single thing—what men call "learning—discovering all the rest, if her search is untiring and courageous. For learning and inquiry are nothing but recollection.

Such, in essence, is Plato's doctrine of Anamnesis, Recollection. It comes to us embedded in the mythical imagery of a religion which is not our own, and many commentators, in rejecting its theological trappings, have concluded that it represents no serious part of Plato's philosophy. But I shall argue that the theory of Anamnesis represents a serious, and subtle, solution to genuine philosophical perplexities. And certainly there is no evidence, at least in the dialogues of the middle period, that Plato ever abandoned it.²

¹ *Meno* 80e ff.; cf. *Symp.* 204a, *Euthyd.* 275c ff.

² On the contrary; in the *Phaedrus* it is Anamnesis, stirred by the perception of physical beauty, which rouses the soul's desire for the "super-celestial place" from which it fell. (249e-250c.)

2. The *Meno* offers a dramatic demonstration of the validity of the first argument put forward for Anamnesis and the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo*: (73a)

When people are questioned, if you put the question well, they will always answer correctly; and yet, unless they had knowledge and the correct account already within them, they could not do this. But you will find the clearest proof that this is so if you lead them to geometrical diagrams, or anything else of that sort.

The slave-boy of the *Meno*, ignorant of geometry, succeeds in establishing the truth of a fairly difficult theorem with no other aid than the figures inscribed in the sand at his feet and the assistance of intelligent questioning. Here is a fact. How is it to be explained? Since the boy had never been taught, but only questioned, does it not imply that he had some recollection of a truth seen before he entered human form, a truth locked and forgotten in the recesses of personal memory?

If that were all that Anamnesis meant, the theory would be worthless, a dusty curio of mental archeology. The fact is the fact of passage, and that passage consists in nothing more mysterious than inference. However difficult inference may be to understand, it seems obvious that it is not all one with memory, obvious too that it provides no easy ground for immortality. Nor is this all. For taken in this way, the theory is a hopeless failure. If we could come directly to know in a previous existence, why can we not as easily come to know now, without the intervention of memory? And if we have really forgotten, our vision remains as remote as the truth itself, whereas if we have not forgotten, there is no need for recollection. So far from solving the Sophist's paradox, this theory is but a prey to it.

But the context in which the theory is presented, both in the *Meno* and in the *Phaedo*, indicates that it is precisely to the problem of inference that Anamnesis is directed.

3. The sophist's question would have been forced upon Plato's mind by his newly awakened interest in mathematics, and by Socrates himself. Socrates had never claimed to teach; Plato in later dialogues would present him as a spiritual midwife, delivering the offspring of other minds, not of his own. Men must recover their knowledge of virtue out of themselves. The *Meno* connects

this fact with our knowledge of mathematics. The dialogue begins with the question of whether virtue can be taught. But a major portion of it is devoted to establishing the truth of the doctrine of Anamnesis by mathematical illustration. This is no accident; the dialogue exhibits a fundamental unity of theme. For neither virtue nor mathematics can be taught, if teaching implies the handing over of information. You do not understand mathematics by memorising the multiplication table, and you do not understand virtue by memorising adages and moral rubrics. In these areas, understanding must come in large measure from within—it must be “recollected.” Recollection, in this very special sense, does not and cannot tell us the date of the battle of Marathon, or the items on yesterday’s menu: the theory does not explain empirical judgments, whose objects are contingent matters of fact, but those judgments whose truth is guaranteed by systematic necessity. This is the significance of the metaphor of “kinship”: (*Meno* 81c-d)

Since all nature is akin (*συγγενής*), and the soul has learnt all things, there is nothing to prevent her, by recollecting one single thing, recovering all the rest.

A single bit of genuine knowledge serves us as the terminal link in a golden chain, by which we may, Zeus-like, draw to ourselves the whole of intelligible reality. The objects of knowledge stand in intimate and necessary connection with each other; to recover one link is to gain the means to recover all. It is because of this necessary structure, and his innate grasp of it, that the slave-boy can pass from ignorance to knowledge.

4. The theory of Anamnesis is a theory of inference, and it rests on the intensional relations which the Forms bear to one another. But it is not clear why inference should be made to rest on Anamnesis.

The answer is bound up with Plato’s view of the relation between particulars and Forms. The *Phaedo* regards them as separated by an unbridgeable gulf, a *χωρισμός*, entailed by two doctrines. To begin with, the Form exists *αὐτό καὶ αὐτό*, alone by itself, independent of and ontologically prior to its exemplifications. It does so because it is a cause, since without it there would be no character to be had by particulars, which are, in a formal sense, its

"effects" (100b-c, *et seqq.*). Secondly, every particular necessarily falls short of the Form, never to own it fully; it is not what it *has*. Forms and particulars are *ἐτερά ὄντα*, different sorts of things (74b ff.). They are members of two worlds, not one.

Because the objects of knowledge are independent of the physical world, and "separate" from it, they cannot be known through it. Because there is a gulf between Forms and particulars, the objects of knowledge and the objects of sense, we cannot, in knowing, pass directly from the latter to the former: passage presupposes prior knowledge. This is the core of the second argument for the doctrine of Anamnesis in the *Phaedo* (74b ff.). There, after establishing that recollection may be provoked either by what is like or unlike to the thing recalled, and that when reminded of something by another thing which is like it, you must be able to compare and decide in what way the resemblance falls short of the original, Socrates proceeds to state the doctrine of the separation of particulars and Forms. There is a thing which is equal, not as sticks are equal to sticks, or stones to stones, but something just equal in itself—Equality. But how do we come to know it? Not through the apparent equals of sense, for sensible equals and Equality are different sorts of things. Why? Because to know Equality is to know it as perfectly equal; one cannot conceive it as in any sense unequal, whereas sensible equals appear, now equal, now unequal, to different observers, or in different perspectives. Again, sensible equals differ from Equality because they are trying to be like it, but fall short; they can never be perfectly equal.

From these considerations, Socrates draws an important conclusion: (75b)

Before we began to see and hear, and perceive in other ways, it was no doubt necessary to possess knowledge of the essential nature of Equality, if we refer perceptible equals to it because they all desire ardently to be of its nature, but fall short of it.

This is true of: (75c-d)

The Greater and the Less and everything of that sort; for our argument applies no less to Equality than to Beauty itself, to the Good itself, to Justice, Holiness, and, in a word, to all those things which, in our dialectic, we ratify with the seal of "Reality."

Now either we have complete knowledge of these things, or we must recall them. And the former alternative cannot be accepted; for the man who has knowledge can always render an account of what he knows, and we cannot always do this. Therefore, we must come to know these things through recollection, and the soul must have existed before we entered human form. (76c)

5. The nucleus of the second argument for Anamnesis is that knowledge of the Forms is epistemically prior to knowledge of particulars. And this is a doctrine of capital importance.

There is a paradox involved in the ease with which Socrates' respondents could point to examples of, say, courage, while yet finding the utmost difficulty in formulating a definition of it. For how, unless you know what a thing is, can you furnish specimens of it? Logically, the thing seems impossible; yet the simple fact is that we do it every day of our lives.

This is a problem of use. You have a predicate, which you apply to an object. But if you are to apply it with intelligence, you must first know its meaning. You must, that is, know what kinds of action are such-and-such before you can say that this is that kind of action.³ Closely associated with the problem of use is the problem of origin—how did you come by your notion of courage to begin with? A common answer to this question has been a theory of abstraction: we come to know and define universals by comparing similar objects of perception, and abstracting, or isolating from the material context, their common character. But despite a certain easy obviousness in the answer, difficulties leap to the eye. For we can know that two things are similar only by knowing that they own a common character; but that character is the universal. Therefore knowledge of the universal must be epistemically prior to knowledge of its instances.⁴

³ Cf. *Laches* 190b-c, Aristotle, *An. Post.* I.1.6.

⁴ Cf. *Theat.* 185a ff. It is Aristotle's doctrine that sense provides the universal, but not as a universal. The universal is apprehended by an act of intellectual intuition, mediated by sense. Such a view is not—at least patently—prey to the criticism here urged. But if, with Kant, we deny the existence of intellectual intuition, or with Plato, that the universal is immanent in the particular, then knowledge cannot be gained by abstraction, since abstraction then presupposes prior knowledge.

The theory of Anamnesis provides an answer to this problem: it represents, in fact, an infant theory of the *a priori*. We may compare Plato's doctrine with that of Kant. It was Kant's goal to uncover the absolute presuppositions of experience, the *a priori* structures without which there could be no experience at all. And if by "experience" we mean, as Kant meant, not the casual flow of data, but the ordered structure of perception, then Kant's goal and Plato's are fundamentally one. For the structure and order of experience presuppose the universal. And though for Plato, like Kant, the universal can—and indeed, in the final analysis, must—be considered apart, it cannot be discovered apart from experience. The doctrine that recollection may be provoked either by what is like or *unlike*, the radical distinction between knowledge and belief, the gulf posited between particulars and Forms, have tended to obscure this point. But in the last analysis, the senses make a genuine contribution to thought—how else could we know that apparent equals strive for Equality and fall short?—and knowledge is the product of cooperation.

But if it is true that both Plato and Kant have a theory of *a priori* knowledge, we would do well not to confuse their views. For Kant, the *a priori* is universal in this sense: it necessarily holds true of the physical world. It is just this which Plato's doctrine of the separation of Forms and particulars is chiefly concerned to deny. There can be no exact science of that which comes to be and perishes. Nor is the *a priori* element, for Plato, a structure which the mind imposes of itself upon experience. Kant's "empirical realism," the projection by the mind of its own categories into the material of sense, and his "transcendental idealism," the refusal to grant objective and independent existence to the Ideals which ground the activity of Reason, are equally alien to Plato's philosophy. The Forms are not subjective principles of organization; they are the objective structure of Being itself.

Although it is only through experience that we can recover knowledge of a Form, once that Form has been clearly known we may follow Ariadne's thread of implication without reference to sensible objects. The world on the further side of the χωρισμός

is self-contained, and once having entered it, we need never leave.⁶ It is this emphasis on the mind's independence of perception that accounts for the strongly intellectualist ethics of the *Phaedo*.⁶ The soul which always follows reason, and fixes its gaze on what is true and divine, the object of knowledge rather than of opinion, finds its own true nourishment, the fulfillment of its own deepest need (84a). The doctrine that philosophy and true virtue consist in the practice of death, the separation of the soul from the body in so far as it is possible to do so, is merely the articulation of the ethical consequences of the *χωρὶς σώματος* and of Anamnesis.

6. We are now in a position to see why inference implies Anamnesis. Inference presupposes knowledge of universals, i.e., of Forms. But the Forms are "separate," which implies that we cannot come to know them through the objects given in sensation. Now either this implies that we cannot know them at all, or that we know them through some means other than sensation. And we *do* know them, since perception presupposes that knowledge. This in turn implies that knowledge of Forms is epistemically prior to knowledge of the particulars which exemplify them, and from this Plato concludes, ostensibly at least, that knowledge of the Forms is temporally prior as well.⁷ This in turn implies that, when we come to explicit awareness of the nature of a Form, it is not a discovery of something wholly new, but the recollection of something already known. Learning is recollection.

But we may still ask whether this provides a genuine solution to the sophist's problem. For how, if we have forgotten the Forms, can we recall them? The answer, of course, is that the

⁶ Cf. *Phaedo* 65e-66a.

⁶ Cf. 82d ff.

⁷ If Plato understood Anamnesis in this way, he has unquestionably confused epistemological with temporal or psychological priority. There is no reason to hold that, because knowledge of *x* presupposes knowledge of *y*, *y* must have been known *beforehand*. Kant, whose view of the *a priori* is in many respects similar to Plato's, never fell into this trap. For him, the *a priori* is part of the very structure of reason; reason could never *come* to know it, precisely because there could be no reason without it. It may be that Plato's doctrine of Anamnesis should be interpreted along similar lines, but the explicitness of the *Phaedo* on the subject of pre-existence makes this appear unlikely.

Forms are implicit in all cognition, that we continually use them without knowing that we use them. But this raises the old problem in a new form; for how is this possible?

In answer we may cite as an analogy the distinction between *logica utens* and *logica docens*. Aristotle, in discovering the syllogism, rendered a brilliant service to the science of logic, *logica docens*. But his discovery was not invention; it was the abstract recognition of a formal principle inherent in many different kinds of valid inference, a principle so native to *logica utens* that for centuries it passed unnoticed by those who used it. Indeed, if it is the valid form of deduction, as Aristotle thought; he perforce had to use it in some measure to discover it. And so it is with the Forms. We could not proceed a step without them, for everything turns on universality; but it requires genius of a high order to recognize their presence. And even when they are recognized, and consciously sought, their nature still remains obscure and difficult to penetrate. To know *that* they are is still not to know fully and clearly *what* they are. For philosophy, they are a task, not a possession. It was this fact that led Plato to formulate and practice the method of inquiry which he calls that of hypothesis. But inquiry itself would be unintelligible were it not for Anamnesis. For how, unless you knew what you were looking for, could you find it?

7. There is a final question to be considered. This account of Anamnesis is largely based on the *Phaedo*; is it consistent with that of the *Meno*? To be more specific, is the account of separation on which the doctrine rests in the *Phaedo* also found in the *Meno*?

If, as we have argued, the doctrine of Anamnesis is an answer to epistemological problems entailed by the separation of Forms and particulars, the question should, it seems, be answered in the affirmative; for it would appear to be a highly unlikely view of Plato's development to hold that he accepted an answer, and only later found a question to fit it. But to argue so would be to take a short way with dissenters, for there is evidence of inconsistency between the dialogues on the intimately connected question of the relation of belief and knowledge.

In his indictment of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* (454c ff.), Plato offers criteria for distinguishing knowledge and belief. Knowl-

edge is infallible, and it is produced by instruction, not persuasion. Belief, on the other hand, may be true or false; and the persuasion which produces it may also destroy it. But though these are distinguishing features of knowledge and belief, we have still learned little of their intrinsic natures. This omission is made good in the *Meno*, where the criteria of knowledge are grounded in systematic connectedness. When Socrates has finished with his examination of the slave-boy, he turns to Meno and says (85c), "At present these notions have been stirred up in him as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions in different forms, he would know as well as anyone at last." So far, the boy has only true opinions, but if his mind is further stirred by questioning, he will go on to recover truth out of himself.

Later in the dialogue, the distinction between knowledge and belief is more carefully drawn. While examining the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, it is agreed that practical success may be equally well attained with right opinion. A man who knows the way to Larisa can guide others; but so too can the man who has right opinion about the way although he has never traveled it. Right opinion, while we have it, is as good a guide to action as knowledge is, and as useful (97a-c).

But it is not the same thing as knowledge. Socrates remarks, "that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge is not a matter of conjecture, but something I would claim to know: there are not many things of which I would say that, but this is one of them" (98b). Opinion or belief, however good and true, may be likened to the mythical statues of Daedalus, which, if not fastened down, run away. It will stay with you no more than a runaway slave unless it is made fast by "reflection on the reason" (αἰτίας λογισμῷ, 98a). On the other hand, "when true beliefs are fastened, they turn into knowledge, and abide; that is why knowledge is more valuable than right opinion; it differs because of its bond (δεσμός)." This account of knowledge, whereby a collection of true beliefs is bound into a coherent system by "reflection on the reason," is intimately related to the *Phaedo's* description of it as able to render an account of itself (λογὸν δοῦναι, 76b5). But the vital point is that, in the *Meno*, opinion is *made into* knowledge by reflection. There is an essential continuity between the two,

whereas in the *Phaedo* (84a), the Forms are described as "true and divine and *not* objects of opinion (*ἀδόξαστον*). " This is evidently an anticipation of the doctrine of the *Republic* (V 476c ff.), that knowledge and opinion have not got the same objects, and that doctrine is the result of the separation between Forms and particulars; if the two are wholly different in kind, our modes of apprehending them must be different, and not translatable one into the other. Opinion can never become knowledge. It follows that the doctrines of Anamnesis in the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* differ in this important respect: in the *Phaedo*, Anamnesis solves epistemological problems generated by a *χωρισμός* between Forms and particulars which Plato, when he wrote the *Meno*, was perhaps groping for, but had not yet clearly formulated. Plato's early dialogues are *πειραστικὸς* "tentative"; and in many ways the *Meno* shares their character. But in the middle period a different spirit is stirring, the spirit of a man who has thought things through, and come to a conclusion. The *Phaedo* presents us with a philosophical system of startling originality, a new theory of man and of the universe. This new philosophy rests, in F. M. Cornford's metaphor, on twin pillars: the immortality and divinity of the rational soul, and the reality and indestructibility of the objects of its knowledge. The architrave of these pillars is the doctrine of Anamnesis, Recollection.

University of Minnesota.

AN INSPECTIVE THEORY OF THINKING

R. J. C. BURGNER

IS A CONCEPT something that is immediately apprehended? Can it be apprehended by itself "bare" or "pure"? Can we refer to it in "entity language" at all? How is it related to perception and language? These are the questions I try to answer in this paper—an attempt to clear up some of the questions left unanswered in a previously published exchange with Professor H. H. Price.¹

The traditional view was that a concept must be immediate if anything is, i.e., it must be something possessed directly by my mind. To deny this seems to be saying (if concepts may be equated colloquially to "thoughts" or "ideas") "I think but I don't have ideas." This is of course what the proponents of the linguistic philosophy are in effect saying, and perhaps for them it is all right. Professor Price has argued ingeniously against the whole linguistic position: against the possibility of a purely linguistic solution to the problem. Yet whether we follow Price or the language philosophers we are forced into a rather puzzling situation. One likes to say that one has ideas, thoughts, concepts, but there is a serious question as to whether we can ever actually cognize such entities. Indeed Price introspects and does not find them. Most of us—including our linguistic colleagues—would be quick to agree. A thought cannot be introspected like an image (or "internal accusative"). There just does not seem to be anything there. As thinkers of thoughts, we are looking inward toward nothing; we are indeed living examples of "hollow men." So it is that we are faced with a dilemma. Either we say we think but do not *really* have ideas, or we must somehow show that such concepts are actually immediate after all. Neither alternative seems the least bit welcome. The latter seems utterly impossible.

Of this dilemma Price grasps the former horn. He chooses what appears to be the lesser of the two evils. He denies the

¹ See this journal, XI (Sept., 1957), 143-159; XII (March, 1959), 481-485; XII (June, 1959), 649-653.

concept its immediacy. Now there can be no doubt that his choice is made to seem more reasonable to us today by its being also sanctioned by the all-pervasive language philosophy. And certainly the particular remedy—in terms of hypothetical statements—exists ready-made for him in the familiar dispositional reductions of the physical world, going right back to Berkeley. Still, there appears to be a basic flaw in it. In such a solution non-empirical matters are dealt with by reducing them to descriptions of regular sequences of ordinary immediates (or “occurents”). In a similar way, Price conjectures, the particular mental process called *thinking* or “concept manifestation” could be handled by reducing it to a sequence of immediates—in this case to ordinary perceptions with the probable addition of images and words. In the previous papers (particularly XII 649-653), I argued that this cannot be done because of the impossibility of rendering the *necessity* component in rational thought—that it could indeed only render a “ghostly twin” of rational thought. Price himself for some time has felt that there is something wrong with the dispositional solution (*Comment*, XII, 482). Although I regard the “necessity” argument as the stronger, it is perhaps sufficient for our present purposes to recall what we have already noted: the dispositional reduction divorces us from our own thoughts. It seems to me that this is a position which, to say the least, is well worth avoiding; for in spite of its widespread acceptance, surely such a view is utterly paradoxical. It would allow us to grasp immediately our words, our ordinary perceptions and even our images; but the one thing it would (somehow unfairly) discriminate against would be the immediacy of our own thoughts, concepts, ideas. We are forced to admit that when we thought we were having *thoughts* we were really just having regular sequences of the only proper immediates: words, ordinary perceptions, images. Much can be said for the dispositional solution when it comes to reducing such non-immediates as elasticity or material substance. Yet how strange that we are to try similarly to explain away our own thoughts!

So there are at least two lines of argument—the impossibility of rendering rational necessity, and the above consideration of divorce—that make it necessary to search for an alternative to the

position of Price, and a position differing also from the linguistic theory; for it should be noted that both criticisms of Price's view apply equally well to the linguistic theory. My previous papers attempted to suggest such an *inspective* theory. This would be a position somewhat similar in many respects to what Price calls the "classical" theory—one held by the classical rationalists and Platonists, but today subject to much scholarly scorn and ridicule. Such an inspective theory of thinking, as a rationalist theory brought up to date, would gain its dialectical force from its ability to resolve the foregoing dilemma. The way it does this, as we shall see, is to seek *per impossible* to grasp its other horn. It will avoid saying "we think but we do not really have ideas." Rather it will seek to maintain concepts as immediate entities in spite of their non-introspectable nature. They will be entities which are nonetheless *inspected*, or the objects of rational insight.

It is clear that this will be possible only on the condition that there could be more than one basic kind of immediacy. There will have to be at least two kinds: the one would of course be that of everyday perception and introspection, i.e. the "occurrents" of the empiricists and positivists. No one denies this. The other would be another kind of immediate experience which is not perception in the usual sense of the word, nor even introspection. It is this second kind of immediate experience that it is our task now to endeavor to clarify. We need only show that it does actually exist in order to break the dilemma.

The Negative Immediate

At this point it would be natural for one to say, "but when you have enumerated all the kinds of Price's 'occurrent,' all the ordinary perceptions, images, feelings, etc., how can there possibly be anything left?" After all, granting Price's point—as I think we all do—that there are no "occurrents" specifically identified as "thoughts" (or concepts or universals), how are we going to go about looking for additional immediate entities? It seems that there are just no possibilities left to exhaust. Of course, it would not do to go *looking* for them anyway, or introspecting, since *ex hypothesi* anything we could thus observe has already been eliminated as a possible candidate. But then, what kind of pro-

cedure will show us that these non-introspectables are really immediate things.⁹ And, pray, what queer kind of immediacy could they possibly have?

It is difficult to know how to begin an answer. Empiricism has traditionally had two very attractive features: its realities are immediate, and its inventory of such entities is small. The sense data, or properties of objects, etc. (a very economical ontology) are the only ultimately real entities to which all else is to be reduced. What I maintained in the previous papers was that for every one of these empirical immediates (or occurrents) there is a corresponding immediate which the empiricist misses. For the empirical perception of—let us say—a triangle, there is a corresponding state of mind of the non-instantiation of a triangle. An example of such a state would be when we expect to see a triangle but do not. One will find Price's disposal of this case in *Thinking and Experience*, pp. 119, 281.

Now there is, I think, no denying that such a state of mind is immediate. Furthermore it is not vague; rather it is a highly determinate or characteristic state, distinctly different for every case. Indeed it appears to be as highly determinate as when instantiation has actually taken place. This claim can be made for the reason that while we are in such a state we can perfectly well recognize instances when and if they come. We can also discriminate against false instances, even when they are very close to the one we want. When we are, for example, expecting something, it is possible for us to reject everything but the thing that we were expecting. Often we can say, "we know what we want" even though we do not have it, even though we have no image of it, even though we may not even have a word for it. This latter version of the case, i.e., of lacking a word, is discussed by Price (*Thinking and Experience*, p. 309) and in my paper (XI, 144). Often we are at a loss for a word. The word acts like a quasi-instance of the concept which we recognize when the right one comes along, and against which we can discriminate in the event of the wrong one turning up. So, in sum, this peculiar state of mind is immediate and it can be perfectly determinate. Yet when one searches for it among the empiricist's list of immediates one finds it to be conspicuously absent.

It is only to be expected that, as an empiricist, Price should try to *explain away* this state in terms of doctrinaire empirical immediates (*Thinking and Experience*, p. 319). I do not propose to attempt a formal disproof of his treatment of it in this paper. Nor do I intend in this paper to attempt to deal with Wittgenstein's treatment of the same matter. For in the inspective theory no disposal is required, since for the foregoing reasons it is to be admitted to the list of real legitimate immediates.

Once we have admitted this, it will, as I say, temporarily double the empiricist list. There will now be one of these "unsatisfied" states of mind for every immediate allowed by the empiricist (excepting images). Since they result from positive and negative states of instantiation I should like to call the two types *positive* and *negative* immediates respectively, depending as they do on whether they *are* or *are not* instantiated. The positive immediates will be the ordinary kind allowed by the positivists and empiricists, while the negative immediates will be our "new"—seemingly extraordinary—kind. So, for example, there is the full-bodied positive instantiation perception of a triangle, and there is also the negative instantiation state corresponding to it, wherein everything is, as it were, the same, except for the absence of the physical triangle. The one is the positive immediate; the other is the negative. Between these resides the image, but its proper theoretical determination is beyond the scope of this present paper.

So it is that the empiricist's list is for the moment doubled. We have triangle instantiated and triangle non-instantiated, tea-cup instantiated and tea-cup non-instantiated; and similarly with dog, justice, causality and all kinds of concepts. Thus we have found our second kind of immediacy, and the dilemma may therefore be resolved—particularly if thoughts, concepts or ideas may be regarded as having this kind of immediacy. "But," one may at this point retort, "you have, as you say, doubled the empiricist list of immediately known entities. On the grounds of Occam's razor you must yield to Price's or Wittgenstein's previously mentioned attempts to explain away these negative immediates. You must allow them to be reduced to good sensible positive immediates or "occurrents." But the answer to this is clear enough. We cannot go back to Price or Wittgenstein without throwing our-

selves back into the original dilemma. So there seems no way to turn. There seems to be no logical alternative left but to admit the unparsimonious double list. No, there is one possibility left. Rather than explain the negative state in terms of the positive, there is still the possibility—the only remaining one—of turning the explanation the other way round. We will have to reduce the positive immediates to negative immediates.

This is perhaps the most important clue to the understanding of this inspective theory of thinking and also to the allied view of the rationalists and Platonists. It is this logical twist, I think, more than anything else that can take philosophical observers of the twentieth century back through the looking-glass into the profoundly misunderstood world of the classical rationalists.

So rather than attempt to make the negative immediate derivative, it is evident that it must be made fundamental; rather than explain the state of negative instantiation (including "expectancy," "mental set," etc.) in terms of "occurrents," we must rather turn the explanation the other way around and explain these ordinary positively instantiated things in terms of negative immediates.

What this amounts to is that we are affirming these negative immediates as the basic elements: the real "atoms" or entities or *logical simples* out of which all else is composed—but which unlike individual physical atoms are not confined to one space-time region. This "all else" will ultimately include even material objects. This is in sharp contradistinction to (and yet to be compared with) the empiricists' and positivists' affirmation of some kind of positive immediate as the basic ontological entity e.g., sense data, or properties of objects.

But, in exasperation, one might retort, "such a negative immediate is properly speaking not an entity at all; it is only a peculiar state of mind." Certainly, we might reply, it is not much like those entities that our contemporaries assume uncritically to be entities: physical objects, images, etc. (Indeed it is one of these latter, I imagine, that even Price is thinking of when he says that a concept is not an entity.) But perhaps, as some of the earlier philosophers maintained, physical objects and such things are not really good entities at all, and are only called so metaphorically out of a kind of philosophic courtesy. Perhaps in holding

these things up as models of what a good entity should be our contemporaries have been gravely mistaken.

What is a suitable entity anyway? The physicist's atom was not too bad an example—before it and its successors were broken up and otherwise altered. A true entity, one might say, should be one simple real thing out of which ordinary things are compounded. Ordinary material objects such as chairs and tables themselves do not qualify in this regard since they are evidently already compounded of parts, e.g., crystals, molecules, atoms, electrons, etc. Furthermore, an epistemologically suitable entity should be knowable—and preferably knowable without reminder, i.e., immediate. So in something like Humean sense-impressions a more promising entity or *logical simple* is found. Indeed Hume remarked that these were the only things worthy of being called substances. But these are only one kind of immediate; and as we have maintained, they must be derivative and not fundamental.

Definition

Whatever be the disadvantages of physical objects, and sense data, they seem to have the advantage of allowing easily for definition. But how, one may ask, is one to define a peculiar non-perceivable non-introspectable entity—if indeed it is an entity? How is one to name and define something that cannot even be observed, let alone pointed to? It is all very well, one may say, for the classical or inspective theory to claim that we apprehend "a bare or naked thinkable, an 'intelligible object' *per se*" as Price described it (*Thinking and Experience*, p. 309). But how are you going to attach this bare entity to a word and bring it into the fabric of language? How are you going to define it and delimit it from other entities also named by words? Indeed, this problem of definition must be dealt with if the negative immediate of the previous section can successfully be regarded as a concept.

To answer this let us go back to our familiar example of the triangle. Let us pretend for the moment that we are thinking of a triangle but are at a loss for a word. Neither do we have a triangle-image. According to the classical rationalist theory we would then be inspecting or apprehending the intellectual entity "triangle." This is the state of negative immediacy we have

argued to be fundamental. At this juncture the empirical or linguistic philosopher could well reply, "surely you cannot be inspecting or in any way apprehending a triangle when there is no triangle there. A triangle has three angles, three extended sides etc." According to any standard definition of a triangle these seem to be essential. "Where," he would demand, "are the straight lines?"

My reply to this might seem rather devious at first glance. But it makes possible, I think, a suitable theory of meaning for the inspective or rationalist view. In the actual verbal definition of a triangle there is of course a grammatical subject and a grammatical predicate. The grammatical subject names the intelligible entity "triangle." The predicate then is what names the appropriate components involved, i.e. the straight lines, etc. I say "components involved" rather than "elements or constituents of which a triangle is made" since, as Plato long ago affirmed, to speak strictly the entity "triangle" is not compounded out of elements. (In this way it meets the conditions of being a suitable entity mentioned in the previous section.) Spinoza makes this case using another example, the example of the circle: "the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a centre as a [perceived or imagined] circle has."²

When we say "a triangle has three straight lines" this use of *has* is not such as to mean: "the triangle is made of three straight lines." It means something nearer to, "a triangle *unites* three straight lines." This, I think, is what Kant means when he says that a concept is a unifying act (*Critique*, B81). And so it comes about that we may apprehend a triangle without apprehending the three straight lines. This is the crucial case of non-instantiation, of negative immediacy, or inspecting a bare intellectual entity, a concept, a universal, an idea, a thought. These various terms, to be sure, can bear somewhat different shades of meaning: *concept*, for example, should be reserved only for the purpose of referring to an entity that has been properly defined. But, in all these cases the epithets "bare" and "pure" can be applied, since the fundamental entity or negative immediate is present without its com-

² Spinoza, *Works*, Dover Publications (New York 1951), II, 12.

ponents. This is opposed to the positive immediate or instantiated entity wherein not only the entity is present but also its proper components—and they, in turn, not merely in the form of negative immediates but as themselves instantiated, and so on. This of course would be a full-bodied perception. But returning to our negative immediate we may say that it is on some occasions found *bare* or *pure* and yet that it is something immediate and real, a state of mind that we “actually live through or ‘enjoy,’” as Price required of it (*Comment*, XII, 483).

The concept *triangle*, one may say, is that specific entity which allows us to apprehend three straight lines as a unity. The straight lines are the articulation—or appropriate components—of the triangle, the features that make possible its verbal determination. (The terms *part* and *whole* could perhaps be used if we were careful.) It is this essential characteristic of the concept that prescribes the proper nature of definition. An entity is properly defined in terms of its *components*: in the case of the triangle, three straight lines. The components must in turn be defined in the same manner. Other concepts have their own specific sets of components. Structural definitions are obviously of this kind; as when we define a biological species as having a certain combination of anatomical features. Other kinds of concepts might offer increasing difficulties. Artifacts like bed and tea-cup should, following Plato, probably be defined functionally rather than by structure; but this should also be capable of being reduced to our fundamental kind of definition. Temporal as well as spatial articulation would be possible, as would be the case with such concepts as *acceleration* or *rhythm*.

Of course there are other kinds of definition, but the inspective theory would have to maintain this one as fundamental. It is an open question whether ostensive definition could be completely in principle eliminated. On first thought, one might think that ostensive definition might be needed to define the components or parts. We have already suggested however that the components are themselves in turn amenable to the same kind of definition as the original entity. And so on—how far? With the example of the triangle one would very quickly reach the end, e.g., the concept of the point, which today's mathematicians prefer to regard as

undefined. In the same way it is possible that some residual minimum of ostensive definition might be required. There are some questions here that I am admittedly not certain about. In any case, I do not think we would have to say that "it all comes down to ostensive definition in the end" (Price, *Comment*, XII, 483). For, unlike those of empiricism, the basic entities of this view—or most of them—do not need ostensive definition. In this connection, also, there is not the inevitable "atomism" or reductionism notoriously inherent in some forms of empiricism—although not in Price's. A triangle is not reducible to straight lines, it is *definable in terms* of straight lines. The triangle is as real as its components, the leopard is as real as its spots.

And, contrary to what one might expect of a "rationalist" view, the theory of definition here proposed is tied up intimately with spatio-temporal perception, with the "physical world." This is necessary to the concept's articulation. Furthermore, it is a suitable means for synthesizing a system of knowledge about such "experience." This is because it shares with ostensive definition the advantage of having direct access to the immediate realities of the system; while at the same time avoiding ostensive definition's monovalent nature. For, at the same time as it names its entity, it articulates the entity in terms of other entities (its components) and these in turn to their names, definitions, components, and so on, until ideally all basic realities are intricately woven with language into one single coherent fabric.

Harpur College, State University of New York.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

JOYCE E. MITCHELL AND STAFF

ADCOCK, F. E. *Roman Political Ideas and Practice*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959. vi, 120 pp. \$3.75—Adcock discusses Roman political ideas and practice from the beginnings to the time of Septimius Severus. There is very little in this volume which will seem new or surprising to a reader who possesses a fair knowledge of Roman history. — K. H.

ASOKA. *The Edicts of Asoka*. Edited and translated by N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. xxvii, 69 pp. \$1.75—The edicts expounding *Dharma*—the laws of piety and morality—which the Indian emperor Asoka (fl. 259 B. C.) caused to be inscribed on rocks and pillars set up throughout the kingdom. The editors have rearranged these edicts in an order designed to render them more accessible to the general reader in a clear, readable translation. — L. S. F.

BERGLER, E. *Principles of Self-Damage*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. x, 469 pp. \$6.00—Bergler argues for the all-pervasiveness of a repressed psychic masochism. The argument is supported by a great wealth of clinical material. Nevertheless it seems doubtful whether this quite justifies the sweeping thesis. The writing is somewhat loose and the tone of Bergler's attack on his critics unfortunate. — K. H.

BRACKEN, H. M. *The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism, 1710-1733*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. xii, 123 pp. Guilders 9.50—Bracken finds that the *Principles* was very inadequately reviewed in the first instance, and that excerpts from it in Chambers' *Encyclopedia* may have furnished the source for a number of later attacks on Berkeley. — R. F. T.

BRIDGMAN, P. W. *The Way Things Are*. Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1959. x, 333 pp. \$5.75—This amazing book treats of such diverse topics as verbal analysis, free will, taxation and military service. Its chief concern is to demonstrate the author's conviction that there is "some fundamental ineptness in the way that all of us handle our minds,"

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief résumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgment does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The Summaries and Comments will be written by the Managing Editor and her staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed to this issue by Robert S. Brumbaugh, James J. Cannon, Robert F. Tredwell and Rulon Wells.

especially in the sphere of human relations. While the insights which Bridgman wishes to communicate are arresting, one hardly knows whether they are ridiculous or sublime, as, e.g. when he proposes techniques for making consciousness public. On the whole, imagination and information in this book are inversely proportional. The chapter, "On the Fringes of Psychology" convincingly argues against the behaviorists and for the method of introspection. — J. E. M.

BRIGGS, M. H. *Handbook of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 214 pp. \$4.75—The compiler complains that the standard dictionaries of philosophy "attempt far too lengthy a discussion of too few terms to be of much value to the beginner." His attempt errs on the side of brevity and over-simplification. E.g., paradox is defined as "A statement or belief involving inconsistencies." The Kantian meanings for reason and understanding, representation and intuition, are ignored, and representation and understanding not even listed. — L. S. F.

BUNGE, M. *Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. xx, 380 pp. \$7.50—A clear, thorough, and suggestive study of causality, by one who has an intimate knowledge of both science and philosophy. In the first part the author discusses different formulations of the causal principle and then proceeds to attack the empirical and the romantic views of causality. In the third part of the study the claims for the "linearity," "uni-directionality," "externality" of causality and the impossibility of novelty are critically analyzed. In the last part the author discusses the role of philosophy in modern science, particularly in physics, concluding that the causal principle is . . . a general hypothesis subsumed under the universal principle of determinacy, and having an approximate validity in its proper domain." — K. H.

CALVIN, John. *Tracts and Treatises*. Vol. I: *On the Reformation of the Church*. Vol. II: *On the Doctrine and Worship of the Church*. Vol. III: *In Defence of the Reformed Faith*. Standard Trans. Introduction and historical notes by R. F. Torrance. Grand Rapids: Wm. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1958. 3 Vols. each \$6.00—These volumes contain some of Calvin's lesser known polemical, devotional, and confessional writings as well as some theological and philosophical works. Beza's life of Calvin is also included in Vol. I. — F. E. B.

CAMPANELLA, Tommaso. *Della Grazia Gratificante: Theologicorum Liber XIII*. Critical text and Italian trans. Romano Amerio. Roma: Centro Internazionale di Studi Umanistici, 1959. 227 pp. n. p. — Another careful and scholarly volume of Campanella's 30 volume *Theology*. This one deals with grace, predestination, and free will. Text and translation are on facing pages. — R. D. G.

COLLINS, J. *God in Modern Philosophy*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959. xii, 476 pp. \$6.50—Collins examines the main philosophical approaches, whether positive, negative, or skeptical, which have been

taken towards God since Cusanus, showing the central and often decisive role which the theme of God's existence, nature, and relation to the world has played in this development. It is an ambitious undertaking, and Collins acquits himself well. His survey includes such diverse thinkers as Montaigne, Descartes, Hume and Rousseau, Pascal, Newman, Marx, Mill, and Whitehead. The concise introductory remarks to each chapter are particularly revealing, and the bibliographical references are extensive and up-to-date. — L. S. F.

CURRY & FEYS. *Combinatory Logic*. Vol. I. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1958. xvi, 417 pp. \$11.25—The first volume of a projected two-volume treatise which will provide for the first time a systematic and comprehensive exposition of an important branch of mathematical logic. Previously published research is integrated and revised in the light of later results, and much new material is presented. Highly technical and, even in introductory sections, extraordinarily dense in style, this is a work for specialists. An important contribution. — L. K. B.

DUNCAN, J. E. *The Revival of Metaphysical Poetry: The History of a Style, 1800 to the Present*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959. 227 pp. \$4.50—Duncan traces the renewed interest in the poetry of Donne, Herbert, Marvell, and others, among poets and critics during the past century and a half. — L. S. F.

FELDMAN, A. BRONSON. *The Unconscious in History*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 269 pp. \$4.75—According to the author, most of history is a record of mankind's persistent sacrifice of children. He insists that he has found support for the hypothesis that human nature is formed by a union of the libidinal and destructive instincts. Patriotism and matriotism—devotion to the mother earth—also receive extensive analysis in Freudian terms. The author has an agreeable style. — J. E. M.

FERGUSON, J. *Moral Values in the Ancient World*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1959. 256 pp. \$5.00—Why Christianity, with its conception of *agapé* was successful in winning the allegiance of the late Romans is the question which leads Ferguson to his examination of the Homeric virtues and the Stoic morality. He finds the classical virtues are incapable of "providing that basis for an universal morality for which people were seeking" because they were each linked to a vanished society or failed to reach to the heart of men's moral strivings. His analysis of the pagan virtues is less than sympathetic, though thoughtful and based on considerable learning. — R. F. T.

GLASS, B., TEMKIN, O., and STRAUS, W. L., Jr. *Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. 471 pp. \$6.50—The "History of Ideas" mode of presentation here finds an especially congenial application to the notion of evolution. Among the fifteen papers, five of A. O. Lovejoy's on the idea of evolution are

reprinted with some modifications. Glass contributes a long study of seventeenth and eighteenth century theories of species. — R. F. T.

- GRÜNDER, K. *Figur und Geschichte; Johann Georg Hamanns "Biblische Betrachtungen" als Ansatz einer Geschichtsphilosophie*. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1958. ix, 192 pp.—Gründer examines two basic concepts in Hamann's early thought as they appear in informal reading notes: God's condescension in creation and salvation, and the typological (rather than allegorical) interpretation of Biblical history. Gründer also sketches the theological history of each concept, notes the historical context of its use by Hamann, and discusses its ontological implications in a very well documented account. A pioneer study. — L. S. F.

- HARTMANN, N. *Kleinere Schriften. Band I: Abhandlungen zur systematischen Philosophie*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1955. 318 pp. DM. 26.00—This volume contains eight essays from the years 1933-1949. The first essays deal with ontology and categorial analysis. In the fifth essay Hartmann discussed temporality and substantiality. In the last essays he turns to man, meaning, and the worth of the individual. — K. H.

- HAWLEY, D. *The Nature of Things*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. \$.75—The author argues for a non-sensual reality, basing his arguments on parapsychology, a consideration of prophecies, and not quite digested aspects of modern scientific developments. As Hawley points out, his views may be those of the future; unfortunately his arguments will not make them so.—K. H.

- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. xi, 214 pp. \$3.75 —"Why are there essents rather than nothing?" is the central question of this work. Heidegger here uncovers the meaning of "being" and the history of man's understanding of "being," mainly through a discussion of the origin and overtones of the pertinent Greek and German terms. The style is difficult; the translation on the whole satisfactory. — R. D. G.

- HELMER, O., and RESCHER, N. *On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences*. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1958. v, 66 pp. n. p.—On the basis of a re-examination of the status of laws, evidence, confirmation, prediction and explanation in sciences, social as well as physical, in which the reasoning processes are not fully formalized—this informative, pioneering monograph sketches a new epistemological orientation. It emphasizes the development of specifically predictive instrumentalities, regarding which new possibilities are explored and further areas of research suggested. — L. K. B.

- HESIOD. *The Works and Days; Theogony; The Shield of Herakles*. Trans. by Richmond Lattimore and illustrated by Richard Wilt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959. 241 pp. \$3.95—Evelyn-White

(Loeb), Mair, and Brown all translated Hesiod into prose; Lattimore now offers us a very readable translation in blank verse. He writes, as Robert Lowell remarked, "the most accurate verse translations in the language." An attractive and refreshing volume. — L. S. F.

HIRSCHBERGER, J. *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, trans. A. N. Fuerst, S. T. D. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1959. vii, 752 pp. \$9.50 —This second volume (see the Review for the first XII, 4 June, 1959) contains a section on American philosophy by D. A. Gallagher. — R. F. T.

KEMENY, J. G. *A philosopher Looks at Science*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959. xii, 273 pp.—This elementary introduction aims "to present a unified picture of Science"; it shows little concern for serious argument or alternative positions. — L. K. B.

KRIKORIAN, Y. H. and EDEL, A. *Contemporary Philosophic Problems*. New York: Macmillan, 1959. xi, 712 pp. \$ —An introductory text which relies on the intrinsic excellence of short pieces. Husserl, Bergson, Whitehead, Quine, Lewis, Tillich, Scheler, and Sartre are represented by ten-to-fifteen-page excerpts or articles. — R. F. T.

LOEWENBERG, J. *Reason and the Nature of Things: Reflections on the Cognitive Function of Philosophy*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1959. xvi, 382 pp. \$4.50—Beginning with a discussion of the necessity of faith in reason, these Carus Lectures call attention to the fact that philosophy possesses a "reflexive" and a "non-reflexive subject-matter." In this latter respect it is like science, differing from it, however, in that it possesses a generic import." The author then goes on to develop his theory of "Dialectical Pluralism," grounding his argument mainly on a critical examination of Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Leibniz, and Hegel. — K. H.

LYNCH, WILLIAM F., S. J. *An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato Through the Parmenides*. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1959. xiii, 255 pp. \$6.00—A provocative and original interpretation of the *Parmenides* as constructive, positive metaphysics. By bringing together the speculative enthusiasm of the continental tradition with the more patient analysis of English scholarship Lynch has opened up a new line of inquiry and discussion. — R. S. B.

MCINTYRE, J. *The Christian Doctrine of History*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957. viii, 119 pp. \$2.50—McIntyre defines history as "meaningful occurrence, and more particularly occurrence the meaning of which is a construct out of certain categories, namely, Necessity, Providence, Incarnation, Freedom and Memory." — F. E. B.

MARTIN, WM. OLIVER. *Metaphysics and Ideology: The Aquinas Lecture, 1959*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959. 104 pp. \$2.50 —An interesting attempt to distinguish metaphysics from ideology. The former is a systematic, autonomous, adequate, historical basic theoretical science. Ideology, in contrast, is an art. — R. D. G.

- MALCOLM, Norman. *Dreaming*. New York: Humanities Press, 1959. vii, 128 pp. \$2.50—Malcolm spends a good part of this short essay discussing what it could possibly mean if someone were to say, "I know that I am asleep." He concludes that such an utterance is not meaningful, that no assertions or judgments can be made in dreams, but that reports of dreams may be accepted without attempted verification. Aristotle's and Descartes views on dreaming are briefly examined. — J. E. M.
- MERCIER, A. *Thought and Being: An Inquiry into the Nature of Knowledge*. Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1959. x, 156 pp. N. P.—Equidistant from the analysts and the existentialists, the author attempts to analyze the nature of knowledge in the light of science, art, and morality. Mercier differentiates between "judicial" and "essential" or "mystical" knowledge, both being genuine apprehensions of truth. The greater part of the study is concerned with the former which is discussed in its "discursive," "idealistic," "pragmatic," and "formal" aspects. — K. H.
- PARKER, F. H. and VEATCH, H. B. *Logic as a Human Instrument*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. xviii, 422 pp. \$5.50—A textbook of formal logic which uses a semantical method to present logic to the student as an integral part of life and philosophy—in this case, moderate realism. The authors greatly enrich the traditional treatment of signs, terms, propositions, syllogisms and inductive arguments with discussions of recent developments in logic. — J. J. C.
- PASCH, A. *Experience and the Analytic: A Reconsideration of Empiricism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. xvii, 275 pp. \$6.50—A critique of modern empiricism, pressed ploddingly but capably from a renovated pragmatist standpoint. In Part I the author argues that a rigid distinction between the analytic and synthetic is presupposed by empiricism and yet leads to a conventionalism out of touch with experience. Part II attacks various attempts to base knowledge on perceptual experience. The constructive position developed in Part III stresses the concept of experience as a plurality of contextual happenings, always involving formal and nonformal elements; the formal structure is held to rest on conventions which should remain flexible, varying according to purposes. Though often clumsy, cluttered, and over-abstract, the discussion is informed and perceptive. — L. K. B.
- PIERSOL, Wesley. *La Valeur dans la philosophie de Louis Lavelle*. Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1959. 101 pp. n. p.—An uncritical presentation of Lavelle's theory of value. Though the author rightly attempts to relate Lavelle's axiology to his psychology and ontology, the relation of value to Lavelle's philosophy as a whole remains sketchy. — R. D. G.
- Plotini Opera*, Tomus II, *Enneades IV-V*. Ediderunt Paul Henry et Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer. *Plotiniana Arabica ad codicum fidem anglice vertit Geoffrey Lewis*. (Museum lessianum, Series philosophica XXXIV.)

- Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et C^o, and Brussels: l'Édition universelle, s. a., 1959.—The first volume, including *Enneads* I-III, was reviewed by Harold Cherniss in this review, VI: 2, 239-52 (Dec. 1952). Presumably a third volume including *Enneads* VI will complete this edition. Besides the text and the scholarly adjuncts, the present volume gives an English translation by G. Lewis of passages in three Arabic works which are more or less translations or paraphrases of passages in *Enneads* IV and V: the "*Theology of Aristotle*," the "Letter on Divine Knowledge," and the "Sayings of a Greek Sage." Editorial clarity and typography are superb. — R. W.
- REGIS, L. M. *Epistemology*. trans. by I. C. Byrne. New York: Macmillan, 1959. xiv, 549 pp. \$6.50—While claiming merit primarily for pedagogical clarity and usefulness, this exposition of St. Thomas' opinions on knowledge and truth also tries to delineate the boundary between neo-scholastic, and Cartesian and Kantian epistemology. — R. F. T.
- RUNES, D. D. *A Dictionary of Thought*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 152 pp. \$5.00—Selections by Runes from his own writings, arranged alphabetically from "abhorrence" to "zero." It is hard to understand why this should cost as much as \$5.00. — L. S. F.
- SAUSGRUBER, K. *Atom und Zelle: Ein Beitrag zur Erörterung des Leib-Seele-Problems*. Freiburg: Herder, 1958. 228 pp. n. p.—Written by a chemist, this is a stimulating book. Following somewhat the line taken by men like P. Jordan, Sausgruber argues that "Democritean," mechanistic principles cannot account for life. This phenomenon forces us to look for a non-material spiritual element, which, the author believes, points to a supreme spirit. — K. H.
- SCHWEITZER, Albert. *The Light Within Us*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 58 pp. \$2.75—A selection of brief, half-page reflections and observations culled from Schweitzer's major works. — L. S. F.
- SMART, N. *Reasons and Faiths; an Investigation of Religious Discourse, Christian and Non-Christian*. New York: The Humanities Press, 1959. 211 pp. \$5.00—In applying a sophisticated version of "ordinary language" analysis to comparative religion, Smarty offers us a highly perceptive account of the inner logic and the principles of justification for religious doctrines. He distinguishes three fundamental doctrinal strands, the mystical, the numinous, and the incarnational, uncovering the demands that each imposes upon the others. — L. S. F.
- STOTT, J. R. W. *Basic Christianity*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans' Publishing Co., 1958. 144 pp. \$1.25—This popularly written apologetical work stresses the character, claim, and deeds of Jesus Christ in relation to man's need and potential response. — F. E. B.
- THURSTONE, L. L. *The Measurement of Values*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959. viii, 322 pp. \$7.50—There is not much

in this collection of 27 technical papers, heretofore available only in journals, which would be of interest to the philosopher. With an inclination towards an empirical ethics, however, one might appreciate Thurstone's discussion of the measurement of social values. — J. E. M.

TILlich, Paul. *Theology of Culture*. ed. R. C. Kimball. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. ix, 213 pp. \$4.00—This collection of essays is an extended discussion of the relation between religion and culture.

Tillich, in defining religion in terms of ultimate concern, cuts across, and at times seems to undercut, traditional views about religion. "Religion is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself." His analyses, although oversimplified in certain respects, point out important inter-relationships and offer suggestive interpretations. — F. E. B.

VAN ZANDT, R. *The Metaphysical Foundations of American History*. 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1959. 269 pp. n. p.—Van Zandt finds that the theoretical structures upon which the study of American history have been based are no longer adequate to explain America's role in our complex and organically unified Western society. This theoretical structure has been rarely consciously held or critically examined because it asserts itself as a fact rather than as a theory and maintains that the facts may be ascertained irrespective of any theoretical construction. This anti-theoretical attitude was inherent in the idea of the American Revolution, which sought to restore the "natural" order of society—a multiplicity of independent societies—freed from the political and theoretical encrustations of the centuries. A large part of the book is devoted to Jefferson's role in crystalizing this "anti-theoretical" theoretical structure which remains dominant even today. A fresh venture written in a style not quite fully articulate or sufficiently concise. — L. S. F.

WEISS, Paul. *Our Public Life*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959. 269 pp. \$4.50—In a very readable book Weiss presents a political philosophy which escapes easy categorization, for he at once believes in natural, social and positive law, laws of nature, and Laws of Civilization, all of which, he claims, are necessary ingredients of our public life. These categories of law appear to be exhaustive, although no reason is given to prove that they are. Weiss is concerned not only with the function of existing laws, but also with laws which ought to be recognized if certain goals of societies are accepted. A systematic treatment of political entities in which, happily, both individuals and groups find a role. — J. E. M.

WHITCOMB, J. C., Jr. *Darius the Mede: A Study in Historical Identification*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1959. x, 84 pp. \$2.75—An attempt to justify the historical references to Darius the Mede in the Book of Daniel. — K. H.

ZARAGÜETA. *Los Veinte Temas Que He Cultivado en Los Cincuenta Anos de Mi Labor Filosófica*. Madrid: Instituto Luis Vives de Filosofía, 1958. 177 pp. n. p.—A dry record, without argument, of conclusions reached on a wide variety of topics through fifty years of scholastic philosophizing. — L. K. B.

La Filosofia Contemporanea in Italia: Societa e Filosofia di Oggi in Italia. Roma: Instituto di Filosofia della Universita, 1958. 572 pp. L. 4.800 —This volume—one of several in a series on contemporary philosophy in Italy and in the U. S.—presents the principal philosophic and cultural currents in Italy through the works of representative writers. The coverage of philosophy is quite complete. Besides the expected articles on Croce, Gentile, existentialism, neo-scholasticism, and the philosophy of history, there are, among others, articles on analytic philosophy, marxism, and the philosophy of science. The appendix supplies information on Italian philosophic centers, organizations, and journals, as well as brief biographies of the contributors. — R. D. G.

Logica. Studia Paul Bernays Dedicata. Neuchatel, Switzerland: Editions du Griffon, 1959. (Bibliothèque scientifique 34) 296 pp./Sfr. 25—Eighteen articles concerning modern logic by Ackermann, Carnap, Curry, Gödel, Heyting, among others, reprinted from the double issue (Vol. XII, 3, 4) of the review *Dialectica* for 1958. — L. S. F.

Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy. ed. Sidney Hook. New York: New York University Press, 1959. xiii, 370 pp. \$5.00—A fine symposium comprising the Proceedings of the second annual NYU Institute of Philosophy, this volume is divided into four parts: Psychoanalysis and Scientific Method; Psychoanalysis and Society; Psychoanalysis and Philosophy; Discussion, Criticism, and Contributions by other Participants. — J. E. M.

LAMONT, C. *The Illusion of Immortality*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. xv, 303 pp. \$3.95. Third edition.

WEISS, Johannes. *Earliest Christianity: A History of the Period A. D. 30-150*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959. I: xxx, 395 pp. \$1.95. II: viii, 471 pp. \$2.25—Formerly entitled *The History of Primitive Christianity*, this book is reprinted with a new introduction and bibliography by F. C. Grant.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1959

Boston University

JACK F. PADGETT, "The Concept of Personality in William Temple's Philosophy." Adviser: P. A. Bertocci.

RALPH L. RUHLEN, "The Relationship of the Economic Order to the Moral Ideal in the Philosophy of Maritain, Brunner, Dewey, and Temple." Adviser: P. A. Bertocci.

Brown University

MYRON G. ANDERSON, "Language and Ontology." Adviser: Wesley C. Salmon.

CARLTON H. GREGORY, "The Problem of Descriptive Religious Statements with Special Reference to the Thought of Paul Tillich." Adviser: Roderick G. Chisholm.

University of California (Los Angeles)

GEORGE T. DICKIE, "A Critical Interpretation and Evaluation of the Main Features of the Moral Sense Philosophy of Francis Hutcheson as Presented in his *Inquiry*, *Essay*, and *Illustrations* with an Analysis of the Previous Criticism of These Features." Adviser: D. A. Piatt.

ROBERT L. MATHERS, "The Nature of Logical Necessity: An Examination of a Contemporary Controversy." Adviser: Rudolf Carnap.

The Catholic University of America

REV. PATRICK J. ASPELL, O. M. I., M. A., "A Thomistic Critique of Trans-subjectivity in Recent American Realism." Adviser: Very Rev. George C. Reilly, O. P.

EDWARD M. CASE, "A Critique of the Formative Thought Underlying Francis Suarez's Concept of Being." Adviser: Rt. Rev. Charles A. Hart.

University of Chicago

RICHARD BURKE, "George Herbert Mead and Harry Stack Sullivan: A Study in the Relations between Philosophy and Psychology." Adviser: Manley Thompson.

JOSEPH L. COWAN, "On Explanations of the Foundations of Logic." Adviser: Manley Thompson.

WALTER R. GOEDECKE, "Rights, Interests, and the Constitution: A Study of Jurisprudence of Mr. Justice Stephen Johnson Field." Advisers: Abram L. Harris and Warner Wick.

HENRY MOULDS, "John Locke's Theory of Natural Law." Adviser: Alan Gewirth.

SIANO-FANG SUN, "Semiotical Analysis of the Language of Science." Advisers: Henry Mehlberg, Charles Morris, and Robert Palter.

WALTER WATSON, "Nature and Action." Adviser: Warner Wick.

Columbia University

PETER A. ANGELES, "S. F. Stout's Philosophy of Common Sense Animism." Adviser: John H. Randall, Jr.

JOHN BURR, "Three Dimensions of Philosophic Intelligence Private, Public, and Visional in the Philosophies of Warner Fite, John Dewey, and George Santayana." Adviser: John H. Randall, Jr.

WILLIAM J. CALLAGHAN, "The Philosophy of Frances Ellingwood Abbot." Adviser: Joseph L. Blau.

ARTHUR W. COLLINS, "The Logical Structure of Explanatory Argument with Special Reference to History." Adviser: Ernest Nagel.

DAVID A. GIVNER, "George Berkeley's Theory of Linguistic Meaning." Adviser: Justus Buchler.

GEORGE GOE, "Empiricism and Geometry in Hobbes and Locke." Adviser: Ernest Nagel.

MARTIN P. GOLDING, "Community, Covenant and Reason: A Study in Jewish Legal Philosophy." Adviser: Joseph L. Blau.

JUDITH JARVIS, "Necessity and Meaning." Adviser: Ernest Nagel.

DONALD R. LOFTSGORDON, "Retributive Morality and Its Alternatives." Adviser: Charles Frankel.

JANEVIVE N. MECHANIC, "Cournot's Probablism." Adviser: Ernest Nagel.

WILLIAM W. PAUL, "Paul Tillich's Interpretation of History." Adviser: John H. Randall, Jr.

JACK PUSTILNIK, "Process and Causality: Whitehead's Reply to Hume." Adviser: John H. Randall, Jr.

CHAUNCEY C. RIDDLE, "Karl Pearson's Philosophy of Science." Adviser: Ernest Nagel.

HOWARD E. SMOKLER, "Scientific Concepts and Philosophical Theory: An Essay in the Philosophy of W. K. Clifford." Adviser: Ernest Nagel.

FRANK A. TILLMAN, "Truth and Meaning: Some Concepts at Issue in Contemporary Anglo-American Philosophy." Adviser: Ernest Nagel.

JOSEPH N. UEMURA, "A Critique of the Case for Small Community." Adviser: Horace L. Friess.

RUDOLPH H. WEINGARTNER, "Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel." Adviser: James Gutmann.

Cornell University

SYDNEY S. SHOEMAKER, "Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity." Adviser: Norman Malcolm.

Duke University

RENA J. PATTE, "George Berkeley's Theory of Language." Adviser: Bernard Peach.

Emory University

JOHN W. DAVIS, "Value and Individuality: An Inquiry Into the Worth of the Human Person." Adviser: Charles Hartshorne.

Fordham University

DONALD A. DRENNEN, "The Oppositionist Character of Nicholas Berdyaev's Philosophy." Adviser: Robert C. Pollock.

ROQUE FERRIOLS, S. J., "The Psychic Entity in Aurobindo's *The Life Divine*." Adviser: W. Norris Clarke, S. J.

JOSEPH GERRY, O. S. B., "Kierkegaard: The Problem of Transcendence; An Interpretation of the Stages." Adviser: Quentin Lauer, S. J.

FLORENCE M. HETZLER, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature: The Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on Book One of the Physics of Aristotle." Adviser: Quentin Lauer, S. J.

JOHN J. MC DERMOTT, "Experience is Pedagogical: The Genesis and Essence of the American Nineteenth Century Notion of Experience." Adviser: Robert C. Pollock.

REV. EDWARD J. O'TOOLE, "The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Schools of Language Analysis." Adviser: W. Norris Clarke, S. J.

Georgetown University

REV. JOHN R. KANDA, C. S. Sp., "Certain Intellectual Operations and the Neo-Scholastic Manuals." Adviser: Edward Hanrahan, S. J.

REV. ROBERT R. KLINE, "The Present Status of Value Theory in the United States." Adviser: Rudolph Allers.

Harvard University

STEFAN S. BRECHT, "The Place of Natural Science in Hegel's Philosophy."

JULIUS M. E. MORAVCSIK, "Meaning and Being in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*."

THOMAS E. PATTON, "An Examination of Reference."

DAVID S. SCARROW, "The Origin and Development of Bradley's *Logic*."

JOE W. SWANSON, "Some Aspects of the Doctrine of Emergence."

ZENO VENDLER, "Facts and Laws."

John Hopkins University

- WILLIAM FREDERICK WABER, Jr., "The Roles of Reason and Sentiment in Hume's Doctrine of the Social Virtues." Adviser: Kingsley Price and Albert L. Hammond.

University of Michigan

- AMEDIO W. ARMENTI, "Intuitionistic Criticisms of the Ethical Theories of Bradley and Green." Adviser: William P. Alston.

- WILLIAM TODD, "An Image Theory of Meaning." Adviser: Charles L. Stevenson.

University of Minnesota

- ROBERT WILLIAMS BINKLEY, "Moral Reasoning." Adviser: W. S. Sellars.
- RIGOBERTO JUAREZ-PAZ, "Studies in Twentieth Century Spanish Philosophy." Adviser: W. S. Sellars.

Northwestern University

- EDWARD COSTELLO, "The Problem of Evil in Plotinus, Aquinas and Leibniz." Adviser: W. A. Earle.

- JAMES B. HARTMAN, "A Gestalt Theory of Musical Perception." Adviser: D. N. Morgan.

University of Notre Dame

- JOHN H. HADDOX, "Reasons for the Importance of a Philosophical Study of Some of the Basic Principles of the Living World." Adviser: V. E. Smith.

- FRANCIS L. KEEGAN, "The Development of Jacques Maritain's Conception of Christian Philosophy: 1910-1929." Adviser: Rev. L. R. Ward, C. S. C.

- DAONALD ARTHUR O'GRADY, "A Metaphysics of Beauty." Adviser: J. F. Anderson.

University of Pennsylvania

- JOHN SWERGART, "The Epistemological Status of Ethical Statements for David Hume and C. I. Lewis." Adviser: Elizabeth F. Flower.

Princeton University

- JOHN H. BROWN, "F. H. Bradley's Theory of Judgment (with special reference to the *Principles of Logic*)." Adviser: H. Putnam.

- FRITHJOF H. BERGMANN, "Harmony and Reason, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hegel." Adviser: W. Kaufmann.

Radcliffe College

- ELLEN S. HARING, "Substantial Form in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*."

- INGRID H. STADLER, "An Explication of Kant's Analysis of Beauty."

Saint Louis University

- FRANCIS J. CATANIA, "Divine Infinity According to Albert the Great's Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*." Adviser: Charles L. Sweeney, S. J.
- HOWARD R. DELANEY, "The Doctrine of Four Term Analogy in Aristotle." Adviser: Leonard J. Eslick.
- WILLIAM S. HAYMOND, "Hume's Theory of Sense Perception." Adviser: James D. Collins.
- REV. WILTON H. KENNEY, S. J., "John Locke and the Oxford Training in Logic and Metaphysics." Adviser: James D. Collins.
- SISTER JANE KOENEN, S. S. J., "Human Operations and Their Finalities in Saint Thomas Aquinas." Adviser: Vernon J. Bourke.
- REV. DONALD W. KRAUS, "Toward a Realistic Theory of Moral Value: A Constructive Study of Perry, Vivas and T. V. Smith." Adviser: Vernon J. Bourke.
- REV. RONALD D. LAWLER, O. F. M., Cap., "The Moral Judgment in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy." Adviser: Vernon J. Bourke.
- REV. FRANCIS E. REILLY, S. J., "The Method of the Sciences According to Charles Sanders Peirce." Adviser: James D. Collins.

University of Toronto

- E. B. ALLEN, "The Notion of Being in Hervaeus Natalis." Adviser: E. Gilson.
- S. M. ENGEL, "The Philosophy of Language in Hobbes and Locke: A Comparative Study." Adviser: F. E. Sparshott.
- L. A. KENNEDY, "Abstraction and Illumination in the Doctrine of St. Albert the Great." Adviser: E. Gilson.
- E. D. MC CORMACK, "Frederick Matthias Alexander and John Dewey: A Neglected Influence." Adviser: T. A. Goudge.

University of Virginia

- STANLEY G. FRENCH, "Concepts, Meaning and Meta-ethics." Adviser: D. C. Yalden-Thomson.
- ARNOLD B. LEVISON, "Proof and the Case-by-Case Procedure." Adviser: S. F. Barker.

University of Washington (Seattle)

- PETER E. RADCLIFF, "The Paradigm Case Argument as an Existence Proof." Adviser: A. F. Smullyan.
- GERALD A. RUDOLPH, "The Affective Criticism of I. A. Richards." Adviser: M. M. Rader.

- WILLIAM F. UNSOELD, "Mysticism, Morality and Freedom: The Role of the Vital Impetus in Bergson's Theory of Ethics." Adviser: P. Dietrichson.

Yale University

- DOUGLAS C. BERGGREN, "An Analysis of Metaphorical Meaning and Truth." Adviser: Charles Hendel.
- RICHARD T. DEGEORGE, "Solitude and Communion: A Study of Their Meaning and Relation in Human Existence." Adviser: Paul Weiss.
- PAUL JACQUES ROY DIT DESJARDINS, "The Form of Platonic Inquiry." Adviser: Robert Calhoun.
- EARL R. HUMBERT, "Moral Language, Grading, and the Prescriptivist Program." Adviser: Nathaniel Lawrence.
- CHARLES LANDESMAN, Jr. "The Concept of Form in Four Philosophies of Logic." Adviser: Rulon S. Wells.
- JOHN W. MATTERN, "The Problem of a Monistic Ontology." Adviser: Paul Weiss.
- FERNANDO R. MOLINA, "Whitehead's Realism in Relation to the Problem of Perception." Adviser: Nathaniel Lawrence.
- ROBERT A. NEIDORF, "Bifurcation and Events: A Study in Einstein, Russell, and Whitehead." Adviser: F. S. C. Northrop.
- BENJAMIN A. RICHARDS, "The Inalienability of Traditional Individual Rights." Adviser: Charles Hendel.
- FREDERICK M. STOUTLAND, "The Structure of Historical Knowledge." Adviser: John E. Smith.
- WILLIAM W. TAIT, "The Theory of Partial Recursive Operators." Adviser: Frederic B. Fitch.
- KHIN MAUNG WIN, "Some Philosophical Problems in Contemporary Burma." Adviser: F. S. C. Northrop.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

An International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science will be held at Stanford University from August 24 to September 2, 1960, under the auspices of the *International Union for History and Philosophy of Science*. The closing date for submission of abstracts of contributed papers is March 1, 1960. Information about membership fees and other details of the Congress may be obtained by writing Professor Patrick Suppes, Serra House, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

The American Council of Learned Societies is exploring the possibility of expanding the present agreement on cultural, technical, and educational exchanges between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Scholars in any of the disciplines included in the constituency of the ACLS who would be interested in carrying on research in the Soviet Union should provide as much detail as possible concerning the projected research in directing information and queries to Frederick Burkhardt, President, American Council of Learned Societies, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York.

The *Graduate Review of Philosophy* has compiled a bibliography of the philosophical articles published in American and British journals during 1958. Interested persons may write the GRP, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 14, Minn.

OUR PUBLIC LIFE

by Paul Weiss

"Dr. Weiss's prose is spare, tight, and conveys in its 244 pages more than many a less disciplined book does in thrice the wordage."

Ward Madden in *Saturday Review*.

". . . a rigorously reasoned, gracefully written, and tensely persuasive essay. . . ."

C. P. Ives.

In this, his latest book, Paul Weiss turns his attention to the nature of the state and society, and man's role within them. He examines the kinds of classes which should constitute an ideal society, and makes a searching study of man's native rights, the problem of sovereignty, the nature of positive and natural law, and the function, limitations and prospects of civilization. Part of the work was presented as the Mahlon Powell lectures at Indiana University in January, 1958.

"His book tackles those problems which Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau tackled. They are still exciting problems, and in facing them Weiss's thought is as tightly disciplined as his vision is grand."

Newsweek.

\$4.50

At your bookstore, or order from

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

BLOOMINGTON

*Two books by MICHAEL POLANYI
distinguished scientist and philosopher*

THE STUDY OF MAN

These three liberal essays—"Understanding Ourselves," "The Calling of Man," and "Understanding History"—set forth Michael Polanyi's principal ideas about the inseparability of fact and value. This volume provides an excellent short introduction to his longer books and extends the line of thought they represent. \$1.75

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

Michael Polanyi believes and demonstrates logically that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge is an indispensable part of science itself. His book should help restore science to its rightful place in an integrated culture, as part of the person's lifelong endeavor to make sense of the whole of his experience. \$6.75

Through your bookseller

UNIVERSITY OF



Chicago PRESS

5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois

IN CANADA: The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Ontario

JUST PUBLISHED

PHILOSOPHY AND ARGUMENT

By HENRY W. JOHNSTONE, JR., *Associate Professor of Philosophy*

The Pennsylvania State University

Most philosophers argue but few stop to consider the reasons for doing so. In *Philosophy and Argument* Dr. Johnstone examines the role of argument in philosophy, both as a response to philosophical disagreement and as a way of reaching philosophical conclusions. He discusses the possibility of distinguishing philosophical argumentation from both rhetoric and formal inference and develops the notion of a valid philosophical argument. This notion he uses as the basis for a classification of the arguments of philosophers.

The author singles out Hume's arguments concerning causal necessity for detailed scrutiny and explores the nature of the oppositions among opposing philosophical systems. Dr. Johnstone also treats the properties of philosophical arguments as pointing toward a view of human nature.

\$4.00

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

UNIVERSITY PARK, PENNSYLVANIA

Have you discovered

DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

THE QUARTERLY by which intellectuals in all fields keep in touch with one another. Each issue contains eight to ten major articles and is built largely around a single unifying theme.

Fall 1959 Issue, "Quantity and Quality"

CONTENTS

- Mathematics Without Numbers, *by John G. Kemeny.*
Quality and Quantity in Quantum Physics, *by Victor F. Weisskopf.*
The Quantification of Sensation, *by S. S. Stevens.*
Quantity and Quality in Economic Analysis, *by Wassily Leontief.*
The Qualitative and the Quantitative in Political and Legal Analysis, *by Harold D. Lasswell.*
Is Preventive Psychiatry Possible?, *by Laurence S. Kubie.*
The Impact of Science and Technology on International Politics, *by Karl W. Deutsch.*
The Pastoral of the Self, *by Renato Poggioli.*
The Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, *by Clarence Morris.*
On Emerson, *by Robert Frost.*

"DÆDALUS has suddenly catapulted its way into the front rank of our intellectual magazines."—
GEORGE N. SHUSTER.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PRESS
Middletown, Connecticut


☐ Please enter my subscription to DÆDALUS as follows ... 1 year \$4.50 ... 2 years \$8.00 ... 3 years \$11.50

☐ Please send me only the issue "Quantity and Quality" a \$1.25

Payment herewith Bill me

NAME:

ADDRESS:



"Barth's most significant contribution to historical theology"
from the Introduction by JAROSLAV PELIKAN, University of Chicago

Protestant Thought

FROM ROUSSEAU TO RITSCHL

By KARL BARTH



"An invaluable, indeed one must say, indispensable, introduction to the most powerful and influential theological mind of this century. From here on, this is the obligatory *sine qua non* to discussion let alone criticism of Karl Barth. Indeed, it is the only appropriate starting point until the day comes, if ever, when he writes his autobiography. Any serious student of Barth must wish to follow the intellectual pilgrimage which formed and determined the mind of the master-theologian of our day. It can now be made under Barth's own guidance."—HENRY PITNEY VAN DUSEN.

"This is my favorite among Barth's books. It shows clearly how inadequate is the image of Karl Barth in this country, how much greater he is than the 'Barthians' have made him appear."—PAUL TILICH. \$7.00

At your bookseller

HARPER & BROTHERS, N. Y. 16

Celebrating Our Fiftieth Number

DECEMBER, 1959

The Review of Metaphysics

offers a special subscription rate to individuals
(including non-subscribers):

TWO YEARS FOR TEN DOLLARS

THE REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS

A Philosophical Quarterly

202 Linsly Hall, Yale University. NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

BJPS

THE BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Contents for August 1959

ARTICLES

- | | |
|---|--|
| Epistemology and Scientific Strategy: | R. F. J. WITHERS |
| Origin Explanations and the Origin of Life: | F. B. EBERSOLE and M. M. SHREWSBURY |
| Sources of Scepticism in Atomic Theory: | GERD BUCHDAHL |
| Epistemology as an Aid to Science: Comments on Dr. Buchdahl's Paper: | J. AGASSI |

Annual Subscription 42s, single copies 10s 6d, postage 6d

PARKSIDE WORKS

NELSON

EDINBURGH 9

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Contents for Volume 9, No. 36, July 1959

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| I. THE CONTENT OF KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT, I: | John R. Silber |
| II. PROPOSALS ON THE LOGIC OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS: | Joseph Margolis |
| III. NOTES ON THE LOGIC OF NATURAL NUMBERS: | G. D. Duthie |
| IV. PROFESSOR MALCOLM ON DREAMING AND SCEPTICISM, II: | R. M. Yost, Jr. |
| V. METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE: | C. H. Whiteley |
| VI. RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, AND THE A PRIORI: | Asher Moore |
| VII. DISCUSSIONS: VALUES AND IDEAL-LANGUAGE MODELS: ON NOT SEEING DOUBLE: | W. D. Zarecor D. C. Blumenfeld |
| VIII. CRITICAL STUDY: <i>The Self as Agent.</i> By John Macmurray: | D. D. Raphael |
| IX. BOOK REVIEWS. | |

*Published for the Scots Philosophical Club
by the University of St. Andrews*

Price twenty-four shillings per annum (in America \$4.00) through booksellers or agents. Orders placed directly with the Treasurer (The University, St. Andrews, Scotland) will be accepted at the subscription price of £1 per annum. Subscribers in U. S. A. should send their orders, \$3.00 per annum, to the Assistant Treasurer (Mr. V. C. Chappell, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, Chicago, 37, Illinois).

IMPRIMERIE

Georges Thone

Specialist in the printing
of periodicals

Careful and speedy execution
of works in English, French,
and other languages

Quotations on request



The Review of Metaphysics

is printed by the:

IMPRIMERIE GEORGES THONE

Liege (Belgium)



11-15, RUE DE LA COMMUNE, LIEGE
(BELGIUM)

ANNOUNCING YALE PAPERBOUNDS

An exciting new entry into the quality paperbound field.

| | | |
|------------------------------|---|---------------|
| Henry Steele Commager | The American Mind | \$1.45 |
| Paul Tillich | The Courage To Be | .95 |
| Erich Fromm | Psychoanalysis and Religion | .95 |
| Roscoe Pound | An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law | .95 |
| Carl Becker | The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers | .95 |
| Etienne Gilson | God and Philosophy | .95 |
| Thurman Arnold | The Folklore of Capitalism | 1.45 |
| Maxim Gorky | The Lower Depths and Other Plays | 1.25 |
| Iris Murdoch | Sartre | .95 |
| Roy Campbell | Lorca | .95 |
| Eugene O'Neill | A Touch of the Poet * | .95 |
| A. Whitney Griswold | Liberal Education and the Democratic Ideal * | .95 |

* Already published.

At your Bookstore
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut

SUSTAINING INSTITUTIONS

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
COLLEGE OF SAINT ROSE
EMORY UNIVERSITY
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY
FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
LEHIGH UNIVERSITY
MONMOUTH COLLEGE
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
SMITH COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
TULANE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
YALE UNIVERSITY

